

# DIASPORA, CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION AND SKILLS MOBILITY

**A FOCUS  
ON AFRICA**



AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP  
GROUPE DE LA BANQUE AFRICAINE  
DE DEVELOPPEMENT



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African Development Bank Group  
Avenue Joseph Anoma, BP 1387  
Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire  
Tel: +225 2720263900  
Website: www.afdb.org

AND

International Organization for Migration  
17 route des Morillons  
P.O. Box 17  
1211 Geneva 19  
Switzerland  
Tel.: +41 22 717 9111  
Fax: +41 22 798 6150  
Email: [hq@iom.int](mailto:hq@iom.int)  
Website: [www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int)

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The preparation of the report was supervised by Linguère Mously Mbaye, Principal Fragility and Resilience officer at the AfDB, and Naomi Shiferaw, Senior Thematic Specialist on Labor Mobility and Social Inclusion at IOM. The core team comprised Jerome Berndt (AfDB), Miriam Siun (AfDB), Cecile de Muynck (IOM), and Fiorella Vargas (IOM).

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# Foreword

**G**lobal migration is one of the most pressing issues of our time. Often couched in negative terms, migration can also be a force for positive change and development, if its power is harnessed for the benefit of all.

Against this backdrop, we are proud to publish this joint study between the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) that explores the evolving migration dynamics in Africa.

This collaboration exemplifies our shared and passionate commitment to maximizing the benefits of regular migration and to tackling vulnerabilities resulting from forced displacement. Through rigorous research and analysis, we address the critical intersections of diaspora engagement, climate-induced migration and skills mobility to provide insights and recommendations that aim to leverage the boundless potential of Africa's human and economic capital.

The «Diaspora Engagement, Climate-Induced Migration and Skills Mobility» study meticulously illustrates that when well-managed, migration can be a powerful impetus for human development and poverty reduction. It can foster sustainable and equitable economies by introducing innovation, skills, knowledge, and remittances between the countries of origin and destination.

Migration management, however, requires collaboration. Solutions need to be tailored to local realities and circumstances. As we navigate the profound impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the imperative for informed and inclusive policies becomes ever more evident. In this context, the study aims to guide development partners, policymakers, and a wide variety of stakeholders toward strategic interventions that prioritize regular migration and mitigate the harm arising from forced displacement.

For instance, the report explores how the African diaspora can contribute to the development of the African continent and the advancement of African influence globally. It examines ways to nurture a new coordinated era of diaspora engagement on the continent.

It focuses on the crucial interrelatedness of climate change and migration. The international community has been slow to address this connectivity. The insights and key areas discussed here serve as starting points to strategically plan and build resilience among Africa's most vulnerable populations, with the potential of transforming the social and economic landscapes of African countries.

In addition, the report takes a deep dive into how Africa can liberalize the flow of human capital across its borders to contribute to the skills development of host and destination countries. The current mismatches between skills and market needs across the continent highlights the importance of intra-African labor mobility as a mechanism for capitalizing the comparative advantages of each country. In doing so, Africa can significantly close the skills gaps.

The African Development Bank Group and the International Organization for Migration are dedicated to addressing Africa's multi-faceted challenges and fostering development. We believe there is a clear imperative for both of our institutions to pool our respective strengths together to help build the resilience of Africa's most vulnerable populations.

In a world of dynamic change, Africa and its people cannot stand still.

This study provides a comprehensive analysis that fuels a transformative migration agenda. It also provides very useful insights for tapping into the potential of the African diaspora, building climate resilience, and harnessing skills mobility to drive Africa's development trajectory. Most importantly, this study resonates with the essence of regional and global innovation, partnerships, and the principles of inclusivity, that collectively pave the way for a more resilient and prosperous Africa.

**Dr. Akinwumi A. Adesina**  
President, African Development Bank Group

**Mr. António Vitorino**  
Director General, International Organization for Migration



# Preface


Established in 1964, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) is the premier pan-African development institution, promoting economic growth and social progress across the continent. The Bank Group delivers financial and technical support to Regional Member Countries (RMCs) through knowledge products, policy advisory, and transformative projects to reduce poverty and advance inclusive and sustainable economic growth. To ensure a greater development impact of the Bank's Ten-Year Strategy (2013-2022), five priorities (High 5s) have been identified: Light up and Power Africa; Feed Africa; Industrialize Africa; Integrate Africa; and Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Africa. The Transition States Coordination Office (RDTs) in the RDVP Complex was created to enable the Bank to refine its assistance strategy in response to situations of fragility affecting African countries. Several AfDB Group strategies and policies, such as the Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience (2022-2026) and the Gender Strategy (2021-2025), include a focus on facilitating voluntary, safe, orderly, and regular migration.

This is operationalized through the Bank's support to its Regional Member Countries (RMCs) to harness the opportunities arising from regional integration and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), to empower forcibly displaced and host communities. Partnerships is a key tenant of this work. RDTs is thus supporting various bank-wide partnerships, such as the Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) Platform on Economic Migration and Forced Displacement which aims to enhance the information and knowledge exchanges, coordination, and collaboration amongst MDBs. RDTs served as Senior Chair of the Platform from July - December 2022 and the production of this knowledge product was a key activity for the AfDB during its term.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM), also referred to as the UN Migration Agency, is the leading actor in the field of human mobility, supporting migrants and developing effective responses to evolving migration dynamics globally. Through a wide programmatic portfolio in various contexts, IOM works on building the capacity within governments to manage all forms and impacts of mobility whilst maximizing its potential as a development enabler; its interventions also focus on enhancing the resilience of people on the move, particularly those in situations of vulnerability. IOM's strong presence in Africa contributes to enhancing a better understanding of current and future migration and mobility trends and the multidimensional humanitarian, development, and peace-related challenges of migration, including considerations related to climate induced mobility and its impact on the continent. IOM's Global Strategic Vision based on the three pillars of Governance, Mobility, and Resilience, as well as its Continental Strategy for Africa (2020-2024), build on the African Union's landmark policy frameworks that shape continental approaches to human mobility governance in all its dimensions.

The African Union Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want lays down the continental aspirations for structural transformation and a shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development. This overarching blueprint gives policy direction for an integrated and prosperous Africa. As one of the flagship initiatives of Agenda 2063, the Africa Continental Free Trade Area has two objectives: (1) A people-centered developmental Free Trade Area that goes beyond tariff liberalization to increase choices of the African people that is tightly linked to their freedom of movement which in turn contributes to movement of goods and economic growth; (2) A Free Trade Area that will enable Africa to address many of the continent's most significant challenges, including youth unemployment, migration, skills development, women's empowerment, industrialization and infrastructure development that will enable Africa to strengthen its trade and investment relations; thereby unleashing its business potential including in its service sector.

Against this backdrop, this report presents a strategic overview of key topics and issues, highlighting ongoing work and relevant initiatives but also identifying main gaps and the prospects for future action. To undertake the assessments and formulate policy recommendations in each of the three areas, the study refers to resources from AfDB, IOM, and other relevant stakeholders.



The study provides clear strategic and evidence-based policy recommendations as well as concrete operational and actionable options to enhance cooperation between the AfDB, IOM, other UN entities, RMCs, and other Donors/Development Partners (including DFIs, the EU, CSOs, the private sector, etc.) with due regard to IOM's strategies and priorities as well as AfDB's specific development mandate, and its focus on addressing fragility and building resilience. The chapters aim to inform actions such as policy dialogues, projects, and programs that can facilitate sustainable peace, inclusive economic integration, human security, and development of the African continent.

In this report, the African Development Bank and IOM reaffirm their commitment as essential partners in the global endeavor to enhance migration management and governance. Our collaboration also encompasses addressing the unique vulnerabilities experienced by migrants and fostering opportunities for the enthusiastic members of the diaspora who are eager to engage with their homelands.

**Ms. Marie-Laure Akin-Olugbade**

Vice President, Regional Development,  
Integration and Business Delivery  
African Development Bank Group

**Ms. Ugochi Daniels**

Deputy Director General for Operations  
International Organization for Migration

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# List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>AAU</b>	Association of African Universities
<b>ADB</b>	Asian Development Bank
<b>ADEPT</b>	The Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform
<b>ADFC</b>	African Diaspora Finance Corporation
<b>ADN</b>	African Diaspora Network (Silicon Valley)
<b>AFD</b>	Agence Française de Développement
<b>AfCFTA</b>	African Continental Free Trade Area
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>BMZ</b>	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>CADFP</b>	Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Programme
<b>CAP</b>	Common African Position on GCM
<b>CCNY</b>	Carnegie Corporation of New York
<b>CD4D</b>	Connecting Diaspora for Development (IOM Netherlands)
<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus Disease 2019
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>CSR</b>	Corporate Social Responsibility
<b>DDI</b>	Diaspora Direct Investment
<b>DEMAG</b>	Diaspora Emergency and Action Coordination
<b>DESAT</b>	Diaspora Engagement Self-Assessment Tool
<b>DFI</b>	Development Finance Institution
<b>EBRD</b>	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ECDPM</b>	European Centre for Development Policy Management
<b>EDTF</b>	Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund
<b>EIB</b>	European Investment Bank
<b>EUDIF</b>	European Union Global Diaspora Facility
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agricultural Organization
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>GADS</b>	Global African Diaspora Summit
<b>GCM</b>	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GDPAL</b>	Global Diaspora Policy Alliance
<b>GDS</b>	Global Diaspora Summit
<b>GiZ</b>	Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communications Technology
<b>IADB</b>	Inter-American Development Bank
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>IIE</b>	Institute of International Education
<b>IMRF</b>	International Migration Review Forum
<b>INFF</b>	Integrated National Financing Framework
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration

<b>IsDB</b>	Islamic Development Bank
<b>JFP</b>	AU, IOM, UNDP Joint Framework Programme for Diaspora Engagement in Africa (Draft Concept Note)
<b>MDB</b>	Multilateral Development Bank
<b>MENA</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>MFW4A</b>	Making Finance Work for Africa
<b>MIDA</b>	Migration for Development in Africa
<b>MSME</b>	Micro, Small & Medium Enterprise
<b>MWDN</b>	Malawian Women in the Diaspora Network
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PPP</b>	Public-Private Partnership
<b>R&amp;D</b>	Research and Development
<b>REC</b>	Regional Economic Community
<b>RMC</b>	Regional Member Country
<b>SADC</b>	Southern Africa Development Community
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SME</b>	Small and Medium Size Enterprise
<b>STEM</b>	Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
<b>TNI</b>	The Networking Institute
<b>TVET</b>	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
<b>UDAN</b>	Ugandan Diaspora in Agribusiness Network
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCDF</b>	United Nations Capital Development Fund
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNNM</b>	United Nations Network on Migration
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollar
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization



# Introduction

## Background

The pursuit of better employment opportunities is a major drive for intra-regional migration within Africa and towards other regions outside the continent. In a post-pandemic era, it has become evident that safe, orderly, and regular migration can play a role in “building back better”. However, there is a need to strengthen capacities to gain a deeper understanding of how mobility can be optimized as a catalyst for the socio-economic recovery of an integrated Africa. When well-managed, migration can be a powerful strategy for human development and poverty reduction. It can further foster sustainable and equitable economies by introducing innovation, skills, knowledge, and remittances to both the countries of origin and destination. This dynamic can open new markets, create economic opportunities, and address labor market gaps, ultimately increasing productivity.

Many view the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), adopted in 2018, as a “game-changer” that has elevated the regional integration agenda to a new level. This endeavor has established a large market connecting 1.4 billion people across the continent. It also has the potential of lifting millions of people out of extreme poverty. As the continent advances with the implementation of the AfCFTA, elements like transnational connectivity, skills development, and mobility will be crucial to ensure that industries and societies alike will benefit from a well-functioning free trade area. The Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (also known as the Free Movement of Persons Protocol), introduced alongside the AfCFTA in 2018, recognize human mobility as a strong enabler of development. Both the AfCFTA and the Free Movement of Persons Protocol have created momentum for African governments and their partners to work toward transforming human mobility. It shifts it from being a potential source of fragility to becoming a cornerstone of social cohesion amidst diversity, prosperity, and sustainable development on the continent. However, the slow pace of ratification of the Free Movement of Persons Protocol indicates some reluctance to fully embrace mobility as a pillar of integration and socio-economic development.

Against this backdrop, this joint knowledge production between the AfDB and IOM aims to inform policymakers and development partners’ operations to maximize the benefits of regular migration and prevent or reduce vulnerabilities resulting from forced displacement. The three areas of emphasis are the following:

- (1) Diaspora Engagement: Tapping Skills and Knowledge Transfer as well as Diaspora investments for Strategic Sector Development in Africa;
- (2) Climate-Induced Forced Displacement and Migration: Preventing forced displacement via climate and disaster resilience; harnessing benefits of migration for climate adaptation and environmental sustainability;
- (3) Skills Mobility: Boosting Employment in Strategic Sectors in Support of AfCFTA and the Free Movement of Persons Protocol.

## Rationale

The World Migration Report 2022 highlights a significant presence of African migrants worldwide, totaling approximately 40 million as of 2020. Of these, around 21 million reside within other African countries, while 5.1 million are in Europe, and 2.4 million are in North America. Between 2015 and 2020, the number of African migrants within Africa grew from around 18 million to the current figure of approximately 21 million. Major destination countries on the continent host millions of international migrants: South Africa (2.9 million), Côte d’Ivoire (2.5 million), and Uganda (1.7 million). There are also African countries with high immigrant populations as a proportion of their total population: Gabon (19 percent), Equatorial Guinea (16 percent), Seychelles (13 percent) and Libya (12 percent). Intra-African migration remains a significant feature of mobility for Africans, with a steady increase since 2000 and this trend is very likely to continue in the years to come (IOM, 2021g).

African economies have also been increasingly benefitting from remittance flows sent by their migrant communities abroad. In 2020, Nigeria and Egypt alone received more than USD 15 billion. Despite a negative forecast announcing the reduction of remittance flows by approximately 20 percent as a consequence of the global COVID-19 pandemic, inflows to Africa actually grew by 6 percent, excluding the sharp decline of 28 percent in Nigeria (IOM, 2021g). In 2021, remittance flows to African countries registered a 16.4 percent increase, reaching USD 50 billion. In 2022, Nigeria received more than USD 20 billion while Egypt received more than USD 30 billion, demonstrating the strong resilience of remittance flows despite concurrent global economic challenges (Ratha, et al., 2022).

The World Migration Report 2022 shows that migrants contributed about 10 percent to the global GDP in 2021 (IOM, 2021g). Migrants play an important role in the development of both their countries of origin and destination. When it is actively promoted by granting access to rights and opportunities, migration has the potential to reduce inequalities within and among countries, thereby impacting on sustainable development outcomes globally. Diaspora communities have significant potential to contribute to the development of their countries beyond remittances. Yet, their resources in terms of skills, expertise, investment potential, and social capital are often understated. To harness these resources, it is essential to build an enabling environment that attracts the diaspora and solidifies their engagement with their countries of origin. Governments should foster connections between Africa and its diaspora professionals, supporting high-value-added projects in the areas of business development, entrepreneurship, and education for global innovation. This approach can highlight Africa's demographic dividend and promote its image as an attractive business destination for global investors, ultimately driving inclusive growth and poverty reduction.

The continent is home to over 250 million Africans who are affected by fragility, a condition that is defined by the African Development Bank Group (the AfDB henceforth) as "a condition where the exposure to internal or external pressures exceeds existing capacities to prevent, respond to, and recover from them, creating risks of instability" (AfDB, 2022a). Fragile situations exacerbate the existing lack of livelihood opportunities affecting communities, directly and indirectly contributing to migration out of desperation, as well as forced displacement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees on the continent and beyond.

The ultimate objective of sustainable development is the improvement of human well-being, which is also intrinsically linked to broader social, economic, and environmental development. Empowering migrants as development actors, along with the communities from which they originate, pass through, and reside, can promote social cohesion, and contribute to overall development efforts.

At the global level, discussions around migration and forced displacement have gained momentum in recent years. While several policy frameworks have been developed on migration and climate-induced displacement over the past couple of decades, both at the global, continental, and regional levels, their non-binding nature presents a challenge that limits their implementation. Hence, there is a pressing need to enhance collaboration between actors to identify gaps and provide tailored support to governments. Moreover, one of the key elements of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) centers on international cooperation and partnerships. Migration management cannot be done by a single government and requires inter-state collaboration as well as the mobilization of different actors and partners at the local, national, regional, and intercontinental levels. Solutions need to be contextualized and tailored to local realities and circumstances. International partnerships and collaboration should allow the identification of the most effective, efficient, and sustainable entry points to build capacity, manage pressures, prevent escalation, resolve protracted crises, facilitate regular migration, and reduce irregular migration as well as forced displacement. At a time when the African continent is facing multiple shocks, there is a need to address fragility and build long-term and inclusive resilience. Countries and regions as well as different gender groups, experience different pressures that can lead to fragility and have different capacities to prevent or remedy these. These pressures might originate from exogenous factors, such as climate change, a rise in insecurity with cross-border spillovers from neighboring countries, a health pandemic such as that experienced with COVID-19, or volatility in global markets. For instance, the conflict in Ukraine is not without consequences for the continent. In 2002, as a result of the spike in global energy and food prices, which was amplified by the conflict, a cost-of-living crisis worldwide was triggered, and 15 million Africans were pushed into extreme poverty. An additional estimated 2.1 million people are expected to fall into extreme poverty by 2023 as a result of this conflict (AfDB, 2022b). While the Russian Federation and Ukraine may have larger trade volumes with non-African countries like European countries, the conflict's impact is having deeper and possibly more persistent repercussions in Africa. This unequal distribution of the impact of global shocks is influenced not only by trade volumes but also by vulnerabilities. Equally, endogenous factors, such as institutional capacity gaps, budget constraints, social polarization, exclusion, marginalization, gender inequality, imbalanced demographics, or youth unemployment, can also contribute to situations of fragility and lead to potential conflict and violence.

The drivers of fragility are intricate, multi-dimensional, and evolving over time. Political, social, economic, environmental, gender-related, and regional drivers can reinforce each other if not properly addressed through holistic and inclusive approaches (including policies, action plans, projects, and programs). These drivers are interconnected within broader systems and cascading effects, necessitating the development of robust systems, economies, and institutions to foster inclusive and resilient societies free of poverty, providing opportunities for all to realize their full potential. Such robust systems should consider the need to harness the opportunities arising from regional integration, gender equality, voluntary, safe, orderly, and regular migration. They should also prevent and address forced displacement by empowering the bottom-of-the-pyramid communities, including forcibly displaced and hosting communities.

This report aims to provide clear strategic recommendations – policy-oriented yet incorporating concrete operational and actionable options – on how the AfDB Group, IOM, other United Nations (UN) entities, Regional Member Countries, other Donors and partners including Development Financial Institutions (DFIs), European Union (EU), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), or the private sector should engage and collaborate better within the context of the findings and with due consideration for IOM's strategies and priorities as well as AfDB's specific development mandate and its focus on addressing fragility, building resilience and ensuring safe and regular human mobility for women and men. Ultimately, the recommendations aim to inform policy dialogues, projects, programs, and operations that facilitate sustainable peace, inclusive economic integration, and the development of the African continent.

## **Three Studies in one: interlinkages between diaspora engagement, climate-induced displacement, and skills mobility**

### **Methodology**

Whilst diaspora engagement, climate mobility, and skills mobility, may initially seem distinct analytical terrains, certain cross-cutting themes emerged in the collection of papers to link these topics together. Before delving into some of those themes, it is important to note that the research papers were undertaken by three individual consultants. Therefore, the researchers adopted a consistent methodology across the papers to allow for the extraction of potential cross-cutting themes.

Each consultant utilized a mixed-method approach to blend extensive engagement of primary and secondary source material within their subject matter with field-led consultations to supplement and verify their findings. These consultations were held with a variety of actors both within AfDB and IOM respectively as well as with other leading voices respective to their subject matter.

### **Diaspora Engagement, Skills Mobility, and Climate Mobility: Areas for Exploration**

The Humanitarian-Peace-Development Nexus as well as mobility and integration agendas across Africa emerged as ways to build linkages across all three studies. Similarly, a deeper relevance can be drawn across certain thematic areas of consideration that are summarized below.

The closest correlation for the diaspora engagement study across the chapters came through the core lens of economic and human capital explored in this chapter. The most straightforward linkage between the skills mobility and diaspora engagement chapters comes through the potential capacitation provided by diaspora expertise, networks, and skills to address issues such as skills mismatch, effective communication of labor needs between countries of destination and origin (through diaspora networking), and support by diaspora networks to help new arrivals integrate into countries of destination or transit. Diaspora engagement is also key in counteracting the “brain drain” and mitigating the impact thereof, which is a key issue when it comes to labor migration. It also facilitates the flow of skills and knowledge from the developed world to the African continent, and vice versa. Furthermore, in terms of skills mobility, there are infrastructural opportunities through the mainstreaming of diaspora capital (in all its forms but especially human and economic capital) in the policy and programmatic responses to enhancing local infrastructure to support job creation and meaningful employment. Finally, there may also be an opportunity to leverage innovative tools to unlock diaspora capital to support skills development and human capital development across Africa that can address challenges or support interventions recommended in the Skills Mobility chapter.

Related to climate mobility, diaspora human capital can be a critical enabler in the formative work by many actors and countries to address issues of climate change. By building sectoral networks of technical expertise, African diaspora communities can be mobilized to support engagements across the climate response dial from quick onset challenges to adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Similarly, diaspora economic capital can be leveraged for such tools particularly through localization strategies as diaspora communities are often more passionate about supporting local communities and addressing situations of vulnerability. Diaspora communities can also be key enablers of communication, educational, and informational processes around the realities of climate change to local and diaspora communities. Financial and social remittances from the diaspora play a fundamental role in helping communities build resilience to climate impacts and remain in situ. Funds and skills allow families and communities to diversify income, spread household risk, or implement new climate-resilient technologies that help prevent displacement. Finally, women and youth comprise increasing numbers of migrants. More women and young people are migrating independently for work or education. Both categories experience heightened risks on the route and at the destination. Diaspora has a role in supporting movement that is safe and developmental.

Considering the impact of climate change in Africa, especially in terms of its food and water resources, there exists a great need to expedite the skills development process in agriculture across the continent. Much of Africa's informal sector also operates in the agricultural sector, and hence developing these skills provides the added benefit of formalizing this large portion of the economy. The sectoral focus on agriculture in the diaspora engagement study also pinpoints such sectoral strategies as a cross-cutting potential to emerge from the studies. Moreover, increased investment is needed in the formalization of agricultural sectors and the development of agro-processing industries across the continent to mitigate the adverse effects of global warming that are impacting Africa, and those that will impact it in the future. Again, diaspora human and economic capital can be mainstreamed into the investment and industrial development plans required to achieve such development outcomes. Urbanization is a key climate mobility outcome. Skills mobility and diasporas have roles to play in developing green technologies and helping to build sustainable cities.

In summary, by mainstreaming diaspora engagement into the policy and programmatic responses to climate and skills mobility, the variance of human and economic capital cutting across different layers of the African diaspora can be energized to support applicable recommendations in the other chapters as well as national, regional, and continental responses to the issues. One of diaspora engagement's most valuable resources is its agility and flexibility for application so this is where it can add value to the other areas under consideration in this collective research.



# CHAPTER 1

## INCLUSIVE DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT: ACCELERATING HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL FOR STRATEGIC SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

### Introduction

Since the African Union (AU) established the African diaspora as the sixth region of the continent through an amendment to the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2003, diaspora engagement has emerged as a developmental priority for a multitude of stakeholders at a national, regional, and continental level in Africa. These include actors such as the AU, CSOs, DFIs, RECs, RMCs, international cooperation partners, foundations, and the private sector. At the heart of this thriving movement lies the African diaspora.

Charting a collaborative and realistic continental agenda to accelerate inclusive diaspora engagement for development across these institutions and operational landscapes is a complex opportunity for Africa. This paper looks to add value in making informed decisions about the role that the AfDB, in collaboration with the IOM, can play in addressing this challenge. In its role as a trusted advisor, partner, and financier in the development of the continent, the AfDB is approaching a critical juncture in designing and executing the next cycle in its continuum of action on diaspora engagement as policy and programmatic options mature across various strategic areas and priorities for the Bank (AfDB, 2008).<sup>1</sup>

This chapter is structured over four sections. Section one provides a situational analysis including the analytical, conceptual, and definitional frameworks basing the research. Section two engages diaspora human capital by outlining existing models of effective engagement of such capital and extends to identifying where such capital can add value for strategic sectoral development in Africa. Section three mirrors this approach to diaspora economic capital to ensure analytical consistency across the report. Finally, building upon this evidence, the final section will offer a set of achievable and clear recommendations to guide the future work of AfDB, IOM, and their respective partners in inclusive diaspora engagement for development.

### Inclusive diaspora engagement for development: a situational analysis

Inclusive diaspora engagement for development has emerged as an important subset in considering the role of migration in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with the IOM Migration Data Portal identifying well-managed migration as a cross-cutting issue that can have a positive impact for all 17 goals (IOM, n.d.e). It has also emerged as a specific objective of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) through Objective 19 which aims to “create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries” (UN, 2019). Other objectives of the GCM, such as Objective 20 on remittances, also pinpoint this growing importance. This momentum led to IOM co-hosting the Global Diaspora Summit (GDS) in Dublin in March 2022 culminating in the adoption of The Dublin Declaration (IOM, 2022a, <https://www.idiaspora.org/en/learn/resources/public-information-materials/dublin-declaration>). The GDS is envisioned as the process to track the implementation of Objective 19 in support of the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF).

<sup>1</sup> These roles were identified in (AfDB, 2008).

## Setting the analytical & definitional framework

In defining inclusive diaspora engagement for development, this chapter adopts the framework of inclusiveness advanced by AfDB in its definition of inclusive growth. This denotes the importance of inclusivity across four elements: economic inclusion, social inclusion, spatial inclusion, and political inclusion (AfDB, 2013a). Underpinning such inclusive development must be a people-centric approach to diaspora and development that ensures access for all layers of society to diaspora engagement both in local and diaspora communities.

Additionally, tensions remain in the marketplace on how best to define diaspora for development in the African context. These are important as certain definitions may impose a developmental limitation on diaspora engagement. Oanda and Obonyo (2021), in their appraisal of the definitional impact on African academic engagement, pinpoint this tension. They note that “a review of some country-level diaspora policies reveals a redefinition of country-level engagements of the diaspora to mean ‘citizens’ of a particular country, whereas the AU Commission sees the African diaspora as one community of ‘all people of African origin’ living outside the continent irrespective of citizenship, nationality, and historical constitution. The country level focus is likely to limit the circulation of the totality of the African academic diaspora, including the historical diaspora, in engaging.”


Formative definitional approaches adopted by the AU, IOM, and others pinpoint the importance of extending an inclusive and participatory definition to diaspora engagement to accelerate its developmental potential. For this research, the IOM’s definition of diaspora as “migrants or descendants of migrants whose identity and sense of belonging, either real or symbolic, have been shaped by their migration experience and background” is recommended as the most instructive definitional understanding of diaspora engagement (IOM, 2019a). It closely mirrors the definitional approach of the AU with one key addition. Given the importance of intra-regional African migration to the composition of the African diaspora, any definition looking to truly unlock the greatest depth of diaspora capital for inclusive development in Africa must include such communities in the definitional framing. The World Bank estimates that such migration makes up approximately “70 percent of all international migration from or within the region” (World Bank, 2022).

In terms of defining the core engagement areas under consideration in this chapter, human capital is “the skills, knowledge, and experience possessed by an individual or population, viewed in terms of their value or cost to an organization or country” (IOM, 2022b). Economic capital is defined “as any economic resource used to buy and/or make products and provide services” (IOM, 2022c). This is based on a wider understanding of diaspora capital as “the resources abroad that are available to a country, region, city, organization, or location through their communities abroad. It is made up of people, networks, finance, ideas, attitudes, and concerns for their places of origin, ancestry, or affinity. That capital presents itself in many forms - human, social, intellectual, political, cultural, and financial” (TNI, 2020).

Beyond clarity on definition, it is important to consider the analytical framework that will help identify the primary recommendations and reflections throughout the chapter. The chapter remains respectful of the varying capacities across the different RMCs working within the portfolios of AfDB and IOM by adopting an integrated 3-I analytical framework to explore how effective diaspora engagement can be built. The framework should be considered as an integrative guidance framework and roadmap.

It is important to note here that the primary focus of this chapter is on inclusive diaspora for strategic sectoral development in Africa. This lens tends to prioritize utilizing the 3-I framework in the treatment of Africa as a region of origin and RMCs as countries of origin for diasporas. Other aspects will be noted, when possible, that are outside this primary scope. For example, the role of diaspora engagement in countries of destination or transit.

**Figure 1. Visualization of 3-I Framework for Diaspora Engagement**



Note: Figure elaborated by the author.

As a synopsis, the following definitions and considerations apply to each layer of the 3-I framework:

**Institutional Components:** These can be defined as the institutional frameworks and processes required to provide the foundations for long-term diaspora engagement for development. Specifically for countries of origin, they can include but may not be limited to developing policy and legislative infrastructure to ensure a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to diaspora engagement. These components combine to deliver a governance of diaspora engagement that considers the influences of key development considerations such as ensuring diaspora engagement is sustainably delivered with respect to human rights, gender-responsive, child-sensitive, and other appropriate frameworks to ensure trusted engagement of the diaspora.

**Informational Components:** These can be defined as the engagement processes required to ensure that evidence-based interventions are delivered in partnership with the intended diasporic audience for engagement. It cultivates a robust system of R&D that ensures clear communication and research tools are built in line with the respective capacities and expectations of the intended diasporic audience. It bridges the role of government as facilitator and implementer by building engagements with, not at, diasporas. This both helps generate reliable data on the diaspora as well as provides opportunities to advance the community network infrastructure of the diaspora community to sustain engagement interventions.

**Implementation Components:** These can be defined as the systematic implementation frameworks that operationalize diaspora engagement across key thematic areas or sectoral interventions. They set out key evaluative criteria to track impact as well as outline microscopic planning on each engagement deliverable. They identify distinct roles and responsibilities of various actors to ensure effective and sustainable engagement of diaspora capital for development. They are primarily multi-stakeholder in nature.

### **Inclusive diaspora engagement for AfDB and IOM: the current situation**

Through research and market analysis, it is evident that there is a prolific level of activity in engaging the African diaspora for development from multiple entry points. Whilst the wider chapter will capture some of the ground-breaking work of other actors such as the AU, diaspora organizations, RECs, RMCs, UNDP, and other partners, this section prioritizes the strategic organizational and operational relevance of diaspora engagement for AfDB, IOM, and continental policy frameworks.

## **Diaspora engagement for development in Africa: an essential aspect of AfDB's purpose**

The mission of the AfDB is “to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its RMCs, thus contributing to poverty reduction” (AfDB, n.d.a). The institutional strategies guiding this mission have centralized the importance of diaspora engagement to this mission. The AfDB’s institution-wide strategy, *At the Center of Africa’s Transformation: Strategy 2013 – 2022*, specifically marks diaspora human and financial capital as important contributory tools in achieving its purpose (AfDB, 2013a).

A series of other sectoral or programmatic strategies follow suit in either identifying diaspora engagement as a primary area of strategic importance or as a supplementary impact area for AfDB work. In terms of primary consideration of diaspora engagement, parts of AfDB’s High Five Priority Strategies directly engage diaspora engagement. Feed Africa denotes the importance of diaspora financing as an enabler for the fulfillment of the strategy (AfDB, 2016a). The AfDB’s integration agenda for Africa, through their Regional Integration Policy and Strategy (RIPoS) 2014 – 2023, also pinpoints the importance of diaspora financing for infrastructural development (AfDB, 2014). The supplementary focus emerges in other key strategies.

These include AfDB’s Industrialize Africa strategy which focuses on supporting governments in “developing efficient industry clusters across Africa through technical assistance,” with a view to building “a 21st century Africa ready to take its rightful place in global value chains” (AfDB, 2019). The African diaspora, through their human and economic capital, can be natural enablers of such work. The sectoral approach adopted in this chapter helps to pinpoint how such clustering can inform enterprise development through diaspora engagement. This can be implemented at both policy and programmatic levels which points to the growing rationale for mainstreaming diaspora engagement and investment into RMCs, RECs, and continental-level economic plans. Similar added value can be drawn across key AfDB institutional and sectoral strategies such as Skills for Employability and Productivity in Africa (SEPA) Action Plan 2022–2025, Private Sector Development Policy and Strategy on Update of Bank’s Private Sector Operations, African Development Bank Group Capacity Development Strategy 2021-2025, Knowledge Management Strategy 2022-2031, Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Strategic Framework 2021-2031, Strategy for Economic Governance (SEGA) in Africa 2021 – 2025, Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy for Creating 25 Million Jobs and Equipping 50 Million Youth 2016-2025, and The African Development Bank Gender Strategy 2021 – 2025, and Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2022 – 2026 (AfDB 2021a, 2013b, 2008, 2021b, 2022a, 2021c, 2021d, 2016b, 2021e, 2022b).

For example, the prioritization of blended finance in the PPP strategy can be greatly impacted by diaspora engagement. Diaspora social remittances, as part of their human and social capital, can be important conduits of advancing governance codes, procedures, and policies at all levels on the continent. Levitt defines social remittances as the “ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending-country communities,” whilst, “the role that these resources play in promoting immigrant entrepreneurship, community, and family formation, and political integration is widely acknowledged” (Levitt, 1998). The advancement of human capital in the AfDB’s SEPA action plan clearly correlates to this potential role of diaspora human capital for development. The rise of gendered diaspora networks, such as the Malawian Women in the Diaspora Network (MWDN), pinpoint the unique opportunities diaspora engagement can play for AfDB’s gender strategy (MWDN, n.d.).

Beyond strategy-based added value, the operational impetus of the AfDB in supporting diaspora engagement for development earmarks the topic as an area for further critical exploration to gauge how to build out the next phase of action on the topic. For example, the participation and current leadership of the AfDB of the MDBs Coordination Platform for Economic Migration and Forced Displacement from July to December 2022 is rooted in their appreciation that human mobility “is the norm” (AfDB et al., n.d.b). This statement reflects the consistency that diaspora engagement will likely occupy in the future operations of AfDB.

The AfDB has already displayed astute leadership in operational activity in the sector at various levels. In 2020, they partnered with the IOM to develop a human capital engagement of the Burundi diaspora for skills transfer and to tackle youth unemployment (IOM, 2020a). Larger-scale collaborations such as the Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A) platform pinpoint how such collaborative efforts could be scaled with diaspora engagement under consideration (MFW4A, n.d.). For example, MFW4A was the vehicle to support the development of a Toolkit for Understanding Diaspora Investment in Africa (DMA, 2020). Financing mechanisms such as the Migration and Development Trust Fund established by the AfDB and the

Government of France in 2009 showcase the longevity of partnership and operational focus on diaspora engagement within the portfolio of the AfDB. This study can serve as a basis to guide future iterations of AfDB's operations and partnerships on diaspora engagement in a systemic manner.

## IOM and diaspora engagement: a continental and global agenda setter

The IOM remains a primary agenda-setter on inclusive diaspora engagement at a continental and global level. Through this role, the organization has developed a repository of proprietary intellectual property that remains at the forefront of designing and delivering sustainable, inclusive diaspora engagement for development. Emanating from their 3E strategy to enable, engage, and empower diasporas to contribute to development, IOM has developed a suite of critical knowledge products that inform exemplary diaspora engagement. For example, their Diaspora Mapping Toolkit (<https://publications.iom.int/books/diaspora-mapping-toolkit>), as well as their Contributions and Counting Guidance (<https://publications.iom.int/books/contributions-and-counting-guidance-measuring-economic-impact-your-diaspora-beyond-remittances>) to measure the economic impact of diaspora communities, address two of the foundational questions occupying the work of national, regional, and continental actors on diaspora engagement – how to map diasporas and measure impact (IOM, 2022d; IOM, 2020b).

They have also embraced innovation in advancing new tools for diaspora engagement, for example, the use of big data in diaspora mapping methodologies (IOM, 2021d). Beyond knowledge creation, they have also played an instrumental role in knowledge management in diaspora engagement through iDiaspora (<https://www.idiaspora.org/en>) which is a global digital hub for diaspora engagement. This leadership can also be seen in their actions at a local, regional, and continental level in Africa through their facilitation of the Maputo Diaspora Declaration and their draft collaborative vision for a Joint Framework Programme (JFP) with the AU and UNDP on diaspora engagement (AU, IOM, UNDP, n.d.).

### Textbox 1. Snapshot case study: the Maputo Diaspora Declaration

The Maputo Diaspora Declaration pledges to establish a Regional Diaspora Engagement Program for Southern Africa, facilitated by SADC (Southern African Development Community). This initiative is driven by the recognized advantages of diaspora contributions to the economies of both their countries of origin and destination. These contributions encompass various aspects, such as social and financial remittances, the stimulation of trade, fostering business establishment and entrepreneurial development, and facilitating the transfer of valuable skills and knowledge.

IOM has also been at the forefront of global planning in the sector. The Dublin Declaration designed a future global agenda of action for diaspora engagement. This agenda responded to the reality that global systems of collaboration for diaspora engagement across different forms of diaspora capital have yet to be institutionally built. The declaration was endorsed by the AU and several RMCs during their participation in the GDS in March 2022 (including Egypt, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, and the Sudan). Key facets of the Dublin Declaration pertinent to the scope of the collection of research papers here include the commitment to:

- “Facilitate the launch of a Global Diaspora Policy Alliance (GDPAL) that will deliver an inclusive ecosystem of collaboration across governments and partners in academia, civil society, and the private sector to prioritize diaspora engagement policymaking and action in countries of origin and destination.
- Strengthen the conditions at national and international levels for the economic and financial empowerment and engagement of migrants and transnational communities through a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach and collaborations with public authorities working in finance, development, central banks, chambers of commerce, international financial institutions, and multilateral development banks and other relevant stakeholders.
- Institutionalize the diaspora engagement in policy development, including development strategies and humanitarian assistance plans, and integrate the diaspora in country-based needs assessments, integration planning, and sustainable reintegration strategies.

- Recognize diasporas as partners in addressing major societal and humanitarian challenges and crises and reducing possible vulnerability as a result of specific situations, including pandemic, conflict, climate change, other related environmental and natural causes or other crises” (IOM, 2022a).

## Inclusive diaspora engagement for development: structuring progress for Africa

The work of AfDB and IOM in the area has been underpinned by additional continental frameworks advocated by the AU and others. Agenda 2063 explicitly positions the African diaspora as a co-creator of future African prosperity and well-being. It advances the vision for Africa to have “dynamic and mutually beneficial links with her diaspora” (AU, 2015).


The Migration Policy Framework for Africa 2018 – 2030 centralizes diaspora engagement as one of its eight main pillars as it is “one key aspect of fostering the migration-development nexus” (AU, 2018b). This also explicitly pinpoints the areas of human and economic capital as primary areas of developmental impact. It does, however, note that “there are still major limitations to the inclusion of diasporas in development policy and practice” (AU, 2018b). The centrality of diaspora human and economic capital to the Common African Position (CAP) on the GCM advanced by the AU also pinpoints the policy relevance of diaspora engagement for the development of Africa (AU, 2019a). These contextual insights convey that structured and coordinated diaspora engagement in Africa has arrived at a point of critical juncture to ensure scale can be achieved.

The chapter now addresses this by exploring how African diaspora human and economic capital is a form of strategic and sectoral power for African development particularly in terms of human and economic capital. It begins this analysis through a baseline assessment of connective roles that diaspora can play across these forms of capital as well as some indicative factors for success and lessons learned in the policy and programmatic engagement both in Africa and beyond.

### Diaspora human and economic capital for inclusive development: developmental power, roles, and lessons

The African diaspora represents a repository of soft and smart power that can not only contribute to the development of the African continent but to the advancement of African influence globally. Soft power is defined as the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies” (Nye, 2005). Smart power, defined as people-to-people power, is rooted upon the idea that in the networked age, the measure of your power is connectedness (Clinton, 2011; Slaughter, 2009).<sup>2</sup> Mobilizing such power is rooted in the baseline set of roles for the diaspora in development that link economic and human capital as identified in the formative analysis of Ardivino and Debass (2009) in considering Diaspora Direct Investment (DDI).

**Figure 2. Different roles of diaspora in diaspora direct investment**



Source: Ardivino and Debass (2009).

<sup>2</sup> The concept of diaspora as a form of smart power was originally introduced within the framework of networked power, a concept advocated by Anne-Marie Slaughter. This idea, in the context of diaspora, was further articulated by Hillary R. Clinton during her opening remarks at the Global Diaspora Forum in Washington D.C. on May 17, 2011.

The brain gainer role for the diaspora focuses on the deposits of “knowledge and technology as well as capital and access to advanced markets in developed countries” that can be mobilized in the diaspora. The altruist technologist positions diaspora as “major conduits of technology and business know-how to their home countries,” with an ability for “importation of technologies in tune with local realities and cultural sensitivities.” Their brave capital investor role makes them “less averse to political risk and economic shocks than others” with their financial commitment outlasting other types of foreign investors (Ardivino and Debass, 2009). Their catalytic role is as first mover which can, in turn, lead to generating avenues for commercial diplomacy to bring in other individual or institutional forms of developmental support. Mobilizing such power and roles must address some foundational challenges already identified in the diaspora engagement landscape in Africa and beyond.

The JFP noted earlier scoped potential structural and operational barriers to growing inclusive diaspora engagement at scale for development on the continent. These include structural issues of local capacity (both research and implementation level), lack of scale in engagement programming, and policy and strategic coherence. Other contextual barriers are identified such as underdeveloped engagement of generational diaspora, a reductionist approach to financial engagement of diasporas through the lens of remittances, and a lack of trust. Addressing these issues will, at a minimum, require a multi-stakeholder paradigm to be applied across the 3-I framework.

This is important for this research as it extends recommendations to embed many actors across the 3-I analytical framework developed earlier. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of collaborations and partnerships in the model, especially for governments. This is critical as such partners may be able to do things that the government cannot do, particularly in the context of countries in fragile situations. This partnership however should be based on complementarity of purpose and such partners, including the diaspora, should not and cannot be seen to substitute the government’s actions. For example, there is compelling evidence that the role of the diaspora in conflict transformation can be of peacebuilder (as to peace spoilers) if certain areas of diaspora capital are engaged (Cochrane et al., 2009; Smith and Stares, 2007).

This complex modeling also identifies some additional reflections on why African diaspora engagement may have, to date, not fully actualized the developmental impact that it could have. It also identifies some key factors for success. These should not be treated as an exhaustive listing but as an indicative guidance on key factors for success and reasons for failure in diaspora engagement. For ease of application and to build out this baseline listing as an interactive tool for AfDB, IOM, and other actors to layer in additional insights, the following typology is offered to categorize where these insights operate. These categorizations are organizational (relating to the design of diaspora engagement) and environmental (relating to the delivery/implementation of diaspora engagement).

**Table 1. Baseline factors for success and reasons for failure in diaspora engagement (organizational and environmental)**

<b>Organizational Factors for Success and Reasons for Failure in Diaspora Engagement</b>	
<b>Key Factors for Success</b>	<b>Reasons for Failure</b>
1. Make a Political and Policy Decision to Prioritize and institutionalize Diaspora Engagement: This may include political recognition of the diaspora or the creation of an enabling environment through legislation.	A. The Firework Syndrome: A lack of local governance and planning for sustainability (especially measurement) both on the side of country/region of origin and diaspora communities.
2. Investing in Implementation Capacity (i.e., dedicating resources and talent to execute engagement vision and mission): It is imperative to ensure policy or programs have the required capacity (human and financial) to deliver results. For example, an ongoing challenge in the sector remains moving from policy creation to implementation.	B. A Catch-All Approach: Not understanding that diasporas are diverse and disputatious. Not segmenting the diaspora to understand differences across the diaspora or not designing tailored interventions for the diaspora can undermine engagement. Not understanding tensions across the diaspora can also bring engagement to a halt.
3. Focusing on Quality, Sustainability, and Scale: Diaspora engagement must be about quality rather than quantity of engagements. This comes through a partnership with the diaspora rather than targeting the diaspora. The level of activity should not be confused with the level of progress.	C. Lack of appreciation that brokers are needed for diaspora engagement. Quite often, government or other institutional actors can enhance impact by collaborating with brokers for engaging the diaspora such as AfDB, international organizations, diaspora organizations, private sector, and foundations.

<b>Environmental Factors for Success and Reasons for Failure in Diaspora Engagement</b>	
4. Following the 'Non-Competitive' Principle for Knowledge Creation and Management (i.e., diaspora engagement is not competitive, and countries can share positive and negative experiences).	D. Lack of Data: Inability due to market factors (such as weak diaspora community networks, trust, or research tools) to develop granular data on the diaspora. This can result in targeting the wrong diaspora despite it having the right purpose.
5. Enhancing communication with diaspora and listening to the diaspora to apply the diaspora capital lens (this will result in building conducive environment locally and in the diaspora on different engagements for different capital).	E. Fuzzy Maths: Believing that all members of the diaspora want to give or be engaged, this is not true. Sometimes, the correct twenty people in a diaspora can positively change a country, sector, or developmental ambition.
6. Layering locality into engagement plans as diaspora communities are often most enthusiastic about a town or region in their country of origin.	F. Failure to embrace digitalization and technology in the networked age of 21st century diaspora engagement. Diaspora engagement must now be 'High-Tech and High-Touch'.

Source: Author's own elaboration

These considerations primarily operate in the engagement dynamics between countries and regions of origin and diaspora communities. However, some also apply in countries or regions of destination in their operational impact, for example, intra-diaspora aspects that may hinder engagement. Given the focus of this chapter, the dynamics between localities of origin and diaspora communities took precedence. Furthermore, these considerations are indicative of global challenges ahead for diaspora engagement and not just in terms of the African context. The political and policy decision to prioritize diaspora engagement is just as critical at the global level to unlock additional support for African diaspora engagement. This gap was narrowed through the Dublin Declaration yet the allocation of implementation capacity for such an agenda will be the determining force in its impact.

The key factors for success shared above for the context of this research are rooted in leadership at a local and diaspora level. It is imperative that diaspora engagement is not envisioned as a nice to have for developmental policy but a must-have. Diaspora engagement needs to be a primary consideration across appropriate institutional policy as well as across national, regional, and pan-African Development Agenda. Finally, effective engagement will be rooted in taking clinical and intentional approaches to diaspora engagement based on evidence and impact. Quite often, diaspora engagement is attracted by the quantity of activity when it is the quality, sustainability, and long-term replicability of intervention that determines impact.

These interventions can be developed through the 'Non-Competitive' principle for diaspora engagement. This can facilitate the sharing of expertise and experience to build a robust knowledge management framework to inform best practices for engagement. This can be a critical role that AfDB can play, and it can build upon existing activity in peer-to-peer sharing in Africa. For example, in 2022, the governments of Seychelles and Cabo Verde, as well as the governments of Ethiopia and Nigeria, held exchanges on diaspora engagement (Seychelles, 2022; Tadesse 2022). The convening power of the AfDB can strengthen this not just at a national level but at regional and continental levels also.

Such collaborative work also provides links to narrowing early reasons for failure. A lack of strategic planning to ensure sustainability across the 3-I's can lead to a firework syndrome where diaspora initiatives launch too quickly only to disappear. The lack of strategy and systemic approaches can lead to operational gaps across data, misunderstanding of target audiences, unsuitable engagement processes or tools, weak evaluation, and other areas of execution such as those noted by the JFP. It builds fatigue both from the diaspora as well as other stakeholders including public authorities. Improving this culture of diaspora engagement through systemic design is, in part, the essence of this study as it will help determine the value proposition for AfDB and IOM in advancing their respective and collaborative diaspora engagement portfolios.

Realizing the developmental potentials of diaspora economic and human capital will be rooted in the types of platforms built to systemically address diaspora engagement on the continent. Such platforms can include, for example, diaspora forums, digital hubs (for communication, networking, or engagement tools), policy dialogues and networks, programmatic interventions, and more. By embedding a holistic approach to a continental-level platform to work across such terrains through the collaboration of AfDB and IOM, the mandate of inclusive diaspora engagement can be achieved. In essence, this relates to

identifying the right types of networks that need to be built to underpin any market interventions on diaspora engagement. That is a complex landscape to build out but at a minimum, it must cut across policy and programmatic levels to ensure market readiness for engagement. The key ingredients for success in building such platforms for unlocking diaspora capital is to ensure they adopt this networked approach and deliver engagements through mission-driven, inclusive, and measurable interventions. The next sections of this chapter explore thematic focus areas to further showcase the diversity of actors, approaches, and networks that need considering within such platforms for diaspora engagement.

## **Diaspora human capital for inclusive development: evidence and action**

Human capital is engrained as a deterministic component of inclusive and sustainable development in Agenda 2063. It notes that it will be fully developed as Africa's "most precious resource" (AU, 2015). It pinpoints the development of such capital as an "inter-generational compact" to advance development in Africa (AU, 2015). Within this landscape, the AfDB and IOM have centralized the importance of human capital and human resource development as a primary pillar of their respective developmental visions. For example, AfDB's SEPA action plan identifies building human capital as a necessity to foster inclusive growth. It is also intrinsically linked to the diasporic concept with the advancement of human capital as a primary influence of mobility (AfDB, 2021a). The Migration Policy Framework for Africa pinpoints the developmental impact of such mobility through the lens of diaspora skills where "student and labor mobility can result in "brain gain" and "brain circulation" (AU, 2018b).

Diaspora human capital remains a connective tissue between human and economic developmental impact. In their recent working paper on The Diaspora and Economic Development in Africa for the AfDB, Gnimassoun, and Anyanwu (2019) capture this connectivity in their appraisal that their "results show that the diaspora contributes positively, significantly and robustly to economic development in Africa and this effect increases with the level of education of emigrants." They also argue that such impact opens the potential for the instrumentalization of such capital through the establishment of new tools such as an African Diaspora Summer School amongst other recommendations.

### **Engaging diaspora human capital: the 3-i framework**

Leveraging diaspora human capital from the institutional perspective opens formative questions on the structured engagement process for such work. Embedding a whole-of-government and whole-of-society framework will be a necessity given that diaspora human capital will both be accessed and applied through such institutional collaboration. For example, critical application areas of diaspora human capital can influence business development, economic and political governance, education, technical and vocational skills, and other sectors. This will infuse collaboration between public and private sector institutions as conduits for such capital. Therefore, at a national, regional, and continental level, the institutional composition of engaging diaspora human capital is complex and diverse. This mirrors global challenges outlined in section one on the importance of the Dublin Declaration as addressing coordination is a critical first step in leveraging diaspora human capital.

However, institutional capacitation is also a potential recipient of diaspora human capital as the case studies below showcase. A central motif across the developmental vision of many institutions in Africa is the area of institutional capacity development which can layer in various aspects such as governance and leadership development. The area of governance and accountability, for example, is one of the core aspirational priorities of Africa 2063 (AU, 2015). It is also mainstreamed for AfDB through their African Development Bank Group Capacity Development Strategy 2021 - 2025 with contextual importance woven through other strategies such as their Knowledge Management Strategy, Private Sector Development Policy, and others (AfDB, 2021b, 2022a, AfDB 2008). Diaspora human capital can drive such an agenda.

## **Textbox 2. Snapshot case study: diaspora human capital for institutional capacity – CD4D and MIDA FINNSOM**

IOM's Connecting Diaspora for Development (CD4D) promotes the exchange of technical expertise through an active role of the diaspora based in the Netherlands in selected sectors in four focus countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, and Somalia. In Somalia, MIDA FINNSOM Health and Education, through IOM, initiated 53 diaspora expert assignments and paired 60 Somali youth with experts from the diaspora. The MIDA FINNSOM Drought Outreach linked local and diaspora expertise to help the government in Somaliland with the severe drought situation in early 2017. MIDA FINNSOM Health facilitated similar exchanges of technical expertise and the project included institutional cooperation with the National Institute of Health and Welfare of Finland (IOM, 2018, n.d.a).

Whilst institutional components can be both a driver and recipient of diaspora human capital for development, the informational components bridge the institutional and implementation dynamics. It is imperative to generate access to granular data on the evolving parameters of human capital working across the diaspora. Put simply, this informational reflection determines understanding not what the diaspora can do but what they will do. It is about gauging the varying human capital capacities at work across the intended diaspora audience. This applies to both human and economic capital. It is about cultivating specificity through dialogue and listening to the diaspora. For example, this can be leveraged to create specific engagement vehicles across key components of the marketplace such as gendered and generational diaspora. This amplifies the importance of a people-centric approach to design tailored engagements to align personal motivation and local needs through diaspora and developmental implementations. This means segmenting the diaspora.

The production of such granular data again emphasizes the plurality of institutional actors as such data is often accessed through actors such as CSOs, research institutions, and brokers such as AfDB, AU, IOM, UNDP, and others, rather than national governments or RMCs. This can be particularly relevant for RMCs where issues of fragility or institutional instability limit the capacity of relevant actors to formalize engagement of diaspora human capital. This reflects on the implementation modalities where such actors can also be key enablers of engagement by making the ask of the diaspora to engage.

### **Diaspora Human Capital for Development: A Segmented and Sectoral Approach**

Working towards operations in the development marketplace more generally, it is imperative to advance a segmented and sectoral approach to fully accelerate the developmental impact of diaspora human capital. This will ensure that tailored “asks and tasks” of the diaspora can be built (TNI, 2020).<sup>3</sup> This is also rooted in the reality of the disaggregated capacities that exist within the African diaspora (Lyons and Mandaville, 2010).<sup>4</sup> In his formative work on leveraging diasporic talent, Kuznetsov pinpoints this by noting that the “heterogeneity of the diasporas of highly skilled,” means that “only a few are experienced, successful, and resourceful enough to engage into a dialogue about creating innovation firms and institutional dynamics. But these few individuals are enough to trigger a process of reform” (Kuznetsov, 2010).

Such segmentation allows engagement to also leverage self-interest in the diaspora to engage in their sectoral or professional preferences. This determines a need for nuanced policy and programmatic approaches based on specific market needs at a local, national, and continental level. For example, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) estimates that “70 percent of African MBA students want to return to Africa” (AFD, 2019). Through different structural networks, such diaspora capital can be channeled for sectoral development in Africa at all levels.

<sup>3</sup> The concept of “asks and tasks” is elaborated upon through the four-step process employed in The Networking Institute’s Diaspora Engagement Training Programme.

<sup>4</sup> The concept of disaggregate diaspora draws upon the work of Terrence Lyons and Peter Mandaville (2010).

### **Textbox 3. Snapshot insight story: diaspora as a tipping agent**

In the 1990s, Intel was expanding operations outside the United States. They narrowed their choice to Scotland or Ireland. They initially preferred Scotland as they had concerns over the talent pipeline in Ireland. The inward investment promotion agency in Ireland (IDA Ireland) engaged the Irish diaspora to see if they would return to Ireland if Intel established an operation there. As the then director of operations at IDA Ireland notes, they “talked to around 1,000 Irish engineers who were working in the semiconductor sector to see if they would have an interest in returning home if the work was there. Around 80 percent of them signaled an interest, so that helped persuade Intel” (Taylor, 2021). That initial investment has grown to be valued at approximately \$22 billion for Ireland and would not have happened without diaspora human capital.

The focus on the “repats” market by AFD pinpoints the potential human resources value available through African diaspora human capital. They note that major companies, such as Orange, Unilever, Canal +, and others have “already made the diasporas a major asset for their development in Africa” (AFD, 2019). There is an opportunity then in the African context to create a more conducive policy environment to attract such capital (special categorization of visas, investment prioritization, CSR initiatives, and such) as well as a more productive prospecting and operational environment to attract such capital. The latter can draw in aspects of networking as well as partnerships with the private sector and universities. Shifting such aspiration of return to a reality of return will demand policy and programmatic support supplemented by a compelling and emotive case statement to drive such return. This can come through the promise of contributing to the mission of African development through diaspora human capital.

The linkages between diaspora human and economic capital may not be automatically visible but they are intrinsically linked through examples the role of human capital in private sector development. Considering this, the African diaspora is a unique global network of smart power connections to link the continental economic empowerment of Africa, materialized through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and the global influence the agreement will advance for African industry. The African diaspora can be advisers, advocates, connectors, and “tipping agents or nudge factors” in channeling private sector development in line with the Intel story shared above from large-scale FDI to SME development (TNI, 2019).<sup>5</sup> However, this will require targeted solutions across the needs of each sector to be effective.

Forerunners in the African context of mobilizing such capital include Homecoming Revolution and Localized. Homecoming Revolution is a Pan-African executive talent-searching firm based in South Africa that recently launched InbyEx which is an executive advisory service that utilizes a demand-driven technological platform to provide C-suite expertise from local and diaspora industry experts to firms looking to enter the African market (Homecoming Revolution, n.d.b). Localized is a talent sourcing platform designed as a systemic approach to link sectors and talent pipelines through the knowledge remittances of diaspora leaders across industries to source employment for young talent in emerging markets with industry-leading firms. It has worked with organizations such as the International Finance Corporate, Google, CISCO, and others (Localized, n.d.). Beyond general private sector development, the chapter now explores some key sectors with a view to addressing the current evidence base to extrapolate findings for the recommendations section of the chapter.

### **Education**

Linked to the intrinsic prioritization of human capital development by the AU and a variety of other developmental actors in Africa, the role of diaspora human capital in the development of education in Africa is critical. Forerunner interventions such as the Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Programme (CADFP) have accelerated this work in recent years. The CADFP, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY), implemented with partners such as the IIE, AAU, and others has funded 584 fellowships for African-born scholars from the United States and Canada to collaborate with over 203 institutions of higher learning in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Uganda. In 2022, 56 fellowships were awarded (IIE, n.d.).

<sup>5</sup> The concept of tipping agents is adopted from The Networking Institute’s Diaspora Engagement Training Program. This concept pertains to how diaspora communities can establish networks of affluence and influence by utilizing their human capital to bolster private-sector development.

Such work is critical in building the “transition from the deficit-laden and emotive-ridden discourse in the form of ‘brain drain’ that dominated the dialogue on human mobility for a long time, to a trendy, rewarding and pragmatic form in ‘brain circulation,’” which is “manifesting itself at the center of the interchange between the intellectual diaspora and higher education in developing and emerging countries” (Teferra, 2021). Whilst often rooted in the academic sector, other key diaspora educational exchanges have been advanced in other key areas such as TVET. In Rwanda, through partnership with the government, the IOM implemented a diaspora engagement program to leverage the skills of the diaspora to advance TVET in Rwanda (IOM, 2019b). Other innovative applications are bringing impact on the continent and globally, for example, in specialized diaspora networks aligned with the advancement of STEM.<sup>6</sup>

## *Health*

The impact of COVID-19 drew global attention to the vital role that migrant and diaspora communities play at the executive and technical levels of the health sector. The response to the pandemic also drove innovation in terms of leveraging diaspora human capital through advancements in telemedicine and other areas. For example, the African Diaspora Network (ADN) in Silicon Valley through partnership with industry-leading health companies such as Genentech and Sanofi with seed support from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation developed a telehealth solution to transmit diaspora knowhow digitally back to the continent. Its mission is to expand “digitized healthcare services by mobilizing African medical professionals abroad” (ADN, n.d.a).

As the world steps into a post-pandemic world at various paces, the prioritization of diaspora human capital in the health sector is strengthening. This is a primary opportunity for Africa in terms of diaspora human capital. In June 2022, the IOM and the World Health Organization (WHO) organized a regional roundtable in the Eastern Mediterranean Region which captured the impact that can be built through such capital. The regional director for the WHO noted that “diaspora health professionals can bring a wealth of skills and experience back from abroad, and mechanisms should be put in place to engage them effectively. Engagement in the diaspora of healthcare workers needs to be well coordinated and supported by governments to achieve a sustainable impact. Clear and robust plans, resilient to any unpredicted changes are needed. These plans can extend into preparedness, response, and recovery phases in countries facing emergencies, including the COVID-19 pandemic” (WHO, 2022). This holistic approach pinpoints where such diaspora technical expertise and skills can also be engaged in key sectors to support adaptation strategies in response to the other research areas under consideration in this collection.

## *Agriculture and rural development*

A fascinating subtext to effective diaspora engagement is the fact that diaspora communities are often most committed to supporting development in the local communities of where they come from within a country. There are also pathway projects in this area emerging in Africa. The Loharano project for diaspora youth volunteers in Madagascar was a collaborative initiative between IOM and government actors in Madagascar to support rural development (IOM, 2019c). Building out from this experience, in 2021, the Diaspora Directorate in Madagascar also initiated a diaspora skill profiling to develop tailored interventions with the “long-term vision of establishing the Malagasy diaspora as a major actor of the country’s development in the coming years” (EUDIF, 2021a).

A primary sector of potential impact in the African context in terms of local development is agriculture. For example, IFAD developed a crowdfunding tool through Babyloan Mali which allowed Malians living in Europe to invest in micro-enterprises or Agri-business opportunities in the rural areas of Mali (IFAD, 2020). In Uganda, FAO developed the Ugandan Diaspora in Agribusiness Network (UDAN) and in 2022, launched the first “Ugandan diaspora-youth match-making program to pair young Ugandan Agri-preneurs with the Ugandan diaspora to facilitate diaspora investment capital into agribusiness,” through their Strengthening Capacity to Harness Positive Effects of Migration project (Nalumansi, 2022).

With the prioritization of supporting local and rural development for sustainable development in the African context, this is a rich area of diaspora human capital for development in Africa that also cuts across the three topics of this research collective. Furthermore, such development is a critical cross-cutting

<sup>6</sup> For example, sectoral diaspora networks like diaspora science networks have emerged around the world. These include the European Science Diaspora Network and country-level networks like ASCINA (a network of Austrian scientists in North America) and the Cameroonian Association of Engineers and Computer Scientists in Germany.

theme across AfDB's operational and strategic focus particularly in relation to addressing fragility. The AfDB's Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2022 – 2026 notes that the Bank will allocate technical and financial support to address “rural infrastructure in areas affected by fragility, to help reduce isolation and gender inequalities, promote economic cooperation and diversification, and strengthen access to basic services” (AfDB, 2022b).

### ***Information and communications technology (ICT)***

Across the examples above, the advancement of the ICT sector has brought implications in considering how ICT tools can enhance the engagement of diaspora human capital, but it is also a critical sectoral focus for the involvement of African diaspora human capital. Across this dual focus, respective challenges and opportunities emerge. During the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the power of ICT to spur diaspora engagement became more evident.

ICT has also produced innovation to promote diaspora diplomacy and communications infrastructure for diaspora engagement. This is signaled by META (previously Facebook) developing a senior policy position for diaspora engagement for Africa, the Middle East, and Türkiye (Nalumansi, 2022). The rise of diaspora media platforms has also highlighted how ICT tools are empowering diaspora engagement. However, challenges do remain in such engagement areas. For example, in areas such as diaspora media, it is imperative that such tools are not used for disinformation or misinformation. This could be particularly heightened in countries in fragile situations affected by conflict and other contexts. Institutional leaders in Africa, such as the AfDB, have a critical imprimatur role to play in this regard to build trusted communication networks to support African diaspora engagement.

In the context of supporting the development of the ICT sector in Africa, there has been emergent work to develop platforms to support the inclusion of African diaspora human capital in the development of the ICT sector in Africa. Bantaba is a platform that “connects African tech start-ups with professionals and investors in the African community abroad” (Bantaba, n.d.). They do this through linking diaspora knowledge, capital, and networking to support African tech start-ups. More related to economic capital, this sector has also seen a proliferation of diaspora engagement across sectors such as FinTech which can develop solutions to ensure investment transparency and trust for the diaspora.

### **Diaspora human capital: the evidence base**

The evidence base is robust on the positive impact for development that can be drawn from the inclusive engagement of diaspora human capital. Whilst varying capacities of such capital exist across the African diaspora, it is a natural lens to apply inclusive diaspora engagement as policy and programmatic approaches can be built through active segmentation of the diaspora. It is also a critical engagement tool in familiarizing the diaspora with evolving local marketplace challenges or opportunities to educate potential involvement in different areas of development.

It is also clear from the samples explored in this chapter that there are determining characteristics of building sustainable interventions in diaspora human capital. It is a multistakeholder endeavor and must be embedded as a key strategic and operational priority to avoid some of the lessons for failure identified in section one of the chapter. The importance of policy coherence is critical also in ensuring such engagements positively contribute to safe, orderly, and regular migration by mainstreaming migration and diaspora engagement into appropriate policy frameworks. The strengthening of policy-based talent partnerships is one example of such coherence (ECDPM, 2021).

It will bridge digital and offline operations. Such engagements also need the development of granular datasets on the respective diaspora being engaged. This will require deep interdisciplinary methodological approaches and tools. Furthermore, such engagements must be seen as part of a continuum of diaspora engagement where human capital is networked to other areas of potential developmental impact. Local African leadership, from RMCs, RECs, and continental actors, is as important as diaspora leadership in making such engagements prosper. It can also cut across philanthropic deployment of human capital in areas such as volunteering and mentorship whilst also being a profitable enterprise in areas such as advisory services, human resources, and market consultancy.

## Diaspora economic capital for inclusive development: evidence and action

Remittances remain the natural entry point for many in conceptualizing diaspora economic capital for development. Whilst they are important exemplifiers of the commitment of diaspora communities to families and local communities as well as clear evidence of how migration is a livelihood strategy for many low-income and fragility-affected communities, they form just one part of the developmental scope of diaspora economic capital.

Collectively the development sector has led important advancements in the remittance marketplace to try to mobilize such finance for local development. As outlined by Hagen-Zancker (2016), this work has been broadly categorized into two areas focusing on “strengthening the remittances infrastructure,” and “leveraging the use of remittances for development.”

The first area has the primary focus of tackling transaction costs which can come from promoting increased competition, increased transparency, and encouraging innovative money transfer technologies (Hagen-Zancker, 2016). The second area pinpoints some procedural steps as identified by Hagen-Zancker (2016) to include “government incentives to ensure remittances are spent on development, such as tax breaks, special deposit accounts, matching funds, investment vehicles, and civil society initiatives. These include cross-selling of other complementary financial services, channeling remittances through microfinance institutions, and securitization of remittances.” There is now an emergent consideration that engagement of diaspora economic capital must think through and beyond remittances as certain dynamics explored above relate more to areas of diaspora finance and investment which should be treated as separate channels of diaspora economic capital for development, independent of the remittance lens.

Remittances do however showcase the commitment and resilience of diasporas which is an important pathway to understanding the scale of potential economic opportunity through diaspora engagement. According to the World Bank, the developing countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region “accrued remittances totaling \$61 billion during 2021, with growth in aggregate registering a strong 7.6 percent,” with the gain particularly driven by “robust inflows into Morocco (\$10.4 billion), a 40 percent advance, and an upturn in Egyptian receipts to \$31.5 billion, a 6.4 percent increase” (World Bank, 2022). They are forecasted to grow to \$65 billion and \$68 billion in 2022 and 2023 respectively (World Bank, 2022).

According to the World Bank, in the region, such remittances have “long constituted the largest source of external resource flows for developing Middle East and North Africa—among ODA, FDI, and portfolio equity and debt flows—accounting for a full 61 percent of total inflows in 2021” (World Bank, 2022). In Sub-Saharan Africa, remittance inflows “soared 14.1 percent to \$49 billion in 2021 more than erasing the falloff of 8.1 percent recorded in the prior year and representing the strongest gain since 2018” (World Bank, 2022). They are forecasted to grow to \$53 billion and \$55 billion in 2022 and 2023 respectively (World Bank, 2022).

In terms of the remittance cost, in 2021, sending \$200 to the MENA region “eased to an average of 6.4 percent in Q4 2021 from 6.6 percent in Q4 2020,” and the cost of sending the same amount to Sub-Saharan Africa region had an aggregate regional remittance cost averaging “7.8 percent during Q4 2021” (World Bank, 2022). In Q4 of 2012, the average cost to send remittances to the MENA region was 7.85 percent and 12.4 percent to Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2012). This shows that varied progress has been ongoing in the sector in terms of reducing remittance costs. There is, however, high volatility in cost in certain corridors (a high of 31.5 percent to a low of 3.4 percent in different corridors in Sub-Saharan Africa region as well as much higher costs to send remittances from outside the region (12.2 percent) as compared to within the region (2.5 percent)) (World Bank, 2022). The World Bank notes that “intraregional remittance costs are quite high due to the small quantities of formal flows and utilization of black-market exchange rates” (World Bank, 2022). This divergence is amplified in important given the intraregional migration composition of the African diaspora explored earlier in the chapter.

Although remittances are a private source of capital for migrants and diaspora, the IOM estimates that, in terms of formal remittances, up to 30 percent of such capital may be left over and leveraged for local investment and developmental purposes once family needs are accounted for. The varied impact of previous interventions on remittances for local development emphasizes the importance of working beyond such entry points to a fuller appreciation of diaspora economic capital for development. This opens critical new lines of analysis and application that can scale up diaspora economic interventions through and beyond remittances, particularly given the wider economic impact of migrant communities.


For example, in 2015, McKinsey estimated that migrants contribute 9.4 percent of global GDP (\$6.7 trillion) which equated to some \$3 trillion USD more than they would have produced in their origin countries (McKinsey, 2016). This shows their impact as migrants currently represent only 3.5 per cent of the world's population (IOM 2019d). As the definition of diaspora in this chapter includes descendants of migrants then the diaspora impact is likely greater.

In the Diaspora Finance for Development: From Remittances to Investment report commissioned by the European Commission (EC), Gelb et al. (2021), probe the critical developmental advantage of a wider economic capital lens through the diaspora investment framework. They position diaspora investment as a lens to more fully understand diaspora economic capital given it is “a distinct form of financial transaction from remittances and as such should be specifically considered in its own terms” (Gelb et al., 2021). It argues that three key features distinguish it from remittances:

- “Diaspora investment is sent (or caused to be sent) by diaspora members, that is, people living outside the receiving country who maintain affective ties to that country, but who have not necessarily emigrated from the receiving country.
- Diaspora investment can be received by business enterprises, government organizations, or non-government organizations – that is, by economic units other than households in the receiving country.
- Diaspora investment is a two-way exchange, involving the provision of a return on the investment with corresponding value from the recipient(s) to the sender(s). In contrast, remittances are a one-way transfer” (Gelb et al., 2021).

They classify the distinguishers of diaspora investment and remittances as follows:

**Figure 3. Distinctions between Remittances and diaspora investment**



Source: Gelb et al. (2021).

The functionality of such investment is then considered through various financing tools that can be developed to unlock such capital across both areas of economic capital. These tools include targeting investment through individual remittances, collective remittances, and philanthropy. Diaspora investment creates economic opportunities, including equity, loans, bonds, and access to investment knowledge (Gelb et al., 2021). The consideration of knowledge is important also in the context of this study as it marks the important crossover between diaspora human and economic capital explored earlier. Additionally, the role of countries of destination is an often-underappreciated dynamic in leveraging diaspora economic capital. Conducive fiscal and trade policy in countries of destination, for example, can spur diaspora giving in support to countries of origin and within countries of destination.

This baseline consideration of potential engagements is supplemented by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) consideration of diaspora finance and the products available to leverage such capital for development for countries of origin. With this perspective, the analysis should not be treated as exhaustive as other instruments for mobilizing diaspora economic capital may be channeled through countries of destination (such as donor-advised funds and other instruments). They identify key factors such as economic conditions in countries and communities of origin; enabling policies and regulations; open digital payment infrastructure and network development; empowered customers and inclusive innovation. Some products they identify include Micro-Savings (M-Savings) bonds, endowment savings accounts, savings and credit cooperative societies, pension schemes, insurance, mortgages, and collective investment schemes (UNCDF, 2021).

Given the important role of the AfDB in creating the enabling environment for such factors and products, they will play a critical role in safeguarding policy, procedural, and product development for leveraging diaspora economic capital. With the AU, IOM, UNDP, and other actors setting programmatic frameworks to engage such capital, there is a leadership opportunity to strengthen coordination for accelerating the role of diaspora economic capital in Africa's development. For example, through the Integrated National Financing Frameworks (INFF), UNDP, IOM, and other actors across the UN network have developed creative solutions to potentially target such diaspora finance. For example, in Cabo Verde, it supported the development of the Fundo Lavanta and the Negocia platform (Joint SDG Fund, 2022). Fundo Lavanta is a domestic revolving credit scheme that the government created with the support of UNDP which is mobilized through the Negocia platform. Plans for the scheme are exploring the potential to include diaspora investors, along with other potential providers of credit in the platform, to support MSMEs in Cabo Verde. During the three-week application period for Fundo Lavanta, over 300 entrepreneurs applied for funding across five categories of projects: green economy (33 percent), blue economy (31 percent), digital (15 percent), social and health (10 percent), and other (10 percent) (Joint SDG Fund, 2022). This indicates the potential for diaspora finance to engage emergent sectoral priorities for sustainable development in Africa, such as green and blue economies. The INFF initiative is being rolled out in 38 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, out of which 15 have put both diaspora investment and remittances as a priority (AU, IOM, UNDP, n.d.).

### **Engaging Diaspora economic capital for development: The 3-I Framework**

Diaspora economic engagement for development must remain responsive to the different capacities active across the diaspora. This aligns with the segmentation approach advocated in section two. Regarding diaspora economic capital, this corresponds to building “mile-wide, inch-deep” engagements that engage large numbers in the African diaspora, thus ensuring inclusivity. However, the African diaspora will also include overachievers who will require “inch-wide, mile-deep” engagements that can focus on networks of transformative impact (TNI, 2020).<sup>7</sup> This model respects the need for inclusivity and the diasporic reality that certain diaspora members may be able to do more for development than others. For example, this is often seen in the realm of diaspora philanthropy where high net-worth individuals can play a transformative role in development in countries of origin and destination (Aikins and Russell, 2022).

This nuanced approach to ensure inclusivity is critical to understanding the institutional, informational, and implementation dynamics for effective engagement of diaspora economic capital. As the UNCDF research implies, institutional dynamics will require important policy, regulatory, and legislative considerations for diaspora financing. This means that relevant policies and frameworks for RMCs, RECs, and continental actors will need to further prioritize the consideration of diaspora economic capital. Furthermore, the public-private linkages to effectively mobilize such capital are clear. The institutional frameworks must actualize a layered governance approach for engaging diaspora economic capital.

At the informational level, robust R&D will cut across areas such as data needs, feasibility planning, communication and prospecting strategies, and diaspora marketing. These will have different demands depending on the intended diaspora audience. Effective delivery of these levers will function as a risk management process for the implementation stage. However, embracing the collaborative implementation asks for economic capital is particularly important across different products or portfolios of diaspora finance. For example, in countries with limited institutional frameworks or those affected by fragility, the brokerage role of the AfDB, AU, IOM, diaspora organizations, or other actors may be instrumental in moving the diaspora to act by providing trustworthy interlocutors.

### **Mobilizing diaspora financing for inclusive development: models and factors for success**

The chapter provides a sectoral snapshot of engagement that works across policy and programmatic approaches to diaspora economic capital for African development. The sectoral focus has been identified to align with the priorities of the Bank-wide operations of the AfDB and the institutional work of IOM. They should be treated as a sampling of diaspora economic involvement as it is beyond the scope of this chapter to develop an exhaustive capturing of the sectoral impact of such diaspora engagement.


<sup>7</sup> Concept adapted from The Networking Institute's Diaspora Engagement Training Programme.

## Diaspora marketing and export promotion

An area of diaspora economic capital that is generating impact across multiple sectors in Africa is diaspora marketing. With examples ranging from sectors including banking, creative industries, nostalgia trade, tourism, and other sectors, the importance of diaspora marketing is positioning the African diaspora as a competitive marketplace where the diaspora can play distinct roles. The diaspora can be advocates, connectors, consumers, and investors. Flagship initiatives like Ghana's Year of the Return are primary examples of diaspora marketing delivering cross-sectoral impact.

However, other sectors such as the banking industry, are also embracing the importance of diaspora marketing to advance their product offerings as outlined in the consideration of diaspora financing. For example, the Bank of Kigali recently completed a diaspora banking competition "Bank Home and Win Big" which provided prizes such as free travel to Rwanda for eligible diaspora customers (Ufitiwabo, 2022). Other analyses have also pinpointed how diaspora markets can be important scaling tools for unlocking new markets for businesses, in areas such as export promotion. In their analyses of diaspora marketing in the Harvard Business Review, Kumar and Steenkamp (2013) articulate further the importance of the segmentation approach in such marketing. They identify four categories of diaspora communities:

**Figure 4. Categorization of diaspora marketing**



Source: Kumar and Steenkamp (2013)

On the informational dynamics of effective engagement, there is also an important distinction to be made between diaspora messaging and marketing. The Global Irish Communications Handbook explores this in its appreciation that messages underpin marketing in that they "are a constant and should be based on your fundamental values, concerns and work" (Ireland, 2018). This distinction is critical to work through. The messages will be determined by the principles and values of engagement that, if not aligned with diaspora expectations, will make diaspora marketing futile.

### *Blended finance and diaspora investment: engagements for impact*

The potential entry points for the acceleration of diaspora economic capital for development are multifaceted. Therefore, the chapter adopts a primary consideration of diaspora investment and blended finance to identify thematic subsets of diaspora engagement that can serve under these frameworks for developmental impact. Blended finance is the "strategic use of development finance for the mobilization of additional finance towards sustainable development in developing countries" (OECD, n.d.). Its application under the rubric of diaspora economic capital through diaspora investment identifies sample subsets of roles and sectors.

The roles of the diaspora across these areas can be direct and indirect. The latter focuses on the tipping agent concept advanced in section two of the chapter on human capital. The former focuses on the instrumentalization of diaspora finance for development and this has witnessed several approaches cutting across policy and programmatic interventions. These have positioned diaspora as key contributors to inward investment such as enterprise development, ethical and social investment, export promotion, FDI (including DDI), infrastructural development, rural development, and more, through the tools identified earlier.

Whilst the role of diasporas in entrepreneurship and enterprise development across Africa is often based on the role of diaspora finance for support of entrepreneurship, there are now emerging initiatives that supplement this with the active involvement of diaspora entrepreneurs in addressing opportunities in the continent. For example, in the past few years, Ashoka – the world’s leading organization for social enterprise – has established diaspora networks as a core pillar of priority for their operations, including in Africa (Ashoka, 2020). More programmatic offerings have been developed by diaspora networks such as the African Diaspora Network which runs the Builders of Africa’s Future program to support “African entrepreneurs running early-stage non-profits or for-profit businesses that address key community needs through technology or differentiated business models” (ADN, n.d.b). Another example is the Mauritian Diaspora Scheme. The scheme is a policy-based intervention that incentivizes diaspora economic engagement by providing customs, excise, and income tax breaks, residency options, and business registration incentives for the Mauritian diaspora to return to Mauritius (Government of Mauritius, n.d.).

In nurturing diaspora entrepreneurship and enterprise development between Africa and Europe, MEET Africa (Mobilisation Européenne pour l’Entrepreneuriat en Afrique) is a diaspora entrepreneurship development project between Europe and Africa implemented by Expertise France, co-financed with 8.5 million euros by the European Union and the AFD (MEET Africa, n.d.). The program built local leadership in Africa by establishing partnerships with eight institutional partners in Africa. To date, it has engaged over 1000 diaspora entrepreneurs, supported 140 companies, and funded over 170 companies (MEET Africa, n.d.).

In terms of structured policy interventions, flagship initiatives such as the Nigerian Diaspora Bond are noteworthy, and the success of this bond was also influenced by strategic diaspora marketing. The work to establish a Nigerian Diaspora Investment Trust Fund, recently approved by the political leadership in Nigeria, will be an important case study to gauge how impactful the country can be in instrumentalizing transactional diaspora economic engagements through bonds towards more mainstreamed, continuous offerings.<sup>8</sup> Other continental solutions are also being developed.

#### **Textbox 4. Snapshot case study: African Diaspora Finance Corporation (ADFC)**

At the Global African Diaspora Summit (GADS) held in South Africa in 2012, an agreement was reached to establish a diaspora investment fund as a lasting initiative of the summit. Subsequently, in 2018, research efforts were undertaken to realize this vision, resulting in the creation of the Strategic, Business, and Operational Framework for an African Diaspora Finance Corporation, led by Prof. Gibril Faal. In 2022, the African Union (AU) officially adopted this framework. The ADFC is an independent, non-AU continental finance institution, operating as a social enterprise and working together with other African and global finance, development, and diaspora institutions. It will operationalize RemitAID as an innovative diaspora financing tool. To harness and channel diaspora savings and resources into socially responsible and impactful ventures in priority sectors in Africa, it will develop, issue, and manage diaspora bonds and mutual funds. ADFC profits and surpluses will be invested in a legacy Endowment Fund. Profits and surpluses made by the Endowment Fund will be disbursed in the form of grants and soft loans to African development organizations and institutions, both in the diaspora and on the continent.

Beyond policy-based interventions, platforms such as WIDU Africa, implemented by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), leverages diaspora economic capital for support of new and

<sup>8</sup> The Nigerian Diaspora Investment Trust Fund was only recently approved for implementation, and it is yet to be operationalized. For more information, please see Terhembe Daka, Buhari okays investment trust fund to promote foreign remittances, The Guardian Nigeria. 12 January 2022.

existing small businesses in Africa through the diaspora in Europe. It “applies an innovative approach that combines funding and coaching” to strengthen such businesses. In terms of financing support, the African entrepreneur and the diaspora member are responsible for 25 percent each with WIDU providing the other 50 percent (WIDU Africa, n.d.). It currently operates in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, and Togo. Key results include the disbursement of 4.2 million Euros in grants with over 3000 businesses engaged as well as 44 percent of entrepreneurs being women (WIDU Africa, n.d.). Similarly, the DIASDEV project is a joint initiative of the French Development Agency together with the Moroccan, Tunisian, Senegalese, French, and Italian Caisses des Dépôts to “increase diasporas’ capacity to mobilize their savings for investing in their countries of origin,” through a facilitation fund for diasporas’ investments, offering funding for technical and financial assistance to financial operators, banks, post offices and a rating and labeling tool on diaspora offerings (AFD, 2021; UNNM, n.d.).

## **Diaspora and impact: humanitarianism and philanthropy**

Another important subset to consider is rooted by the fact that diaspora economic capital engagements often begin in the natural entry points for many diaspora communities in how they engage with home – through an ethics of care.<sup>9</sup> The role of diaspora in the humanitarianism-peace-development nexus is critical in this regard as it conveys how the role of diasporas in across the nexus and within work to address situations of fragility, such as climate or conflict-induced disaster, can be a critical agent in development. This cuts across many roles such as disaster risk reduction through to crisis and emergency response. One such area of engagement can be philanthropy as it addresses a cross-cutting focus of this research collection, local root cause change to issues affecting migration.

In terms of diaspora economic capital, the area of diaspora philanthropy is quite often one of the first involvements for diasporas to begin to think through impact-focused giving. Globally, it has played a transformative role in energizing the diaspora to think about how to give more strategically. Philanthropy, for many, is considered “the art and science of strategic giving” (Frumkin, 2006). Effective philanthropy is not about alleviating the ills of a particular issue. It is about addressing the root cause of that issue. It takes an investor, long-term mindset to the application of its giving. It is strategic and that is its potential power for African development. Other trends like the forthcoming Inter-Generational Transfer of Wealth (which Accenture estimates to be \$30 trillion alone in North America) also pinpoint the potential of this area for African development (Accenture, 2015). Committing support to cultivate and steward African diaspora philanthropy can bring transformative impact for development through blended finance tools.

Additional exemplary work by the IOM through their Diaspora Voices initiative to address climate change, their humanitarian webinars in 2021 co-organized by various IOM offices, iDiaspora, Shabaka, and Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform (ADEPT), as well as the work of other actors such as Danish Refugee Council and USAID through Diaspora Emergency and Action Coordination (DEMAC) have developed critical progress in the work to institutionalize diaspora actors within formal humanitarian systems (IOM, n.d.; DEMAC, 2022). Through support of knowledge management and capacity development of diaspora organizations, it has led to an increased appreciation of diaspora communities as key humanitarian actors in terms of building resilience and response to issues through economic and human capital. This has recently been seen in the role of the diaspora in humanitarian action addressing COVID-19 in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Somalia, the Sudan and Zimbabwe as explored by Shabaka (Shabaka, 2021).

Beyond the humanitarian lens, there are also emerging examples of how impact-driven investment and giving is reshaping the diaspora economic capital landscape. For example, the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund (EDTF) is a non-profit organization established to mobilize the global Ethiopian diaspora community to raise funds for vital socioeconomic projects in Ethiopia. They have also launched The Relief Fund which aims to finance specific short-term relief initiatives that meet critical emergency needs selected based on their potential to have an immediate positive impact on the Ethiopian people in need (EDTF, 2019, n.d.).

## **Diaspora and sustainability: the green economy**

The importance of impact, particularly environmental and social impact, must remain a guiding light of the developmental ask of the African diaspora. Such tasks are transforming to address issues of climate and sustainability through the green economy. For example, Zidicircle and SNV (The Netherlands Development

<sup>9</sup> The concept of an ethics of care is adapted from the work of Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, Mark Boyle and Brenda S.A. Yeoh (2014).

Organization) Ghana recently launched the Green Venture Backers Programme with the aim to train aspiring angel investors both in the diaspora and in Ghana on how to invest in green economy start-ups and SMEs in Ghana. This program is solely focused on certain sectors in the green economy namely, Food & Agriculture, Renewable Energy and WASH (Water, Sanitation, Hygiene) (Zidicircle, 2022).

A recent report on the role of diasporas in the green transition provided the following recommendations: “Increase the visibility of opportunities by capitalizing on information and experiences in the sector through more structured communication; strengthen skills and knowledge transfer schemes to learn from past experiences as well as enhance the skills of the diaspora and local partners; Provide financial incentives for diaspora initiatives in the green economy sector and facilitate access to finance, especially from banks; Strengthen the integration of these issues into existing or future partnership arrangements (partnership agreements, calls for projects, dedicated funding, etc) based on a flexible approach; Building the capacity of the diaspora and other stakeholders in the green economy; and develop diaspora intervention frameworks that generate green economy activities, stressing the benefits of co-creation for better sustainability and impact” (EUDIF, 2022). The AfDB and IOM can collaboratively respond to such recommendations to further connect the role of diasporas in the green economy which can have cross-cutting impacts across the thematic areas of the chapter.

## **Diaspora financial capital: the evidence base**

The evidence base on engaging diaspora economic capital for development denotes the centrality of multi-stakeholder governance and implementation. Within such approaches, the varying levels of institutionalization operating across the different RMCs or RECs will have an intrinsic impact on the role of government in nurturing such engagement. The importance of a brokerage model will be critical.

Based on lessons from large fundraising with the diaspora, this boils down to the lesson that the number one reason why diasporas commit financial support is belief in the mission of the project, and the second reason is because of who asks them (TNI, 2019).<sup>10</sup> In building sustainability by envisioning diaspora economic engagement as habitual and not transactional, such brokers will have to be reliable. The AfDB has a critical role to play in being the continental innovator in this regard to contribute to a continental-level response to formalize diaspora engagement.

This opens formative considerations for advancing a more systemic governance and operational framework for engaging diaspora economic capital. In many ways, African diaspora engagement for development is evolving from an exploratory phase to an expansionist phase. This will bring different expectations of supply from institutional leadership in Africa at a local, regional, and continental level from the perspective of the African diaspora. These form the core considerations in the recommendations of this chapter but early signaling by key institutions on the continent pinpoint their willingness to engage in such expansionist opportunities.

An imperative factor for accelerating the developmental potential of diaspora economic capital is ensuring that diaspora communities as well as local communities in Africa who are leveraging such capital are supported through digital and financial inclusion. Whilst initiated in the context of remittance mobilization, financial education support has emerged as a central aspect of driving sustainable impact from inclusive diaspora engagement.

INFF implementation models, for example, have advanced the topic as a key support area. Traditional capacity development tools such as training have also been complemented by digital development tools in the area. For example, GiZ in 2022 launched a free E-learning program to better equip diaspora communities in Germany, including the African diaspora, with financial education on how to utilize their remittances. The program has four main modules: fit to remit, fit to save, fit to invest, and fit to entrepreneur (GiZ, 2022).

This focus can lay foundational support to the AfDB’s wider vision and mandate to support digital and financial inclusion on the continent. Through the work of their Africa Digital Financial Inclusion Facility, the AfDB has been at the forefront of advancing this. Such work underpins a foundational factor for success in diaspora engagement. Effective diaspora engagement gives to the diaspora first to ensure they are best equipped to channel their diaspora capital in all its forms for development purposes.

<sup>10</sup> Insight drawn from The Networking Institute’s Philanthropy and Fundraising Training Program.

## Inclusive diaspora engagement for development: research recommendations

Collaboration across societal sectors has emerged as one of the defining concepts of international development in the 21st century. Initially in part a response to the limitations of traditional state-led, top-down development approaches, partnerships have grown to become an essential paradigm in sustainable development (Stibbe, 2018).

The scope of policy and programmatic interventions highlighted in this chapter illuminates the prolific growth of diaspora engagement across the continent. For example, in their research on global diaspora investment tools, Gelb et al. (2021) identified that across a repository of over 300 diaspora investment initiatives, Africa was the largest geographical recipient of diaspora finance mechanisms (97 initiatives) and diaspora knowledge mechanisms (37 initiatives). Coupled with the fact that in a scoping analysis of 41 African countries on diaspora engagement, it was found that 21 countries have a diaspora engagement policy or are in the process of drafting one, and 30 have at least one diaspora-related institution, this signals a growing systemic opportunity for inclusive diaspora engagement in Africa (Tittel-Mosser, 2021). This is further substantiated by the work of the AU to advance the Diaspora Engagement Self-Assessment Tool (DESAT) which allows AU Member States to systematically review and assess their current diaspora engagement environment (AU, 2019c).


However, activity does not automatically equate to progress and impact. There can, for example, be a danger of duplication of effort and expenditure. Systemic approaches to inclusive diaspora engagement for development in Africa have arrived at a critical juncture. By furthering their leadership in the diaspora sector, the AfDB and IOM will be critical in fully executing the developmental potential of inclusive diaspora engagement for development on the continent.

There is a collaborative opportunity, as identified by Stibbe above, to shift from ad hoc service to systemic support of the sector. This can spark and sustain a collaborative culture of excellence and experimentation to embrace emerging opportunities in diaspora engagement. This must meet the demands of inclusive diaspora engagement identified in section one of the chapter: economic inclusion, social inclusion, spatial inclusion, and political inclusion.

Such leadership has already shown signals of the impact this could bring. For example, it has been noted by EUDIF that “the majority of diaspora engagement policies were adopted (or drafted) after Agenda 2063 was proposed in 2015 (2015: Burundi, Ethiopia and Mauritius; 2016: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Zimbabwe; 2017: Djibouti; 2019: Chad, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia)” (Tittel-Mosser, 2021). Similarly, trends towards institutionalization of diaspora engagement were noted as “more obviously visible in countries involved in the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, which have been beneficiaries of external donor support in this regard, in particular from the EU and EU member states and other international stakeholders such as IOM, ICMPD, UNHCR, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank” (Tittel-Mosser, 2021).

Considering this, the chapter provides the following internal recommendations for AfDB and IOM respectively as well as a core set of collaborative recommendations to strengthen their partnership on inclusive diaspora engagement for development through diaspora human and economic capital. Whilst these recommendations focus on AfDB and IOM, the study acknowledges the integral role that existing and additional partners can play in furthering impact through collaboration for AfDB and IOM.

**Figure 5. Internal and collaborative recommendations for AfDB and IOM**



Source: Author's own elaboration.

## **Institutional recommendations for AfDB and IOM to accelerate inclusive diaspora engagement for development**

The collaborative recommendations will be driven by some small but important preliminary internal recommendations for both institutions. These are provided below.

### ***AfDB internal recommendations***

With diaspora engagement a potential crosscutting added value for the institutional vision, mission, and mandate of the AfDB, the short-term recommendation is to focus on the internal institutional capacitation of a One Bank approach to the topic. There will be an educational and informational process to follow to ensure the current prioritization of diaspora engagement is advanced across the organization. This can be termed as "diasporizing" the Bank. Key steps in this process can include the embedding of diaspora engagement as a component in appropriate strategic documents in the sectoral strategies of the Bank as well as direct capacity development training for relevant executive and technical staff in the Bank.

Through this process, it can evolve to the second recommendation which is an internal agenda-setting functionality in the Bank on inclusive diaspora engagement through an Action Plan. This will result in the establishment of a formal strategic approach to diaspora engagement which can be based on the evidence in the field and research markets. IOM can play an important supportive role here given their institutional knowledge on the topic.

This aligns to ensuring institutional coherence as the diaspora engagement action plan for the Bank can be seen "as an overarching framework for providing a level of coherence to the range of diaspora policies devised and implemented by a variety of agencies," across the Bank (Ancien, Boyle, and Kitchin, 2009).<sup>11</sup> This can also explore options on how to institutionalize diaspora engagement across the organizational composition of the Bank. This can channel the rationale for the allocation of budgetary capacity to enact sustainable diaspora engagement in the Bank through existing instruments and, if required in time due to market demand, additional facilitation of budgetary support through new instruments.

### ***IOM recommendations***

The IOM has repeatedly showcased its leadership on diaspora engagement across the continent. A challenging context however has been the internal coordination of activities across country and regional offices to build out technical dynamics such as knowledge management and the advancement of a singular vision given the geographical and sectoral scope of interventions developed by the organization.

<sup>11</sup> is definition of a diaspora strategy is adapted from Ancien, D., Boyle, M., and Kitchin, R. (2009). 'Exploring Diaspora Strategies: An International Comparison'. NUI Maynooth Workshop Report, June.

By establishing a visionary leadership framework through key conceptual threads such as the continental integration and mobility agendas, the IOM can begin to nurture a new coordinated era of diaspora engagement on the continent.

## Collaborative recommendations for AfDB and IOM to accelerate inclusive diaspora engagement for development

The collaborative recommendations have been designed to combine the respective institutional expertise and mandates of AfDB and IOM through the evidence generated in this chapter to service an inclusive range of stakeholders on the continent. These recommendations identify collaborative entry points for AfDB and IOM to shape their interventions in diaspora engagement in Africa. The specificities built across each pillar of recommendation will require a phase of active consultation and co-design through AfDB and IOM with different stakeholders on what these specificities should be.

The outcome of these recommendations is to build the connective and collaborative framework through which the specificities of direct market intervention can be shaped by active input across respective actors in each institution and with other stakeholders. This systemic approach will allow for appropriate market interventions to emanate as needed across diaspora human and economic capital. To initiate the development of these recommendations, a grounding recommendation would be to develop an AfDB and IOM Diaspora Engagement Working Group that centralizes the co-design of potential interventions across the pillars below. Given the mandate of the Bank and IOM's knowledge and technical programming in the subject matter, diaspora economic capital can be at the center of this working group with a supplementary focus on human capital and other areas under consideration in the recommendations. This will help to nurture more meaningful institutional collaboration between the two institutions to achieve the recommendations proposed.

The recommendations cut across three key pillars that collectively advance inclusive diaspora engagement for strategic sectoral development:

Collaborative Recommendation Pillar	Respective Roles of AfDB & IOM in Collaboration	Operational Modalities
Diaspora Engagement Policy and Legislative Development	<p><b>AfDB:</b> Technical Partner &amp; Financier, Implementation Vehicle</p> <p><b>IOM:</b> Advisor, Knowledge &amp; Implementation Partner</p>	Inclusion of diaspora components in existing modalities and distribution networks of both institutions.
Diaspora Human and Economic Capital Programming	<p><b>AfDB:</b> Technical Partner, Financier, &amp; Implementation Vehicle</p> <p><b>IOM:</b> Technical Partner, Financier, &amp; Implementation Vehicle</p>	Dual approach of scaling market exemplars and design of sectoral and thematic interventions through innovation of existing facilities of both institutions.
Diaspora Engagement Knowledge Management	<p><b>AfDB:</b> Co-ordination Lead &amp; Knowledge Management Contributor</p> <p><b>IOM:</b> Platform Builder, Knowledge Builder, &amp; Knowledge Management Actor</p>	Elevation of knowledge management capacities on diaspora engagement through existing platforms and tools of both institutions (e.g., iDiaspora).

### ***Pillar one: diaspora engagement policy and legislative development***

This pillar focuses on building AfDB and IOM collaboration through policy and legislative development for diaspora engagement. This recommendation responds to the growing prioritization of diaspora engagement from RMCs and RECs to formalize diaspora engagement through coherent policy and legislative frameworks. There is still work ahead to support RMCs, RECs, and others in advancing coherent policy and legislative frameworks for diaspora engagement. This cuts across both the design and implementation of such frameworks.

This will centralize African governments as the prime beneficiaries of this collaboration and strengthen their role in safeguarding further institutionalization of diaspora engagement to underpin programmatic interventions on diaspora human and economic capital. Without this underpinning, diaspora engagement will likely remain ad hoc on the continent which will limit the potential impact of efforts to instrumentalize diaspora engagement for development in areas such as human and economic capital. This can be most purposefully addressed at a regional level to ensure the scale of the market for recommendations in the programming pillar.

Specific recommendations within this pillar are to utilize existing platforms, partnerships, and agenda rooted through AfDB's convening power to advance an African Diaspora Policy Alliance, potentially built across RECs, as a forerunner of the Global Diaspora Policy Alliance envisioned in the Dublin Declaration. This can nurture a network of expertise across the public sector, private sector, research community, philanthropic community, and other key sectors to build knowledge and processes to support RMCs and RECs in delivering policies of excellence to underpin diaspora engagement for development in Africa.

Through such partnership, it is envisaged that regional policy and legislative development programs be advanced to support RMCs and RECs who have already developed or expressed a desire to develop diaspora engagement policies and strategies. This can include legislative support to best formalize and institutionalize diaspora engagement, support implementation of finalized diaspora policies or strategies, and develop products and services for human and economic capital engagement suitable to the local context of RMCs and RECs. The bridging from policy creation to implementation remains a strong barrier for growth in diaspora engagement for many countries in Africa and this recommendation is to help provide a solution to this barrier. It is also to advance the embryonic regional lens to drive diaspora engagement at that level. It can ensure a link between continental leadership to regional and local implementation for diaspora engagement.

The policy and legislative base to nurture sustainable diaspora engagement is arguably the foremost determinant of impact in accelerating diaspora and human capital for development in Africa as it will create the enabling environment for engagement to flourish. Whilst ground-breaking work has been done over the past decade or so on these issues, this pillar focuses on positioning the AfDB and IOM as coordinators of maturing progress through the role of advisor, technical partner, and potential financier of such growth. In essence, this pillar works to ensure market readiness for scalable engagements of diaspora human and economic capital.

### ***Pillar two: diaspora human and economic capital programming***

Pillar two focuses on diaspora capital programming to accelerate diaspora human and economic capital for development in Africa. The sustainability and scale of diaspora engagement programs from a multitude of stakeholders, particularly diaspora organizations, both in Africa and globally need to be addressed.

The recommendations of this pillar are essentially two-fold. Firstly, it is to leverage AfDB's and IOM's institutional networks to support connections for growth for existing exemplars in terms of African diaspora engagement facilities, initiatives, or networks working in relation to diaspora human and economic capital. Through low-cost and effective 'championing' communication campaigns, the AfDB and IOM can provide an important connector role to open new opportunities for existing leaders in the African diaspora landscape.

The second dynamic in this pillar is to develop a continental-level platformed solution (i.e., digital and in-person) within a preferred current instrument of AfDB and IOM's institutional apparatus to mobilize diaspora economic and human capital across core prioritized sectors or thematic areas identified by AfDB and IOM. As outlined in section one, this platformed solution will need to develop interventions that are

mission-driven, inclusive with respect to different diaspora capacities or networks, and measurable, to build impactful diaspora engagement.

Key informant interviews for this research pinpointed the need for AfDB and IOM as an honest broker to facilitate more effective diaspora engagement, especially from the diaspora perspective, to drive trusted engagement. The platformed solution can work to map engagements of financial and non-financial capitals to core strategic sectoral development priorities through specific diaspora offerings in line with the sectors and capitals explored in this chapter. Specific prioritization of sectors and offerings can come through collaborative co-design of AfDB, IOM, and partner entities.

The advancement of this pillar serves the purpose of centralizing the African diaspora as an active beneficiary and contributor to the engagement process by innovating existing operational modalities. This will ensure that the collaborative recommendations of pillars one and two combine to ensure the partnership of AfDB and IOM addresses the institutional, informational, and implementation components shared in this study through inclusive, multi-stakeholder operational modalities.

### ***Pillar three: diaspora engagement knowledge management***

Pillar three focuses on the imperative of knowledge management to support diaspora engagement in Africa. The focus of this recommendation should be viewed as a constant in the preparation and application of the other two pillars. Actors such as the AfDB, AU, IOM, UNDP, and others have been doing formative work in trying to standardize knowledge aggregation in the sector. However, there is an obvious opportunity to support more structured aggregation and distribution of knowledge to inform policy and programmatic interventions in diaspora engagement in Africa.

The infrastructure for this purpose is already in place within both AfDB and IOM through their research and development components. The recommendation of this pillar is twofold: first, to gather and evaluate existing knowledge related to diaspora engagement in Africa, creating a dynamic and interactive resource tool for Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), diaspora organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Member Countries (RMCs), the private sector, and other stakeholders. Second, to generate instructive, evidence-based, and standardized tools that can inform the implementation of pillars one and two.

These pillars will naturally unearth additional knowledge that can be woven into the work of pillar three. African diaspora engagement requires a continental-led go-to knowledge house that can support the multitude of actors trying to generate developmental impact through diaspora human and economic capital. The knowledge leadership and distribution networks of AfDB and IOM position them as natural collaborators in such work. Existing institutional platforms from both AfDB and IOM, such as iDiaspora, as well as explorative work from the AU to standardize such tools are well-positioned to build such functionalities. This is at the crux of building a sustainable ecosystem of diaspora engagement for development in Africa as it will provide a perpetually regenerative knowledge base to inform the market and to keep pace with market changes.

The internal and collaborative recommendations provided here should not be treated as independent of each other. By strengthening the institutional basing of diaspora engagement within both AfDB and IOM, the collaborative recommendations become accessible and achievable. The incremental internal processes described should provide organic opportunities to realign funding and operational mechanisms to begin to scale out the pillars of collaborative recommendations developed. This is a risk mitigation strategy for both AfDB and IOM to incrementally build out their partnership.

## **Concluding remarks: operationalizing a new era of inclusive diaspora engagement for development in Africa**

Arguably, the most important step that the AfDB and IOM can take to accelerate continental development through inclusive diaspora engagement is to formalize and structure their partnership. This action will signal to the market, especially current partners of both institutions and the African diaspora, that diaspora engagement is increasing as a development priority at a continental and institutional level. Such formalization positions it as a sector and market of scale, capable of attracting innovative and transformative diaspora capital, as well as providing additional capacity for both institutions to expand their leadership footprint in the diaspora sector.

While diaspora engagement is a dynamic field that doesn't follow a strict set of rules, scalable impact is achievable and realistic for Africa. Over the past fifteen years, various actors at all levels across the continent have contributed to the growing professionalization of diaspora engagement. The progress made means that we've reached a point where we can ask some critical questions about the road ahead. Achieving scale can be realized through systemic responses to the opportunities opening up for Africa within the diaspora.

The recommendations in this chapter aim to guide the AfDB and IOM in their respective and collaborative journeys to realize this new era of scale through systematic diaspora engagement for development in Africa. It's important to acknowledge that while the primary focus of this paper is on harnessing diaspora human and economic capital, other forms of diaspora capital, particularly cultural and social capital, must remain central to this new era of diaspora engagement. These forms of capital, by their very nature, serve as tools of inclusivity in diaspora engagement initiatives.



# CHAPTER 2

## CLIMATE-INDUCED FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND MIGRATION

### Introduction

Africa has historically contributed only 3 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions (AfDB, 2021a), yet it bears a disproportionate burden of adverse impacts of climate change. As the least climate-resilient region in the world, Africa faces high vulnerability to climate change and limited readiness for adapting to climate shocks (AfDB, 2022b).

Climate change is emerging as a prominent driver in Africa (World Bank, 2021). It disrupts livelihoods and systems in both rural and urban settings and increasingly leads directly and indirectly to displacement and migration within countries and across borders.

This chapter applies the term climate-linked mobility. It includes three types of human mobility as identified by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2010):

- Displacement – predominantly forced movements, usually short-term and within a country;
- Migration – voluntary movements that can be internal or across borders, short-term, temporary or permanent;
- Planned relocation – assisted movements, usually by a state to protect people from risks or adverse impacts.

The distinction between these types of mobility is not always clear. Climate-linked mobility is a particularly complex topic that encompasses a wide range of interrelated factors, given that climate change permeates all aspects of society. Migration is also a complex process that encompasses a series of multifactorial and individualized factors.

Climate-linked mobility is also an emerging policy and programmatic area. While migration dynamics have also been closely linked to environmental change and disasters, countries, regions, continents, and the international community have only been formulating coordinated responses and platforms in recent years. Most related projects have been relatively limited in size and scope, and few are in evaluation phases.

Addressing climate-linked displacement and migration requires a comprehensive approach that considers climate impacts and accounts for infrastructure, institutions, support networks, and people's safety, capacities, livelihoods, assets, and lifestyles (ICRC, 2020).

As continental leaders in sustainable economic development and human mobility, the African Development Bank and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) respectively have multiple areas of convergence and opportunities for partnership in concrete actions. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) also play an important role in addressing human mobility within the context of climate change (MPI, 2022).

This chapter sets out to (i) provide an overview of relevant climate-linked migration and displacement policies and frameworks, including AfDB and IOM positions, (ii) summarize the evidence on climate-linked mobility, (iii) summarize how fragility interacts with climate-linked mobility and outline key fragility factors, (iv) offer considerations for human mobility policies and programs based on key learnings and best practices to date, and (v) recommend priority areas for collaboration between the AfDB and IOM to address climate-linked mobility.

## Relevant climate-linked mobility policies and frameworks

Despite being two of the most pressing issues of our time, the international community has been slow to address the interrelatedness of climate change and migration (IOM, 2017). This is changing. The 2010 UNFCCC (2010) Cancun Adaptation Framework was the first to recognize human mobility within the global climate change policy debate. The 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) was a milestone for human mobility in the context of climate change. Its inclusion has spurred significant developments.

Since 2015, climate-linked mobility has been increasingly recognized in international processes, policies, and legal frameworks at the global, regional, subregional, and national levels. A Mapping Exercise on human mobility and climate change conducted by the IOM (UNFCCC, 2018) found:

“a clear increase in the number of processes that comprehensively mainstream climate and human mobility dimensions since 2015. However, a number of processes of thematic relevance to human mobility and climate change still make insufficient reference to these dimensions.”

Currently, there is no primary policy or legal framework created to address climate-induced migration and displacement specifically and singularly. However, at least 50 policy frameworks, strategies, and mechanisms related to migration, climate change, disaster risk reduction, and development address different parts of the climate change mobility nexus in Africa (IOM, 2021a).

Some of the global frameworks include the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2015), the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the 2015 Nansen Protection on Cross-border Displacement, the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, the 2017 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).

The list of African frameworks includes: the African Union Agenda 2063, the 2009 Kampala Convention on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA), the 2018 revised MPFA, the 2020 – 2030 African Union Strategy on Climate Change, the African Common Position on Climate Change, and the 2018 Humanitarian Policy Framework.

Free movement and integrated regional policies are important for people moving in the context of climate change. Free Movement is one of the goals of Agenda 2063. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the 2018 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (AU Free Movement Protocol) have significant potential to accelerate development and integration. If implemented properly, these frameworks can significantly increase support, protection, and resources for people moving in the context of climate change and help achieve development outcomes.

The Regional Economic Communities (RECS) play a critical role in migration and climate governance and in implementing free movement. The different continental RECS are at different stages of policy and framework development and implementation. In June 2021, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) states adopted the IGAD Free Movement Protocol, the first free movement protocol to address people fleeing disasters and climate change specifically. It protects people moving to neighboring countries before, during, or after environmental threats and allows them to remain until it is reasonable to return (IGAD, 2020).

Many more policies, collaborations, dialogues, and initiatives exist that include different parts of the human mobility–environment nexus. Promising developments continue to occur, and climate and human mobility are increasingly being recognized in legal and policy frameworks at all levels. In July 2022, the member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and States of the East and Horn of Africa signed the Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Climate Change & Environment. Signatories noted that the impact and link to migration have not been adequately considered or dealt with. (IOM, 2022b)

### IOM

The IOM is a leader in migration, environment, and climate change. It has been at the forefront of operational, research, policy, and advocacy efforts and has developed and implemented over 1,000 projects since 1998 addressing the links between migration, environment, and climate change. (IOM, n.d). The IOM

has been engaged in UNFCCC negotiations since 2008, contributed to the inclusion of human mobility in the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and is a member of the Task Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts.

In 2015, IOM established a Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division to address the migration, environment, and climate nexus. This division oversees, supports, and coordinates the development of policy guidance for activities with a migration, environment, and climate change dimension. MECC thematic specialists operate in IOM regional offices in the Middle East and North Africa, West and Central Africa, and East and Horn of Africa.

The IOM's institutional position frames migration, environment, and climate change within a broad mobility management approach that considers measures to avert, minimize, and address displacement (UNFCCC, 2018):

- To avert - is understood as measures to reduce or avoid the risk of forced and unmanaged migration as much as possible. Measures may include disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and mitigation, resilience building, and community stabilization.
- To minimize - is understood as measures to facilitate safe, orderly, and regular migration as part of adaptation strategies to climate change and thus, curb the number of people forced to move by providing alternative livelihoods. Measures may include ensuring migration pathways via free movement protocols, labor schemes, or transhumance agreements; or, as a last resort, planning relocations of people living in high-risk areas.
- To address - is understood as measures to prepare for and respond to displacement when it happens, including through ensuring assistance and protection for those on the move due to climate change, and seeking lasting solutions. Measures may include contingency planning, humanitarian relief aid, granting, expediting, or waiving visas, non-return policies or reintegration strategies.

IOM's **Institutional Strategy on Migration, Environment and Climate Change 2021-2030** (Climate Strategy) (IOM, 2021b) sets out three objectives that guide IOM's work in the area:

1. Develop solutions for people to move by managing migration in the context of climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters due to natural hazards.
2. Develop solutions for people on the move by assisting and protecting migrants and displaced persons in the context of climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters due to natural hazards.
3. Develop solutions for people to stay by building resilience and addressing the adverse climatic and environmental drivers that compel people to move, making migration a choice.

The Climate Strategy identifies four priority areas of engagement based on institutional strengths and potential growth areas:

1. Migration policy role –support States and other players to develop innovative rights-based migration policies and practices that integrate issues of climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters due to natural hazards.
2. Knowledge provider role –strengthen evidence-based policy and operational approaches to address migration in the context of climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters due to natural hazards, through the production, analysis and dissemination of relevant data and knowledge.
3. Operational role – support States and other players to operationalize responses to migration and displacement in the context of environmental degradation, climate change, and disasters across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus
4. Convening role – As a leading convener, IOM will promote policy coherence and inclusive partnerships to mainstream the inclusion of migration and displacement considerations in climate change, environment, disaster, and other relevant agendas.

The IOM Continental Strategy for Africa 2020- 2024 (Africa Strategy) (2020c) includes climate change and environmental degradation as a cross-cutting issue that is fundamental in addressing Africa's migration agenda. It acknowledges that climate-linked migration is likely to increase, exacerbated by the limited capacity to respond to humanitarian and development challenges.

## AfDB

The AfDB does not have a specific climate-linked mobility focus area or strategy. Cross-cutting issues related to climate-linked mobility are addressed through a series of strategies and plans.

The AfDB is a member of the **MDB Platform on Economic Migration and Forced Displacement** (AfDB, n.d) in partnership with six other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). The platform seeks to help countries harness the opportunities and address the challenges of human mobility. It acknowledges that mobility “does not constitute an explicit part of each MDB’s mandate, human mobility, and its drivers are closely intertwined with the MDBs’ commitment to providing long-term responses to complex development challenges”. It identifies climate change as a lead driver of forced displacement and acknowledges that mobility – both voluntary and forced – is of utmost importance to international development and calls on MDBs to address the needs of both people on the move and host communities and be active in countries of origin, transit, and destination (AfDB, n.d.b).

The MDB Platform claims MDBs address opportunities and challenges related to human mobility by:

- Investing in **vital, climate-resilient public infrastructure** that enhances access to services and quality of life, with a focus on gender, youth, and other features that build resilience.
- Building **resilience** to natural disasters and climate change via crisis prevention and recovery, climate change mitigation and adaptation in a way that responds to the needs of vulnerable groups, including women and youth; Removing structural barriers to **private sector** growth and boosting **job creation** via skills enhancement, **local financial sector** development that supports entrepreneurship and MSME financing, including for women and youth.
- Investing in **gender equality** and removing structural barriers to women’s economic empowerment.
- Fostering financial inclusion and helping countries tap the development potential of remittances.
- Complementing humanitarian assistance by sensitizing their projects to fragility and vulnerability, and by ensuring **social cohesion and inclusion**.
- Contributing, with partners, to the **peacebuilding** agenda for inclusive, green, and sustainable pro-poor growth.

The **Ten-Year Strategy 2013 – 2022** (2013) establishes twin objectives to achieve inclusive growth and transition to green growth through five operational priorities: infrastructure development, regional economic integration, private sector development, governance and accountability, and skills and technology. It also highlighted three areas of special emphasis: gender, fragile states, and agriculture and food security.

To respond to the challenges in the strategy, the Bank has established five development priorities - The High 5s (AfDB, n.d.a):

1. Light up and Power Africa
2. Feed Africa
3. Industrialize Africa
4. Integrate Africa
5. Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Africa.

The **2022 African Economic Outlook - Supporting Climate Resilience and a Just Energy Transition in Africa** (AfDB, 2022b) “rekindles the Bank’s strong commitment to addressing the continent’s climate vulnerabilities and transitioning toward net-zero by 2050”. It recognizes that weather-related disasters drive mass internal displacement, particularly in developing countries, and identifies new strategies and instruments to finance climate resilience and a just energy transition.

The AfDB Group’s **Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2022-2026** (Fragility Strategy) (2022a) sets out an approach to addressing fragility by building more resilient institutions, economies, and societies in all its regional member countries (RMCs).

The Fragility strategy tackles the connections between fragility, climate change, migration, and displacement and acknowledges that fragility can manifest in any situation. The Fragility Strategy outlines three interconnected and mutually reinforcing priorities:

1. Strengthening institutional capacity—intensifying and scaling up efforts to build effective national and regional institutions, focusing on core economic and financial governance functions and regional cooperation on shared challenges.

2. Building resilient societies—investing in infrastructure and public services, to help create more resilient economies and societies. Building on its comparative advantage in infrastructure development, the Bank will provide targeted support for energy, transport, water and sanitation, and social and rural infrastructure in areas affected by fragility, to help reduce isolation and gender inequalities, promote economic cooperation and diversification, and strengthen access to basic services. This will include a focus on regional infrastructure and the management of cross-border natural resources.
3. Catalyzing private investment—continue to invest in creating the conditions for private investment and job creation, through support for improved business environments and stronger value chains and skills, including for women and youth. It will combine direct investments in leading businesses with support for national financial institutions and the use of de-risking instruments to stimulate foreign and domestic investments. This will be achieved by using sovereign and non-sovereign instruments in complementary ways.

The **Climate and Green Growth Strategic Framework: Projecting Africa's Voice – Policy** (Green Strategy) (2021a) puts climate change adaptation at the forefront of AfDB's investment agenda. The strategy includes four areas of special emphasis: transition to green growth; gender, youth and social inclusion, private sector development and participation; and robust and resilient recovery. It has a strong fragility focus, including boosting climate resilience and adaptation to climate change and reducing fragility as a guiding principle, and addresses climate-linked mobility in the context of fragility.

**The Skills for Employability and Productivity in Africa (SEPA) Action Plan, 2022–2025** (AfDB, 2021b) presents an approach for operationalizing the Bank's commitment to skilling Africa's workforce. It pledges to contribute to the Bank's Green Strategy by supporting skills training and innovations that promote green technologies and address local, regional, and global environmental concerns. This includes improving awareness and knowledge of climate change (and related job opportunities) among the youth and expanding the involvement of women and young entrepreneurs in climate-smart and green innovations.

Many other AfDB institutional and sectoral strategies address and are relevant to climate-linked mobility. Some of these include the Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy for Creating 25 Million Jobs and Equipping 50 Million Youth 2016–2025 (2016a), the Feed Africa: Strategy for Agricultural Transformation in Africa 2016 – 2025 (2016b), and the African Development Bank Gender Strategy 2021 –2025 (2021c).

## Climate change and migration

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2022), Africa has already experienced widespread loss and damage, including biodiversity loss, water shortages, reduced food production, loss of lives, and reduced economic growth. The most marginalized people in the most fragile countries suffer the worst impacts. Climate change is increasing the frequency, intensity, duration, and locations of both slow- and sudden-onset impacts. These will pose some of the greatest threats to people, ecosystems, and development over the coming decades (World Bank, 2018).

Climate-linked mobility will intensify in rural, urban, and coastal systems (World Bank, 2021). Not only will people move more than ever, but climate change will alter migration patterns and routes. Climate change is disrupting population trends and distribution, further complicating the already intricate dynamics of migration across Africa.

According to the World Bank's (2021) Groundswell II model, certain climate migration hotspots may surface as soon as 2030, and their prevalence is expected to grow by 2050. Forecasts exhibit notable variations contingent upon the extent to which the world takes action regarding mitigation and adaptation measures. The extensive range of factors involved makes it difficult to use environmental determinism to accurately project how climate change will impact human mobility (De Sherbinin, 2020) and to plan accordingly.

### An important adaptation strategy

Migration is often framed as a failure to adapt to climate and environmental impacts but is, in fact, an important adaptation strategy against imminent or existing climate impacts or in areas where they are projected to worsen.

Migration offers options for individuals, families, and communities facing climate threats. It enables families or individuals who rely on climate-vulnerable livelihoods to diversify their income and spread household risk by seeking alternatives. Families are unlikely to want to abandon their lifestyles and homesteads completely when faced with diminishing or unpredictable returns on traditional income sources such as crops or yields. They are more likely to send some members to seek supplementary income through temporary or circular migration.

This strategy allows households to remain in place and keep their homes and livelihoods. Financial and social remittances from family members can help enable adaptive measures against climate impacts, such as buying drought-resistant seeds or installing irrigation systems. It often leads to autonomy and new skills for migrants. (Stapleton, 2017).

While disruptions to farming and rural exodus threaten food security, migration can provide relief from competition over diminishing resources in rural environments.

## **Slow-onset climate impacts**

Slow-onset climate impacts include drought, desertification, salinization, ocean acidification, glacial retreat, sea-level rise, and changing seasonal trends. Temperature increases on the continent are expected to exceed global averages, particularly in interior regions. Increases in mean temperatures in most land and ocean regions are creating hot extremes, as well as more variable rainfall and drought.

Water availability will become the main migration driver in some African regions as water scarcity pushes people out of coastal and inland areas (World Bank, 2021). In some areas, reduced rainfall has parched lands and rendered them unable to absorb regular rainfall, in turn causing floods. Dry conditions coupled with flash floods are a major source of displacement. Extreme rainfall and river discharge variability have had largely negative, multi-sectoral impacts across water-dependent sectors. The range of future extremes is expected to be even more severe (IPCC, 2022).

Rising temperatures, droughts, and erratic rainfall patterns are affecting crops, food availability, and employment in agriculture. Agricultural productivity growth has been reduced by 34 percent since 1961 in Africa due to climate change (IPCC, 2022). In some areas, net yields are either diminishing or becoming less predictable as soil quality worsens and water supplies become more stressed or less predictable. Shorter growing seasons and increasing water stress will increase with future warming. Temperatures exceeding 2°C will lead to decreased yields of essential crops.

Most agriculture on the continent is rainfed, and agriculture is a significant source of employment. Changing CO<sub>2</sub> levels are also impacting the nutritional quality of stock livestock feed and water availability and contributing to the spread of livestock diseases. Farmers, herders, and agricultural value chains that rely on rainfall are seriously impacted. The poorest people are more likely to rely on weather-dependent agriculture.

Sea warming, sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion, acidification, coastal erosion, and flooding threaten livelihoods in coastal areas and deltas. Declining fish catches in both marine and freshwater fisheries could expose as many as 285 million people to specific nutritional deficiencies by 2050 (IPCC, 2022). These impacts, along with other effects, have far-reaching consequences for the ecological, economic, and social systems, including health, livelihoods, food and water security, and human security that impact migration and forced displacement.

## **Sudden-onset climate impacts**

Sudden-onset climate change disasters are large-scale singular events of extreme weather, including hurricanes, cyclones, storms, heatwaves, or heavy rainfall leading to landslides or floods. The intensity and frequency of extreme weather events and the areas impacted by them are growing as global temperatures rise (IPCC, 2022).

In 2021, 2.55 million and 233,000 people were internally displaced by disasters in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, respectively (IDMC, 2022).

Displacements from sudden-onset impacts are easier to isolate than those from incremental environmental changes, but the numbers are not always distinct. Disasters often lead to mass displacement. People most often flee to the nearest safe location or where they can access disaster relief or aid. Many people return home once it is safe. However, sudden events may also trigger longer-term migration (IOM, 2020).


Sudden-onset disasters can prompt temporary or permanent migration when they render environments uninhabitable or unable to support livelihoods. Some research has found that these sudden shocks can erode migration aspirations, including among potential migrants who had previously expressed a strong desire to migrate (Suckall et al., 2017). Climate shocks can also diminish migration capabilities because they wipe out assets and cause trauma.

## Climate change and mobility nexus

The nexus between climate change, disasters, and migration is complex. Migration is a highly personal decision made for various complex and interrelated reasons, including social, political, economic, environmental, and demographic factors (Ionesco, 2017). The multi-causal nature of migration makes it difficult to isolate climate change as a single or main driver or to accurately estimate the number of people on the move directly due to climate impacts. There is no existing method of tracking how many people are moving partially in response to climate impacts.

Even where climate impacts contribute to the decision, the underlying economic, socio-political, and cultural factors ultimately determine if and where people move or don't move. A five-year study in Delta regions found that migrants most often cite economic or socio-political factors as key drivers, even when faced with severe erosion and flooding (DECCMA, 2018). Often, even if people do not perceive climate change as a key factor in their decision, it contributes to a deteriorating economy.

**Figure 1. Conceptual framework showing migration drivers**



Source: Author's own elaboration.

### *Mobility is predominantly internal*

While climate-linked migration is often framed as an international or inter-continental phenomenon, most climate-linked mobility occurs within countries or between neighboring countries. The IPCC (2022) projects that with a 1.7 °C temperature increase by 2050, internal migration in sub-Saharan Africa could involve 17-40 million people, increasing to 56 -86 million with a 2.5 °C warming. The scale of internal migration will be most significant in the poorest and most climate-vulnerable regions.

International migration comes at a high-cost. It requires resources, knowledge, and connections. Many people migrate with reluctance. Individuals frequently strive to stay put and adapt to their current location to preserve community ties, family connections, and sources of livelihood. People are most likely to seek work close by in areas with a similar culture, language, and currency or where other community members have gone before them.

The presence of existing migrant networks plays a significant role in helping to develop migration capabilities and aspirations (Cattaneo, 2020). A considerable number of individuals move incrementally from nearby locations to more distant ones over time or spend some time migrating seasonally and circularly before moving permanently.

## *Involuntary Immobility*

Many poor people who depend on climate-vulnerable resources such as agriculture or aquaculture are at risk of involuntary immobility. The most vulnerable people have the fewest options to adapt or move. Poor families and individuals who depend on agriculture, aquaculture, or other vulnerable livelihoods face diminishing returns. This erodes the human, financial, and social capital required to migrate, and they become less mobile (Mazzai, 2020). As the impacts worsen over time, their resources are likely to deplete even further. This is a dangerous cycle in which climate change contributes to fragility, and leaves people more exposed to impacts, with fewer adaptation options and eroded migration capabilities. Some of the most vulnerable people will be left behind in ‘the poverty trap’.

The least mobile populations in a community are often the most vulnerable. Young, able-bodied working-aged people are the first to move. Due to financial and social limitations, vulnerable populations, including the elderly, low-skilled women, children, and people with disabilities and trapped, face communities with fewer people available to help care for them.

Research in 115 countries has shown that between 1960 and 2000, rising temperatures in low-income countries reduced migration to cities and other countries and trapped people in poverty (Cattaneo, 2016).

## *Urbanization*

While other forms of migration are consequential, including rural labor migration to work in agriculture and mining, rapid urbanization will be the most significant climate-linked mobility outcome. The World Bank (2018) Groundswell Part I report predicts that two-thirds of the world’s population will live in cities by 2050. This number will accelerate thereafter unless significant climate change mitigation and adaptation measures are taken.

Climate-linked urbanization is happening in a context where Africa is already rapidly urbanizing. Since 1990, the number of people living in cities has increased by 500 million and the number of cities has doubled, from 3 300 to 7 600 (OECD, 2022). According to the IOM Africa Migration Report (IOM, 2020a), the percentage of people living in urban areas in Africa has grown from 15 percent in the 1960s to 43 percent in 2018 and is expected to pass 50 percent by 2030. Sub-Saharan Africa is the fastest-urbanizing region in the world.

Combined with natural population growth, migration (rural-to-urban and external) has been one of the driving forces. In the context of climate change, people move to cities in response to both sudden and slow climate impacts. Rural migrants move to cities seeking better economic opportunities in response to environmental shocks or decline.

Urbanization has significant potential for development if managed well. Urbanization in Africa contributes to better economic outcomes and higher standards of living - approximately 29 percent of the average annual per capita GDP growth across Africa between 2001 and 2020 is due to urbanization (OECD, 2022). Urbanization, when well-planned, has the potential to increase structural transformation, generate economies of scale, reduce logistics costs, and increase labor markets. For individuals, it can improve access to education, drive up incomes, boost health and social services, and enable new skills. Historically, however, urban poverty has increased in Africa. As per Goyal and Sy (2015), as much as 70 percent of Africa’s urban populace resides in ‘slum’ conditions or informality.

Many cities, particularly in fragile situations, are unprepared for rapid population growth. They lack adequate housing, infrastructure, education, food, water, and health facilities to host a significant number of migrants. People migrating from declining rural environments are likely to be poor and dispossessed. They often settle in unplanned and informal settlements. Urban centers have struggled to keep up with the demands for transportation, housing, healthcare, water, sanitation, education, safety, and other essential services, exposing urban dwellers to difficult living conditions. Urban migrants often experience resentment, xenophobia, and even violence from locals who blame them for the lack of services or jobs. Urban migrants frequently swap one form of vulnerability (rural) for another (informal) when they relocate.

Many of these rapidly growing cities are also susceptible to climate threats. Rural-to-urban migrants in towns have settled in climate-vulnerable areas, such as floodplains, water-scarce areas, or urban heat islands, where they experience acute climate threats and even secondary displacement.

### Textbox 1. Snapshot case study: rural to urban migrants in Madagascar end up in cyclone decimation

Madagascar’s urban population has exploded from 2.8 million in 1993 to 24.8 million in 2016 (Rouhana and Matera, 2018). The capital, Antananarivo, is the most popular destination, driven by population growth, urban-to-urban migration from smaller cities, and rural to urban migration among people seeking livelihood opportunities. Urban development capacity is weak. An estimated 72 percent of the city’s population lives in informal settlements that lack adequate planning, sanitation, and other services. Most are in flood-prone areas and are vulnerable to cyclones and floods. Rural to urban migrants are often the poorest and most at-risk.

Between January and March 2022, Madagascar was hit by five storms and tropical cyclones (Ana, Batsirai, Dumako, Emnati and Gombo). Climate change contributed to heavier and more damaging rainfall. Tropical Storm Ana hit Antananarivo at the end of January, killing at least 34 people and destroying an estimated 10,000 homes, and huge amounts of infrastructure, including health facilities and schools. The slum areas were hit the worst, where fragile homes made with earth walls and thatched roofs were destroyed and many people lost their food stock and belongings. Many of the worst impacted people were rural migrants.

## Fragility, climate change and migration

The AfDB Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2022-2026 (AfDB, 2022a) defines fragility as a condition where the exposure to internal or external pressures exceeds existing capacities to prevent, respond to, and recover from them, creating risks of instability. The report observes that in 2020, nations grappling with conflict and fragility were inhabited by 3 percent of Africa’s population and accounted for 48 percent of those residing in extreme poverty. It highlights those countries that have experienced fragility over an extended period face higher poverty and food insecurity, wide gaps in infrastructure and public services, deep institutional deficits, and undiversified economies. Fragility is not confined to a specific group of states; instead, it represents a spectrum of conditions that can impact any state to varying extents and in diverse manners.

Escalating climate change poses similar threats as other shocks and stresses – they may exceed their institutional capacity to manage them and contribute to political crises, conflict, and forced displacement. Many of the countries affected by conflict and fragility are also climate change hotspots. In some cases, disaster and conflict-related displacements overlap (IOM, 2021). The table below shows that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 81 percent of new displacements in 2021 due to disasters took place in countries that are eligible for support from AfDB’s Transition Support Facility (TSF).

**Table 1. 2021 displacement in AfDB transitioning states due to conflict and disasters.**

Fragile state	New IDPs 2021 due to conflict	New IDPs 2021 due to Disasters	Total IDPs end of 2021 due to conflict	Total IDPs end of 2021 due to disasters
Burkina Faso	682,000	N/A	1,580,000	N/A
Burundi	94	87,000	19,000	94,000
Central African Republic	496,000	24,000	692,000	36,000
Chad	42,000	24,000	392,000	24,000
Comoros	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2,712,000	888,000	5,339,000	201,000
Djibouti	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Eritrea	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Gambia	700	2,400	N/A	N/A
Guinea	N/A	2,600	N/A	2,600
Guinea-Bissau	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Liberia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Madagascar	1,300	4,800	2,800	N/A


Mali	249,000	6,000	326,000	24,000
Mozambique	187,000	44,000	735,000	138,000
Niger	110,000	118,000	224,000	40,000
Sierra Leone	N/A	N/A	5,500	N/A
Somalia	549,000	271,000	2,968,000	N/A
South Sudan	429,000	506,000	1,369,000	527,000
Sudan	442,000	99,000	3,175,000	85,000
Togo	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Zimbabwe	N/A	2,400	N/A	43,000
<b>Totals in transitioning states</b>	<b>5,900,094</b>	<b>2,079,200</b>	<b>16,827,300</b>	<b>1,214,600</b>
<b>Totals in Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	<b>11,558,000</b>	<b>2,554,000</b>	<b>25,130,000</b>	<b>2,029,000</b>
<b>Percent in transitioning states</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>81%</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>60%</b>

Source: IDMC (2022)

Adapting to climate change requires major social, cultural, and economic resources. ICRC (2020) explains that countries in fragile situations have less ability to build and maintain infrastructure, control the use of natural resources, protect ecosystems, resolve tensions, implement long-term planning, mobilize international support, or engage in diplomacy. Some of the most climate-vulnerable countries on the continent have weak governance and rule of law, are prone to conflict, and have undiversified agriculture-based economies. Increasing stresses on resources through environmental threats and growing populations threaten to overburden weak states, undo development gains, and aggravate already fragile situations.

Climate impacts intersect with non-climate drivers and stressors to exacerbate vulnerabilities (AfDB, 2021). The extent to which climate hazards lead to displacement or migration depends on a community and individual's exposure and vulnerability:

**Figure 2. Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems**



Source: IDMC (2022)

Climate impacts intersect with socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Intensified climate impacts are more likely to trigger forced migration or involuntary immobility where people are more vulnerable and have less capacity to adapt. People's capacities to anticipate, cope, and recover from climate hazards play a central role in determining migration and displacement.

Vulnerability is partly determined by factors such as age, gender, ethnicity, citizenship status, disability, and broader factors linked to inequality or marginalization. Individuals who are politically, socially, and economically marginalized bear the brunt of impacts and are more vulnerable because they lack the financial and social assets required for coping. These include land tenure, access to social services,

livelihoods, governance, and infrastructure. These groups tend to have less access to information and resources to prepare and build resilience or plan voluntary migration (IOM, 2018).

Climate change serves as a fragility amplifier. In almost all fragility categories, climate change contributes to negative cycles, whereby climate change deepens vulnerability.

Changes to the natural environment put pressure on social, economic, and political systems. Climate change impacts exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and inequalities, threaten to undermine development gains, and hinder future progress (AfDB, 2021a). These affect the poorest and most vulnerable countries and people because of structural constraints, limited institutional capacity, conflict, lack of financial resources and high vulnerability to shocks (IOM, 2019b).

Stapleton et al. (2017), offer the below categories of vulnerability and capacity factors that impact migration and displacement:

Political/Governance	Political instability or poor governance can lead to poor climate risk management, disaster risk reduction, assistance in response and recovery, and migration management.
Economic	Financial resources, savings, incomes, insurance or ability to borrow improve the capacity to cope with climate impacts and remain in place or to migrate and achieve success. Lack of financial resources makes it difficult to rebuild at source or move to a new destination.
Social	Strong community or kinship networks improve peoples' abilities to adapt - either in place or in a new location. Lack of cohesion or networks impede information dissemination, generate mistrust, and can expose isolated people to more dangers.
Cultural	Disability, illness, age, gender or belonging to a minority group can increase vulnerability as climate impacts occur. These can influence displacement and how successfully people can migrate.
Environment/Infrastructure	Well-functioning ecosystems and hazard-resistant infrastructure help to mitigate damage. Environmental stresses and poor housing and infrastructure make it harder to cope with hazards.

## Some specific fragility factors

### Conflict

There isn't an easily defined direct causal link between climate change and conflict. The direct causal link between climate change and conflict is not easily defined and remains a subject of debate. Nevertheless, there is an increasing body of evidence indicating that climate change can intensify security risks (Scheffran et al., 2022). In regions characterized by pre-existing tensions or conflicts, the competition for diminishing resources poses a high risk of fueling tensions and violence. In multiple countries on the continent, where there is already a confluence of fragility risks, climate change acts as a threat multiplier.

Many of the African climate hotspots are in existing conflict zones. According to ICRC (2020), globally, 60 percent of countries considered to be the most vulnerable to climate change are affected by conflict. Many African conflicts are rooted in competition over control of and access to land and other natural resources (AfDB, 2022a).

Countries and areas enduring conflict are disproportionately vulnerable to climate change impacts because their adaptive capabilities are already limited by dealing with conflict. Conflicts disrupt a society's social, political, and economic, deepen inequalities, exacerbate poverty, and erode development.

The natural environment is often directly attacked or incidentally damaged in conflict. Attacks can contaminate water, soil, and land and harm wildlife purposefully or incidentally. Water access is often politicized in broader struggles.

States in conflict have diminished capacity for long-term climate adaptation planning and are inclined to allocate their resources primarily to security or economic concerns. Conflict often limits their capacities to maintain necessary infrastructure, protect ecosystems, manage resources, and engage in diplomacy. Conflict further hinders people's ability to choose mobility strategies in response to climate impacts (ICRC, 2020).

## *Transhumance*

Climate change is altering environments and disordering transhumance patterns in some regions. Pastoralists in many places must move differently or further than before to find suitable water or grazing for their stock, including across international borders (ICRC, 2020). In some cases, pastoralists who previously moved in uncultivated areas are moving towards farmed lands. Some farmers have conversely taken over pastureland.

In some cases, these changing patterns are driving competition for land, water, and forage. This destabilizes community cohesion or causes tensions, and even conflict, among herders or between herders and farmers; or exacerbates existing tensions. In many cases, these tensions are occurring in fragile states that lack the capacity to intervene and help manage intercommunal tensions or enforce land-use regulations. Additionally, the legitimacy of traditional authorities that historically helped govern transhumance routes or resolve conflicts has eroded in some places.

### **Textbox 2. Snapshot Case Study: Transhumance in West Africa**

Africa is home to 37 percent of the world's nomadic population. Transhumance is a crucial economic sector in Mali, comprising 15.2 percent of its GDP, just slightly behind agriculture at 16.2 percent. However, the available land for pastoralists is shrinking. Roughly 80 percent of the Sahel's farmland is suffering from degradation. Temperatures are rising faster than the global average, and droughts and floods are becoming more common. Surging population growth is pushing farmers northward.

Mali has been embroiled in conflict since the 2012 secessionist rebellion. The primary areas of conflict in northern and central Mali coincide with pastoral zones that house significant livestock populations. These conflicts have created no-go areas. Due to a combination of instability and drought, some pastoralists have been pushed southward in search of more favorable grazing areas. Farmers previously welcomed pastoralists because their cattle and goats fertilized croplands. However, rising pressure has triggered conflicts with some farming communities. Some tensions are historical and have escalated into deadly inter-communal conflict that are likely to worsen in.

## *Internally Displaced Persons*

Many internally displaced people live in precarious conditions, either in temporary camp shelters or urban slums. The living conditions can be extremely challenging, including high poverty and unemployment rates, social marginalization, poor sanitation, and criminal activity (IOM, 2017). The crisis that leads to internal displacement – whether disaster or conflict – often proves state's ineffective capacity to assist. Many of these locations are also vulnerable to environmental hazards and shocks. In these situations, vulnerability is exceptionally high, and the capacity to adapt or move can be extremely low.

Instances have arisen in which internally displaced individuals, escaping conflict, have encountered severe climate change effects in camp and urban settings and have experienced secondary displacement (ICRC, 2020). Others have returned home after displacement to find their homes had been washed away by floods.

## *Gender*

Gender intersects with both climate change and migration. Women are disproportionately impacted by climate change due mainly to existing gender inequalities and gender roles and responsibilities. Climate change, in a reinforcing loop, worsens these existing inequalities (IOM, 2018).

Women tend to be poorer, have less education, and have more health risks (Chindarkar, 2012). In fragile contexts, labor markets are heavily gender-segregated, with women employed primarily in low-paying and insecure occupations (AfDB, 2022a). Women carry a disproportionate unpaid work burden in households and communities and rely more on natural resources for their livelihoods. In vulnerable climate regions, women have to travel further or work harder to find firewood or plant crops, which can often expose them to risks, including violent attacks. Time spent on these activities reduces time spent on adaptation

strategies. Resilience measures are less accessible – for example, land tenure, ownership of productive assets, or social protections despite playing essential roles in agriculture, aquaculture, and other livelihood activities (IOM, n.d).

In family situations, men are most likely to migrate to seek income opportunities and leave women behind to care for households and children. Women are at a higher risk of involuntary immobility, being left behind and trapped while caring for households and children. Post-disaster mortality, injury, and illness rates tend to be higher for women due to their limited and reduced mobility and their role in taking care of and looking after the health of family members (IOM, 2018).

Men also have specific vulnerabilities and can experience higher exposure levels to natural hazards, such as secondary hazards related to emergency assistance, and could be less capable of mobilizing social capital to migrate (IOM, 2018).

Migration is a profoundly gendered process. Gender is central to the causes and consequences of migration. It is one of the most critical factors shaping the migration experience at each stage of the process - pre-departure, transit, arrival, stay and return. Women have different access to resources, information, and opportunities. In many cases, women have less autonomy over their migration choices and are more likely to migrate due to a family decision (O'Neil, 2016). Behavioral restrictions and gender norms sometimes limit women's abilities to migrate independently.

An increasing number of women are autonomously making migration choices for work, education, as heads of households to meet their own or their families' needs. According to the IOM Migration Portal, the number of female international migrants in Africa increased by 69 percent between 2000 and 2020. Females comprise 47.1 percent of the 25.4 million migrants in Africa (UNDESA, 2021).

Migration can be an effective adaptation, empowering women in terms of economic advancement and skill development. It can increase autonomy, mastery, remittances, and social standing and disrupt gender norms and inequality (O'Neil, 2016).

However, it can also exacerbate disparities and subject them to risks and vulnerabilities. Women have greater exposure to multiple dangers along the migration pathways. They are at heightened risk of abuse, discrimination, exploitation, gender-based violence and trafficking and carry more family and reproductive burdens.

On arrival at a destination, they often face gender discrimination and barriers. They experience disparate 'deskilling' whereby they do work not aligned with their skills and are concentrated in unregulated, unskilled, and undervalued sectors. Evidence in some regions shows that women migrants are less likely to be employed (Crush, 2017). Labor markets are usually segmented by gender, class and ethnicity, and women migrants often face intersectional xenophobia, racism and patriarchy that exposes them to 'triple' discrimination.

Gender also plays a key role in remittance patterns, including amounts, frequency, means, recipients and use. Evidence shows that women send a larger proportion of their income more regularly and over longer periods (Crush, 2017).

Despite the central role that gender plays, many policies and practices related to climate-linked mobility remain gender-neutral. Gendered perspectives are necessary to help understand how gender dimensions impact climate vulnerabilities, migration decisions, journeys, and outcomes in different situations. Like other factors contributing to fragility, the specific gender factors will vary in each situation, and localized responses that include gendered analysis and responses are crucial. Wherever possible, climate change and migration data should be disaggregated by gender to understand better how gender factors in and to develop more durable solutions.

According to the AfDB African Economic Outlook (2022b), climate finance with a gender-responsive focus addressing gender inequalities has seen significant growth. It has increased from an average of \$80 million in 2010 to \$1.6 billion in 2019. However, less than one-quarter of climate development finance considered women's specific needs and contributions between 2010 and 2019.

Women should be active agents in developing mobility solutions that build on their capabilities, knowledge, and perspectives. Mobility solutions should harness the development potential of migration, protect women and children while they move, provide them with access to skills and reduce their exposure to

climate risks. In cases where women do not want to move, adaptation projects should protect them and ensure their circumstances are not exposing them to added vulnerabilities.

### *Children and youth*

A significant portion of the global displaced population consists of individuals under the age of 25, yet children and youth are largely invisible in displacement data (IDMC, 2022). The child, climate and migration nexus is similarly unexplored.

According to IDMC (2020), around a billion, or half the world's under-18s live in 'extremely high-risk countries for climate change impacts. Approximately 820 million are exposed to heatwaves, 920 million to water scarcity, and 870 million to cyclones or flooding. Young people in low and middle-income countries tend to be most at risk.

Africa hosts the highest proportion of child and youth migrants in the world – 25 and 16 percent, respectively. Displacement for long periods of time has serious and lasting effects on children that can continue into adulthood and undermine development (IDMC, 2020). Evidence suggests that malnutrition, childhood trauma, and early pregnancy to be more prevalent among displaced populations and result in poor health later in life. Displacement disrupts various aspects of life, including education, access to nutrition, healthcare, livelihoods, and overall stability. In many cases, families resort to negative coping mechanisms such as child labor or early marriage to navigate their challenging circumstances.

Displaced children are at higher risk of violence, abuse, exploitation, and neglect. Unaccompanied minors and children separated from their families are among the most vulnerable. These disruptions can have lasting repercussions, including physical stunting, health issues, and less economically productive futures.

UNICEF (2022) highlights that children who move in the context of climate change may be exposed to various risks including abuse, trafficking and exploitation. They may also lose access to education, be forced into labor and endure poor living conditions. Children and youth are moving in response to climate impacts both unaccompanied or with family or friends. Some are sent to urban areas while parents stay behind.

## **Policy and program considerations**

Climate-linked mobility is a challenging topic. Projects that target climate change mobility interventions are not always fully informed on the links between climate change, migration, and displacement (MPI, 2022). Yet, mobility programs in the context of climate change have provided some important considerations and best practices that should be applied to projects and programs.

### **Local engagement**

Adaptation is highly localized. Faced with the same climate impacts, community abilities to adapt vary drastically. Solutions should be context-specific, flexible, and adaptable. Each community has unique vulnerabilities and resilience opportunities. Despite this, adaptation responses are often driven internationally and nationally, excluding local governments, community leaders and community members from planning and designing interventions.

Adaptation planning and finance must be inclusive to be successful. Local perceptions on climate change and mobility need to be included in research and evidence production, ensuring that different population groups are included (Grundy and Zingg, 2020). Failing to engage with local leaders and community members may create suspicion and frustration and lower community ownership. Priorities determined internationally or nationally often do not match with local needs (Krishnan, 2020). Local governments, community leaders and community members are in the best position to lead local strategies.

### **Youth engagement**

By 2050, the African population is expected to double. Currently, 70 percent of Africans are under 30 years old. The 'youth bulge' is confronting escalating climate impacts, economic uncertainties, and a lack of good quality employment prospects (El Ouassif, 2021). High rates of youth unemployment are drivers of social and political unrest and irregular migration (AfDB, 2022b)

Migration is a popular choice among young Africans seeking livelihood opportunities. Significant barriers exist to travel within and outside of the continent and pose risks of resorting to dangerous, irregular routes. Youth representatives from Africa have called on governments to facilitate free movement on the continent in order to drive integration and unlock economic development for young people (IOM, 2022a).

Young people must be recognized as agents of change. Youth are becoming increasingly mobile and often express different perspectives and priorities, if compared to adults. Yet, they are rarely involved in the design and implementation of responses (IDMC, 2020). Youth are keen to be heard and to participate in decision-making processes. Strategies to include young people in decision-making processes should be implemented widely.

## Planned Relocations

Some communities on the continent are becoming uninhabitable as climate impacts increase. Sea-level rise, salinization, acidification, and desertification are already irreversible in some places. In many cases, adaptation measures such as early warning systems or improved infrastructure and technologies can help enable communities to stay and adapt in place.

In other severely exposed places, spending on these measures could prove futile. Pre-emptive systematic relocations to less-vulnerable locations may protect lives, livelihoods, and assets from future harm while maintaining community ties (Ferris and Weerasinghe, 2020). Interest in planned relocation as a possible adaptation strategy is growing, particularly as a long-term response to slow-onset climate impacts.

Planned relocations remain relatively uncharted in Africa. Historically, only a small number of initiatives have been attempted in West Africa, and some are currently underway, primarily in coastal communities (IOM, 2021a). Most of these initiatives have been in response to sudden disasters rather than pre-emptive, leading to poor results. Some have resulted in the loss of land, property, livelihoods and reduced access to food, and people ended up more marginalized with worse socio-economic outcomes (Ferris and Weerasinghe, 2020). Consequently, there is still uncertainty about how to conduct them safely and effectively.

Planned relocation is challenging, particularly if the goal is to reduce fragility and improve people's development prospects. Most individuals and communities have strong place attachment and do not want to leave their livelihoods, communities and homes, which are often their biggest assets.

Africa also has a history of state-led relocations for nefarious or undemocratic reasons. Many colonial governments relocated groups as part of broader efforts to disenfranchise and dispossess them. Some post-colonial governments have relocated communities under the guise of socioeconomic redistribution or 'villagization' to achieve political objectives (Arnall, 2019).

According to Arnall (2019), planned relocations must meet at least three minimum criteria to succeed:

1. They should be a last resort when alternatives have been exhausted or are unavailable.
2. They should be voluntary. The strong influence of free and informed consent is crucial for long-term success.
3. They should be developmental. People should be better off after moving.

The lack of positive examples and inherent complexities of planned relocation underscore the need to proactively and strategically plan pilot cases that can help develop best practices.

Planned relocation and voluntary movement in anticipation of climate impacts tend to yield better outcomes than unplanned, emergency displacements. Waiting until there are no other options and relocating in haste will have far worse outcomes. Planned relocations should form part of mobility-focused adaptation planning, and finance should be allocated. Early action is imperative to build-in adequate time for community buy-in and leadership.

### **Textbox 3. Post-disaster relocation in rural Mozambique**

Research was conducted in three state-led relocations in Caia, Tambara and Morrumbala, in the central region of Mozambique. The region was hit by a series of cyclones and floods in 2007 and 2008 that displaced thousands of small-scale farmers out of the Zambezi River valley. International funds were provided to help the provincial and district government relocate homesteads in the floodplain to drier villages in the high area a few kilometers away. The new locations were situated nearby, but they were in an agricultural area with lower fertility. Donor funds were utilized to facilitate the development of alternative livelihoods, such as income diversification, to reduce dependence on crops. The study found that farmers relocated nearby who received greater technical and financial support enjoyed improved livelihoods. Others who relocated further away or received less assistance were significantly worse off. About 30 percent of households returned to the floodplains. Some remained at the new location because they felt pressure from the government or because they came with better protections against the armed militant and political movement, Renamo. The failures in this project were not related to financial support but poor planning and implementation.

#### ***Maladaptation***

Many international climate interventions, intended to reduce vulnerability and facilitate community adaptation, have had unintended consequences. Some have inadvertently reinforced, redistributed or created new vulnerabilities. Even interventions that have positively affected certain groups have exacerbated vulnerabilities for those already marginalized.

Eriksen et al. (2021) identified four mechanisms that have driven unintended maladaptation:

1. A shallow understanding of the vulnerability context;
2. inequitable stakeholder participation in both design and implementation;
3. a retrofitting of adaptation into existing development agendas; and
4. a lack of critical engagement with how 'adaptation success' is defined

These authors caution against labeling existing development activities as climate adaptation simply because they incorporate climate-related factors. In such cases, the interventions may not genuinely aim to reduce vulnerabilities and can even prove maladaptive.

Effective Interventions require a strong grasp on the current and past socioeconomic and political landscape and be cognizant of which groups will benefit and which are at risk of being excluded. A narrow focus on adjusting to climate impacts without considering these dynamics runs the risk of worsening them.

### **Textbox 4. Cyclone Idai experiences in Chimanimani, Zimbabwe**

The Highlands of Zimbabwe are witnessing a growing occurrence of cyclones and floods, both in terms of frequency and intensity. On March 15, 2019, Cyclone Idai isolated the region off completely. Roads and bridges were damaged, and there was a breakdown of communication systems. Helicopter operations were hampered due to poor visibility, and Zimbabwe faced challenges in responding effectively due to low institutional capacity. It was only after five days that state disaster management officials and international aid agencies gained access to the affected areas. In the interim period, the local community took initiative and mounted its own organic response before, during and after the cyclone. Local actors played a pivotal role in conducting rescues and organizing the distribution of food, aid, shelter and other forms of support. Community members who had lost their homes found refuge in the residence of others, in churches and even in schools.

When the government and humanitarian support services finally arrived, their priorities did not align with those of the local communities. They provided aid, including financial support, focusing on specific categories of loss while neglecting others. Many people who had given their homes, belongings or funds or had been injured trying to assist were not compensated for their losses. This discrepancy created divisions and resentment within the community and towards aid providers.

## Priority areas for collaboration

IOM and AfDB share several areas of convergence on issues related to climate-linked mobility. Each organization has institutional strengths and comparative advantages that can be effectively utilized through collective efforts. The following priority areas represent opportunities for fast and impactful collaboration within the framework of the AfDB and IOM partnership. These areas will require further consultation within the IOM and AfDB to develop specific interventions. It is recommended to establish a joint working group comprised of relevant sectors within the IOM and AfDB to determine short, medium, and long-term strategies and corresponding activities in each priority area.

### Mobilize increased funding for mobility solutions in countries in fragile situations

A cornerstone of the 2015 Paris Agreement was that wealthier countries, which have exploited natural resources and fossil fuels to attain their prosperity, should allocate substantial funds to less-developed countries to assist them in mitigating and adapting to the impact of climate change. Yet, Africa has some of the lowest per capita climate inflows in the world - only 3 percent reaching sub-Saharan Africa annually (AfDB, 2021a). The AfDB Outlook (2022b) claims that Africa is owed nearly ten times the global climate finance it received between 2016 and 2019 and issues a stark warning: "Unless developed countries scale up their climate finance to developing countries, Africa might not meet its climate commitments." Finance flows targeting adaptation in Africa are billions of USD less than the lowest cost estimates and urgently need to be increased.

Furthermore, existing global finance approaches do not make explicit references to climate-linked mobility, which hinders finance action on a large scale (UNFCCC, 2018). There is a pressing need for more funding to support initiatives aimed at preventing, minimizing, and addressing climate-linked mobility (IOM, 2019b).

The 2015 Paris Agreement asked MDBs to scale up their activities: moving from "billions to trillions". The AfDB is making significant strides to prioritize bankable adaptation investments (AfDB, 2021a). The AfDB aims to allocate 40 percent of its annual funding to climate finance. It also aims to mobilize \$25 billion by 2025 to enhance access to climate finance for low-income African countries, positioning Africa's financial sector as a leader in financing innovations.

These efforts should include mobility considerations. The AfDB should bolster internal capacity in this regard, including knowledge, incentives, and strategic direction to enhance institutional understanding of the issues, encourage an institutional approach to climate mobility across sectors, and increase funding for projects addressing climate-linked mobility. The IOM can support this process using its substantial knowledge and training capacities on this topic.

Globally, vulnerability has historically not been a key factor influencing the allocation of funds (Doschi and M Garschagen, 2020). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2020) found that financing tends to flow toward countries where donors already have a presence, strong institutional capacities, and perceived ability to implement projects successfully. Investors seek sufficiently predictable environments to measure and generate a return on investment and are reluctant to invest in countries with poor policy, institutional and market environments. Financing in fragile and conflict-affected countries is particularly precarious because they lack the institutional strength to absorb funds and implement and measure interventions.

Even when climate-vulnerable countries receive sufficient adaptation funding, it may not necessarily reach the most vulnerable communities. A study by Eriksen et al. (2021) on climate adaptation funding found that disproportionately less funding is allocated to the areas with the greatest need. Some communities facing fragility lack financial, technology or human resource capacities. Sometimes, funds en route to communities can be siphoned due to corruption.

## **Textbox 5. Snapshot case study: Zimbabwe – climate action is growing but lacks appropriate funding**

The Highlands of Zimbabwe are witnessing a growing occurrence of cyclones and floods, both in terms of frequency and intensity. On March 15, 2019, Cyclone Idai isolated the region off completely. Roads and bridges were damaged, and there was a breakdown of communication systems. Helicopter operations were hampered due to poor visibility, and Zimbabwe faced challenges in responding effectively due to low institutional capacity. It was only after five days that state disaster management officials and international aid agencies gained access to the affected areas. In the interim period, the local community took initiative and mounted its own organic response before, during and after the cyclone. Local actors played a pivotal role in conducting rescues and organizing the distribution of food, aid, shelter and other forms of support. Community members who had lost their homes found refuge in the residence of others, in churches and even in schools.

When the government and humanitarian support services finally arrived, their priorities did not align with those of the local communities. They provided aid, including financial support, focusing on specific categories of loss while neglecting others. Many people who had given their homes, belongings or funds or had been injured trying to assist were not compensated for their losses. This discrepancy created divisions and resentment within the community and towards aid providers.

Climate mobility interventions require flexible and innovative tools. Existing financial products are not ideal, particularly in fragile environments. Investments and loans are not always appropriate. Grants, concessional finance, insurance, and forecast-based financing are more appropriate for fast and flexible disbursement. They are, however, more difficult to access.

As global adaptation funding grows, AfDB and IOM's institutional responses should access and direct the fund to climate-linked mobility. The AfDB, specifically the Transition Support Facility, is an expert in funding in the context of fragility. The Fragility strategy (AfDB, 2022a), pledges to "scale up its operational engagement in fragile contexts, leveraging its full range of financial instruments, while ensuring that resilience-based considerations are mainstreamed across its operations through systematic application of the fragility lens". The IOM is undergoing the accreditation process to become eligible for the Green Climate Fund with the goal of accessing financial flows for climate-linked mobility projects. It can further leverage its knowledge and operational roles to support joint efforts with AfDB to mobilize funding toward mobility responses.

### **Green livelihood solutions**

Green livelihoods, encompassing employment and skills opportunities in existing or new sectors, play a pivotal role in developing solutions for people to stay, to move, and on the move.

The stability of opportunities and jobs, livelihoods and the availability of basic infrastructure and services in places of origin play pivotal roles in ensuring mobility is an option, not a necessity (AfDB, n.d). Initiatives to diversify livelihoods, train in climate-resilient skills, create sustainable livelihoods and promote green growth help to address the root causes of vulnerability. By doing so, they, reduce instances of forced displacement and involuntary immobility, empowering individuals to decide whether they wish to remain in their current location or move without heightening their vulnerabilities.

Versatile climate-resilient skills and livelihoods also have significant potential to help people to move from one place to another, become productive in new environments, and continue a development trajectory. Labor mobility schemes and labor migration policies can help facilitate skills mobility, harness the social benefits of migration, and improve labor market data and information systems (IOM, 2020c).

Integrated green livelihood projects, which include mobility considerations, should be formulated to include vulnerable and non-vulnerable populations, including IDPs, women, returnees, youth and diaspora. They should include rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to urban, displacement, and returns.

The AfDB holds a significant comparative advantage when it comes to green livelihood solutions and skills. According to the Green Strategy (AfDB, 2021a) "The Bank's approach to supporting climate-resilient, low-carbon, resource-efficient, and sustainable development in Africa is intertwined with its goals on

economic growth, livelihood generation, job creation, poverty reduction, socially inclusive progress, market expansion, and socio-political stability.” Its role as a leader in this area positions it well to bring innovative solutions and lead other partners to support investments that integrate mobility considerations in green livelihood solutions.

IOM, on the other hand, possesses institutional expertise in labor programs, mobility, planned relocations, disaster-induced displacement, and mobility-related data. IOM also boasts substantial experience in the design, planning, implementation, and evaluation of livelihood projects in the context of mobility. Both types of expertise can be leveraged to determine specific entry points and develop fundable projects.

It is essential to involve migrants in developing strategies, including relevant and desired skills and livelihoods. Communities and migrants are already adapting to climate change and diversifying their skills. Their solutions should be documented and help to inform solution-oriented policies. IOM has a wealth of knowledge in this domain.

Youth are a priority population for both the IOM and AfDB. Creating decent jobs for youth is at the core of both development and migration. According to the Green Strategy (AfDB, 2021a):

“Given Africa’s demographic structure, the demographic dividend can only be realized if the power of a young labor force is harnessed. This calls for accelerated job creation and the provision of quality education and vocational skills, as well as the mobility of such skills and knowledge, to reduce regional gaps on climate change and green growth. Channeling the power of youth into productive mitigation and adaptation activities is also an important element in a broader effort to reduce youth disenfranchisement, disaffection, and disempowerment...”

Investments in green livelihood diversification that is resilient to climate change and provides greater economic security at all stages of the migration process – source, transit, and destination – are needed. Interventions to lower the costs and better capitalize on financial and social remittances, including technologies, skills and knowledge, should also be considered.

Many potential entry points exist for collaboration, some ideas include climate-smart agriculture and agroforestry, linking rural production to rural and urban markets, training programs for rural women living in cities or green value chains that include migrants.

## **Integrated Water Management**

Water is a primary factor driving climate mobility and immobility in Africa. Flooding and drought are the highest drivers of disaster displacement. Slow onset climate impacts, including sea-level rise and drought, severely impact fragile communities and drive mobility and immobility.

Water scarcity is one of the main climate change impacts. Water scarcity is defined as the physical or economic lack of water resources to meet the demands of a population (McFee, 2022). Physical water scarcity occurs where natural water resources are over-exploited and economic water scarcity occurs where there is insufficient investment in and maintenance of water distribution systems and infrastructures. Rising temperatures, longer periods of drought, reduced rainfall, and the rise in frequencies and intensities of flooding are all climate change impacts that have a direct bearing on both physical and economic water scarcity.

Water access and fragility are directly related. Because water is a core element of household labor, women bear a disproportionate burden of water scarcity. They must travel further to access it and are exposed to increased threats. Men who adapt to water scarcity by migrating often leave women behind to face the intensification of water scarcity while carrying family and household burdens (McFee, 2022).

Water availability also impacts other fragile situations, such as transhumance and urban settings. Changes in seasonal rain patterns and droughts affect access to arable land and grazing, altering traditional transhumance patterns and timing and even causing conflict in some cases. In conflict areas, water access is often politicized as part of broader power struggles. Water scarcity in cities impacts sanitation, access to drinking water, and the provision of basic social services and healthcare systems. Unplanned urbanization can prevent proper draining and cause floods, particularly in informal settings.

Water interventions that integrate climate mobility are needed, including water and sanitation for basic needs, water for livelihoods and economic development, and protective climate-resilient water infrastructure and alternatives, such as nature-based solutions, to manage water-related risks.

Improving water and sanitation and agriculture comprise two of the AfDB's High 5 areas of work. The Bank again has a comparative advantage in water initiatives through facilities and funds such as the African Water Facility and the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund. In the past decade, it has supplied improved water and sanitation to 21 million people in transition states, of which 10.5 million are women (AfDB, 2022a). The IOM can contribute knowledge on the links between water and human mobility. This includes toolboxes designed to scale up pilot water projects, including water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), irrigation, flood protection, nature-based solutions, and multipurpose systems. IOM can provide best practices and technical guidance on how climate mobility can be integrated into program design, planning and financing.

### **Textbox 6. Uganda water investments for refugees improve community relations**

The Highlands of Zimbabwe are witnessing a growing occurrence of cyclones and floods, both in terms of frequency and intensity. On March 15, 2019, Cyclone Idai isolated the region off completely. Roads and bridges were damaged, and there was a breakdown of communication systems. Helicopter operations were hampered due to poor visibility, and Zimbabwe faced challenges in responding effectively due to low institutional capacity. It was only after five days that state disaster management officials and international aid agencies gained access to the affected areas. In the interim period, the local community took initiative and mounted its own organic response before, during and after the cyclone. Local actors played a pivotal role in conducting rescues and organizing the distribution of food, aid, shelter and other forms of support. Community members who had lost their homes found refuge in the residence of others, in churches and even in schools.

When the government and humanitarian support services finally arrived, their priorities did not align with those of the local communities. They provided aid, including financial support, focusing on specific categories of loss while neglecting others. Many people who had given their homes, belongings or funds or had been injured trying to assist were not compensated for their losses. This discrepancy created divisions and resentment within the community and towards aid providers.

## **Climate-resilient Infrastructure**

The MDB Platform recognizes the significance of “Investing in climate-resilient public infrastructure that enhances access to services and quality of life with a focus on gender, youth and other features that build resilience” (AfDB, n.d.b) as a key opportunity and challenge related to human mobility. This applies to both rural and urban contexts.

However, cities are at the forefront of climate-linked displacement and migration. The African Economic Outlook (AfDB, 2022b) highlights the urgent need to scale up investment in various sectors, such as agriculture, energy, transportation (roads, rail, airports, seaports), manufacturing, public services, job creation, and environmental sustainability.

Much of the work in developing and implementing urban planning occurs at the municipal government level. The importance of cities in addressing climate change is growing, with many cities taking proactive steps ahead of their national governments. Mayors are at forefront of preparing urban areas for growth and play a pivotal role in bridging global policy with local action. Networks such as the Mayor's Migration Council<sup>12</sup> or C40 Cities<sup>13</sup> highlight their leadership. These networks increasingly focus on environmental sustainability and climate adaptation, encompassing aspects like energy systems, sustainable infrastructure, and land use. Cities and city leaders need to be enabled to act faster and develop the requisite infrastructure to prepare their cities for rapid growth. Achieving this objective necessitates the development of additional financial mechanisms, increased funding, and enhanced governance frameworks.

Urban expansion presents important opportunities to leverage the potential of migrants, benefiting from agglomeration effects and economies of scale to drive economic growth and development. Agglomeration must be inclusive of rural, undocumented, irregular, and stateless migrants, regardless of their nationality or status. These migrants can help drive economic transitions and transform cities

<sup>12</sup> The Mayors Migration Council (MMC) is a mayor-led advisory and advocacy organization that helps cities to shape national and international policy on migration and displacement. See [mayorsmigrationcouncil.org](http://mayorsmigrationcouncil.org)

<sup>13</sup> C40 Cities is A global network of mayors taking urgent action to confront the climate crisis and create a future where everyone can thrive. See [www.c40.org](http://www.c40.org)

into hubs for green technology and innovation, skills transfer, and infrastructure development, including energy, transport and water.

Secondary cities play a significant role in the context of climate mobility. Major metropolises and megacities often have adaptation limits, such as physical form or historical land-use patterns. Some have severe climate vulnerabilities, including sea-level rise, floods, and landslides. Smaller cities often have more opportunities for planning and development because they lack the same restraints. However, they typically have less revenue and human resources such as planners or climate change experts required for infrastructure changes. Nevertheless, secondary cities can serve as vital hubs for absorbing climate migrants and fostering the development of inclusive urban areas.

The AfDB has significant institutional history in infrastructure development and urbanization. Its Fragility Strategy (2022a) underscores the Bank's extensive experience in delivering top-notch infrastructure projects, with a focus on integrated projects—such as transport corridors—that incorporate social and economic infrastructure, to promote inclusive growth and community resilience". It prioritizes providing targeted support for infrastructure and public services to promote more resilient economies and societies. The IOM also has significant experience in infrastructure projects in migration contexts including schools, roads, medical facilities, community centres and more (IOM, 2022c).

As with other priority areas, the scope for potential projects is vast. Partnership in this focus area would enable the IOM to contribute its knowledge and operation capabilities, leveraging the AfDB's comparative advantage in infrastructure investments. This partnership can facilitate the scaling up of investments that incorporate considerations related to climate-induced mobility.

## Data and knowledge

The cross-cutting nature of climate-linked human mobility means that data, knowledge, policies, and interventions are spread across multiple sectors, such as agriculture, environment, health, labor, security, and development. Consequently, data and knowledge are often scattered, and unharmonized or inaccessible. This includes internally within organizations and externally to other stakeholders, investors, or decision-makers.

To address these challenges and enhance our understanding of how climate change intersects with mobility and its role in development and adaptation, there is a need for more interdisciplinary research. Data on the many topics related to climate-linked mobility and the number of people moving due to climate change – particularly slow onset impacts, the final destinations of people and the duration of disaster displacement are lacking due to methodological issues and lack of data (IOM, 2021). Yet, according to the IPCC (2022), Africa received just 3.8 percent of climate research funding.

Both AfDB and IOM have substantial bodies of evidence and data. However, issues of accessibility and usability persist. By partnering, the AfDB and IOM can overcome these challenges and work collaboratively to enhance data collection, sharing, and management. This partnership can involve the development of data collection tools and mechanisms, methods to make data more accessible and useful to MDBs and decision-makers, and dissemination.

The partnership will further enable the AfDB and IOM to deepen existing lines of questioning or to expand the scope of knowledge and interventions to include new lines with the aim of strengthening the knowledge and capacity of stakeholders and providing valuable insights to plan interventions and resilience strategies. For example, they could develop joint regional analyses that map existing data, that determine sectors and regions that are among the most affected by climate change, that study how green growth may shift migration pathways and trends, that investigate the extent to which some sectors may require re- or upskilling as a result of climate change disruptions.

## Support policy implementation and uptake

There are multiple global, regional, subregional, and national frameworks and plans addressing the links between climate change and human mobility. They could significantly strengthen RMCs abilities to respond to climate change. RMCs, including countries and communities in fragile situations, would benefit from adopting and operationalizing them.

For the AfDB, effective climate mobility interventions would be easier to develop, fund, implement and evaluate if member countries have appropriate laws and policies. If governments prioritize climate mobility within their climate change adaptation plans, both the IOM and the AfDB will be better positioned to support projects.

Translating policies and frameworks that are relevant to climate-linked mobility into national policies and actions will require technical and financial support.

Both the AfDB and IOM engage in strategic policy dialogues, policy formulation and policy implementation. The IOM is deeply engaged in this work with respect to climate-linked mobility on the continent through its policy and convening roles. Both organizations recognize the importance of promoting safe, orderly, productive migration that is an option, not a necessity and is based on enhanced social and economic choices (AfDB, n.d). Properly implemented policies and legal instruments can significantly reduce fragility and boost development.

IOM and AfDB can leverage their policy and convening roles to support the AU, RECS, and RMCs to operationalize existing frameworks or formalize policies and plans that include climate-mobility considerations.

## Concluding Remarks

Climate-linked mobility cuts across all levels and sectors and requires new whole-of-society approaches. The IOM and AfDB partnership allow both partners to leverage their institutional strengths for collective action that significantly increases the scope and scale of climate-linked mobility interventions on the continent.

The business case for using migration as a strategic vehicle for inclusive and sustainable development is strong. Migration has inherent development properties. Orderly and well-managed migration can serve as an effective adaptation strategy with positive development outcomes. It can empower individuals and communities and enhance skills to cope with and respond to climate-related impacts and reduce inequalities. Supporting interventions that enable seasonal, circular, free movement with inexpensive remittance channels, or help people move away from risks, will help unlock the inherent development potential. Interventions should recognize the development potential of migration and avoid framing it as a security risk.

The opportunity costs of involuntary immobility, loss of livelihood, mass displacement, uncontrolled informal urban growth, rural production losses, and youth brain drain are known. The economic costs of insufficient action and the benefits of good planning and implementation are significant.

As financial flows related to climate adaptation grow and increasingly target climate-vulnerable communities and countries, the scope for the AfDB and IOM partnership will continue to grow. There is a clear imperative to work together to plan strategically to build resilience among the most vulnerable populations on the continent. The insights and key areas discussed in this report can serve as valuable starting points for acting.



# CHAPTER 3

## SKILLS MOBILITY AND INCLUSIVE KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER: BOOSTING EMPLOYMENT IN STRATEGIC SECTORS IN SUPPORT OF AfCFTA AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS PROTOCOL

### Introduction

In January 2018, African Union (AU) member States convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to sign the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement, as well as the Free Movement of Persons Protocol (FMPP). While the former aims to liberalize the movement of goods and services across African borders, the latter promotes increased labor migration. Both of these frameworks are considered as crucial for promoting social and economic development and fostering integration on the continent. Consequently, various stakeholders in Africa – such as the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), national governments, and multilateral institutions — have intensified their focus on pushing this agenda. In fact, most of these institutions’ targets theoretically feed into a common goal: the **AU’s Agenda 2063**<sup>14</sup>. However, since these stakeholders have varying intentions, their approaches to achieving the target of a more integrated continent are insufficiently synchronized. Some governments are also more hesitant to buy into the concept of increased labor mobility due to the heterogeneity in social and economic characteristics across the continent.

The institutional capacity of African countries to facilitate increased labor migration is also weak compared to their capacity to promote the free movement of goods and services. Moreover, this capacity varies greatly across countries. These factors have contributed to a significantly slower uptake of the FMPP compared to that of the AfCFTA. Only four nations have ratified the former, while the latter has been ratified by 43 African governments. Notably, some of the greatest resistance to the FMPP have come from North Africa and Southern Africa – the continent’s two regions that experience the largest degree of skills mismatches, which has contributed to relatively high levels of under- and unemployment, as identified in section 3 of this chapter.

The consistent thread running across the literature reviewed during this research process can be classified into two key themes: (i) to enable the free movement of goods and services, the full mobility of labor is required, and vice versa; and (ii) the benefits of increased skills mobility and knowledge transfer are irrefutable when managed effectively. Therefore, it is key not only to identify and highlight the benefits, but also to provide guidance on the implementation process. This research paper aims to (i) assess relevant labor migration strategies and frameworks, (ii) identify and analyze labor migration trends on the African continent, and (iii) make policy recommendations based on the findings under the first two goals. Ultimately, these recommendations can inspire various stakeholders, which are involved in promoting skills mobility and inclusive knowledge transfer in Africa, to advance social and economic development as well as enhanced integration.

### Existing policies and frameworks

#### Skills mobility and the outlook for Africa

Most of the present-day borders in Africa have their origins in the continent’s colonial history, where foreign settlers fought and scrambled for land and resources. As a result, borders were created in accordance with settlers’ strategies, while the needs and cultures of Africa’s indigenous population were seldom considered. This meant that borders often cut through economic regions and the territories of ethnic groups. Moreover, the continent was fragmented into several territories, many of which are small and disadvantaged in terms of its resource allocation.

<sup>14</sup> African Union Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. Available at: [www.au.int/en/agenda2063/overview](http://www.au.int/en/agenda2063/overview).

In this regard, migration in Africa plays an essential role in negating some of the disadvantages brought on by the colonial past. The emancipation of workers – whether they are low-skilled, semi-skilled or highly skilled – to move across borders to markets where their skillsets are best suited hold many benefits for both origin and destination countries and the migrants themselves. However, disparities in the movement of people across Africa are widespread. These disparities can hinder or, in some instances, entirely eliminate the economic advantages that a particular country could have gained by utilizing the relevant skills of its workforce in sectors where a comparative advantage exist.

As such, African authorities have ramped up their efforts in recent times to address these issues, usually through policy reform. These policies stretch a vast political landscape, from continental powers to regional and local authorities. The regional framework that covers the largest geographical, institutional, and political landscape is the AU's Agenda 2063.

Agenda 2063 outlines Africa's inclusive and socio-economic development path over 50 years. A key component of this strategy is the promotion of labor mobility and the free movement of persons. To achieve this, the AU developed its Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (MPFA) 2018-30,<sup>15</sup> which is meant to serve as a migration management blueprint for member states and RECs. The strategy serves as an attempt to, firstly, identify the key hindrances and opportunities relating to skills mobility and knowledge transfer in Africa; and, secondly, to address these hindrances and promote these opportunities. In this regard, the MPFA identifies eight key focal points:

- Better **migration governance** to facilitate safe, orderly, and dignified migration. This is the overarching objective of the MPFA, as large discrepancies exist in how African governments view and manage migration in their respective countries.
- **Labor migration and education**, which entails the formulation of regular, transparent, comprehensive, and gender-responsive labor migration policies, legislation, and structures at national and regional levels. The skill sets of countries' workers vary greatly and are often not aligned with the needs of their respective labor markets. This is an issue that can be addressed by increased labor mobility and by identifying mismatches between supply and demand.
- **Diaspora engagement** to counteract and mitigate the effects of brain drain, which is currently a key challenge for African economies. In this regard, the MPFA framework suggests that expatriates should be encouraged to contribute to the development of their home countries through financial, skills, technology, and knowledge transfers.
- Strengthened **border governance** through cross-border cooperation to meet security, immigration, and development needs. Instead of stricter border controls in Africa, regional cooperation and governance on this front could stimulate economic integration.
- Stricter immigration policies have, in fact, resulted in an uptick in **irregular migration**, which adversely affects national and international stability and security. To counteract this, stronger transnational cooperation and legal frameworks are necessary.
- **Forced displacement**, which is closely linked to conflict, both as a consequence and potential cause, needs to be controlled through national, regional, and continental policies.
- **Internal migration**, which typically occurs in the movement of people from rural to urban areas, needs to be managed effectively to prevent strain on urban infrastructure and services. At the same time, nations need to leverage the potential benefits that stem from urbanisation, which can be achieved through strengthening local migration policies and strategies.
- The phenomenon of **migration and trade** is becoming increasingly relevant, particularly short-term migration. In this regard, the introduction of the **AfcFTA** and impending implementation of the **FMPP** should support trade, continental integration, and development.


Regarding the MPFA's final pillar, the **AfcFTA**<sup>16</sup> came into effect in January 2021. This free trade agreement allows for the free flow of goods and services across the borders of African nations. The objective is to foster sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, promote gender equality, and enhance competitiveness and industrial growth. Nevertheless, the free flow of goods and services across borders needs to be accompanied by increased labor mobility. As countries intensify their efforts to trade the goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage, the development of the skills that are required to optimally achieve this goal will be promoted. Consequently, valuable knowledge transfer is likely to result from the increased mobility of skills.

<sup>15</sup> African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action 2018-30. Available at: [www.au.int/en/documents/20181206/migration-policy-framework-africa-mpfa](http://www.au.int/en/documents/20181206/migration-policy-framework-africa-mpfa)

<sup>16</sup> African Union African Continental Free Trade Area. Available at: [www.au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated\\_text\\_on\\_cfta\\_-\\_en.pdf](http://www.au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf)

The FMPP<sup>17</sup> was launched alongside the AfCFTA to complement the free flow of goods and services with similar freedoms pertaining to the movement of individuals in Africa. In this regard, the AU envisions a single African passport for the continent's inhabitants. The rationale of the FMPP is phrased as: "The free movement of persons, capital goods and services will promote, [among others], integration, enhance science, technology, education, research and foster tourism, facilitate inter-African trade and investment, increase remittances within Africa, promote mobility of labor, create employment, [and] improve the standards of living of the people of Africa."

**Figure 1. Uptake of the free movement of persons protocol**



Source: African Union  
\*As of August 2022

While the AfCFTA has been signed by all 54 countries in Africa and subsequently ratified by 43 nations, the uptake of the FMPP has been much slower (see Figure 1). Although 32 countries have signed the FMPP according to the AU, some notable signatories remain absent from the list. No North African nation – and nearly half of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – have not signed it. A larger concern is how few countries have ratified the protocol. Only four African nations – Rwanda, the Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mali – have, so far, ratified the FMPP, which requires 15 ratifications to come into force (Hirsch, 2021). The reluctance to ratify – or even sign – the FMPP in comparison with the AfCFTA highlights authorities' concerns regarding the movement of human capital. More specifically, countries are hesitant to forfeit their sovereignty when it comes to who can cross their borders due to the potential domestic economic and security impacts. Ways to address these concerns, and to leverage the FMPP to promote skills and knowledge transfer, will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.

Another key framework is the **Joint Programme on Labor Migration Governance for Development and Integration in Africa**, better known as the **Joint Labor Migration Programme (JLMP)**,<sup>18</sup> which has been jointly formulated by the AU, International Labour Organization (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), and UNECA. The strategy aims to identify challenges present in African nations, which may include labor and/or skills shortages on a sectoral level, and high unemployment levels, especially among a growing youth cohort across the continent. In this regard, the overall objective of the JLMP is to "strengthen the effective governance, and regulation of labor migration and mobility ... towards increased equitable, full-employment economic growth and sustainable development of the African continent." To achieve this, the JLMP sets out four clear objectives, namely:

<sup>17</sup> African Union Free Movement of Persons Protocol. Available at: [www.au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol\\_on\\_free\\_movement\\_of\\_persons\\_in\\_africa\\_e.pdf](http://www.au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> African Union, International Labour Organization, International Organization for Migration, and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Joint Programme on Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration in Africa. Available at: [www.au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39732-doc-jlmp\\_strategic\\_framework\\_eng\\_dec\\_6.pdf](http://www.au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39732-doc-jlmp_strategic_framework_eng_dec_6.pdf)

- enhancing effective governance and regulation of labor migration and mobility in Africa;
- creating a safe and secure working environment for migrant workers in both the formal and informal sectors that provide access to and portability of social protections, and offers the mutual recognition of skills and qualifications;
- improving the access to and use of labor migration data to inform evidence-based decision-making and policy planning, formulation, and implementation; and
- strengthening the governance and accountability of the JIMP.

To achieve these outcomes, **the JIMP focuses on leveraging RECs on the continent.** In this regard, it aims to enhance inter-REC cooperation and encourage the sharing of lessons and good practices among RECs. It also promotes the coordination of labor migration programmes among RECs. This choice makes strategic sense: there are considerable discrepancies among RECs on the continent, meaning that there is significant scope for knowledge sharing. There is much to learn from communities that have seen greater success on the labor migration and knowledge transfer front, such as the **Economic Community of West African States** (Ecowas) and **East African Community** (EAC). That said, the focus on promoting skills mobility and inclusive knowledge transfer in Africa should go beyond hinging on inter- or even intra-REC efforts. Instead, continental and regional strategies should be implemented simultaneously. This is something the JIMP balances well, as it requires the participation of AU member States, as well as RECs, due to the all-encompassing characteristics of its stakeholders.

The United Nations' **Sustainable Development Goals** (SDGs)<sup>19</sup> framework, which has been signed by a long list of African countries, also highlights the contribution of migration to sustainable development. Migration is a cross-cutting issue, which is relevant to all 17 SDGs (11 SDGs have explicit targets and indicators that relate to migration or mobility).

Another relevant initiative under the auspices of the United Nations is the **Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration** (GCM).<sup>20</sup> In adopting the GCM, member States and other stakeholders consider diaspora engagement as a key strategy to advance the development in countries of origin, transit, and residence. The pact requires all stakeholders (governments, development actors, and civil society) to create an environment encouraging migrations and diasporas to contribute to sustainable development. While much of the GCM focuses on diaspora engagement, some of the objectives refer more explicitly to skills and knowledge transfer. In this regard, the pact aims to:

- Free up the required resources to increase the capacity of diaspora leaders and organisations to promote the transfer of skills and knowledge.
- Strengthen diaspora networking and advance tailored and sustainable digital solutions. This includes using the iDiaspora.org platform as a key tool to promote networking and peer learning among diaspora organisations and transnational communities.

#### **Global Compact for Migration targets related to skills mobility and inclusive knowledge transfer**

- Enhancing availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration
- Investing in skill development and facilitating mutual recognition of skills, qualifications, and competencies
- Establishing mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits
- Strengthening international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly, and regular migration

<sup>19</sup> United Nations: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Available at: [www.sdg.un.org/2030agenda](http://www.sdg.un.org/2030agenda)

<sup>20</sup> IOM Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. Available at: [www.iom.int/global-compact-migration](http://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration)

The successful implementation of the GCM hinges strongly on the participation of all stakeholders. It also requires a robust monitoring, evaluation, and learning system to measure its successes and make adjustments in areas where the pact appears ineffective.

## Supportive strategies and frameworks currently in place

Ultimately, the increased attention from global and regional bodies like the UN and AU on migration and labor mobility underscores the necessity for efficient policy execution in this domain. Though, the discrepancies between the policy recommendations of these entities and those put into practice by local authorities in Africa need to be resolved to ensure the achievement of migration and skills mobility goals. It is in this context that multinational institutions, such as the **IOM** and **African Development Bank (AfDB)**, can play a pivotal role in aligning international standards and domestic policies.

The IOM has developed a **Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF)**,<sup>21</sup> which outlines the “essential elements for facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people through planned and well-managed migration policies”. The framework consists of three principles which stipulate the conditions necessary for well-managed migration. It also contains three objectives, which are meant to ensure that migration is governed in an integrated and holistic manner.

**Principles of the MiGOF.** The first principle emphasizes the importance of upholding international standards and the fulfilment of migrants’ rights. This is crucial to ensure that migration occurs in a humane and orderly manner that complies with international law. It necessitates the protection and respect of all individuals, regardless of nationality or migration status, to safeguard their safety, physical integrity, well-being, and dignity. The second principle stipulates that migration and related policies are best formulated using evidence and whole-of-government approaches. Given that migration is often a contentious political issue, and often susceptible to populist sentiments, it is essential that migration policies are grounded in facts and informed by a rigorous analysis of the risks and benefits of the movement of people across borders. The third principle asserts that good migration governance relies on strong partnerships. Fundamentally, migration and mobility require multiple players: states and their neighbours, subnational authorities, local communities, migrants and their families, diasporas, employers, and unions. Additionally, there are various intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations whose mandates cover migration and humanitarian action.

**The objectives of the MiGOF.** The first objective states that sound migration governance and related policies should aim to enhance the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society. Instability, poverty, and poor access to health and education systems are often key drivers of forced migration. Those who are forced to migrate, in contrast to those who opt to migrate, often do so under unfavourable conditions. The second objective stipulates that effective responses to the mobility dimensions of crises are required. Around 60 million individuals were displaced in 2015 by natural and manmade disasters, with many of these displaced persons remaining in precarious situations for prolonged periods afterwards. Thirdly, it is key to ensure that migration takes place in a safe, orderly, and dignified manner so that the risks associated with the movement of people are mitigated. This requires the implementation of effective cross-border health measures and strengthening public health strategies. It also requires the ability to detect irregular migration and prohibit illegal cross-border activity.

In the African context, the IOM developed its **Continental Strategy for Africa 2020-24**<sup>22</sup> to guide policies regarding migration and human mobility on the continent. **The strategy aims to build upon Agenda 2063, the AfCFTA, and the FMPP to boost migration and human mobility across the continent.** In this light, it is meant to foster collaboration between AU member States and RECs on migration governance and legislation.

Another key point of **the strategy is to create employment and livelihood opportunities that are gender- and youth-sensitive.** The presence – or lack– of employment opportunities is a key driver of migration. Therefore, policies that facilitate the portability of skills through mutual recognition of qualifications and credentials, and the establishment of more effective labor market systems, will ensure greater fluidity in the human capital market for supply and demand to meet easily.

Like most migration-related policies, **the strategy sets out to combat irregular migration and human trafficking.** The IOM engages with member states and RECs to mitigate individual vulnerabilities to trafficking and exploitation, especially those that relate to women and children, through assistance with policy development and implementation.

<sup>21</sup> IOM Migration Governance Framework. Available at: [www.publications.iom.int/books/migration-governance-framework](http://www.publications.iom.int/books/migration-governance-framework)

<sup>22</sup> IOM Continental Strategy for Africa 2020-2024. Available at: [www.publications.iom.int/books/iom-continental-strategy-africa-2020-2024](http://www.publications.iom.int/books/iom-continental-strategy-africa-2020-2024)

**Diaspora engagement is considered as a fundamental element.** In addition to increased remittances, it contributes to developing social, cultural, and human capital. Migrants and diasporas can help to alleviate poverty and contribute to local development by supporting education and incomes.

**The strategy also focuses on improving governmental crisis response and management** as the occurrence of conflict and violent extremism – combined with crises due to disasters, climate change, and environmental degradation – become more prevalent on the continent. In this regard, displacement is seen both as a consequence of disasters and conflicts, as well as a driver of elevated disaster risk. Therefore, the AU, IOM, RECs, and members states collaborated to find sustainable solutions to internal displacement and forced migration through synchronised policy development and implementation.

Lastly, the strategy aims to support African governments' efforts to **address challenges pertaining to climate change and environmental degradation.** In this regard, the IOM offers support to African governments to improve their understanding of how this affects migration patterns, and how to develop policies and programmes that stabilise susceptible communities.

There are policies that, although not focused solely on migration, take the issue into account due to its sweeping impact. The AfDB's **Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2022-26**<sup>23</sup> is one such example, as it takes the impact of fragility and insecurity on migratory trends into account. Specifically, irregular migration is associated with poor development outcomes, as characteristics of fragile and insecure states, for instance high youth unemployment levels, typically breed social and political unrest. In this regard, the strategy identifies three key priorities that will – either directly or indirectly – improve the conduciveness of migration in Africa: (i) **strengthening institutional capacity**; (ii) **building societal resilience**; and (iii) **encouraging private investment.**

There are also several policies that relate more strictly to addressing inequalities in female and youth employment patterns. One such policy is the **AfDB's Group Gender Strategy 2021-25.**<sup>24</sup> The strategy aims to reduce gender inequality across the African continent by improving access to finance and technical assistance, advancing technical skills, and encouraging gender-responsive infrastructure. Although the strategy does not explicitly focus on migration, migrants and forcibly displaced individuals as a theme is intertwined across the three pillars, as women typically comprise a large portion of these cohorts. The **AfCFTA's 'Futures Report: Making the AfCFTA Work for Women and Youth'**<sup>25</sup> focuses on ways to leverage the AfCFTA to promote and support female and youth entrepreneurs and business owners. Improving access, especially to finance, education & training, and digital technologies, is key in achieving this goal. The harmonisation of these initiatives with the aforementioned policies, which are explicitly focused on labor market mobility and migration, will promote equitable outcomes in terms of migration in Africa.

It is worth mentioning that the AfDB's framework for support to Civil Society in Africa which can integrate the various aspects of diaspora engagement developed in these studies. This framework can support the implementation strategy lined with the recommendations made in this report. Moreover, AfDB is in the process of developing another migration initiative that has two main components: **diaspora engagement** and **intra-Africa mobility.** The former aims to leverage diaspora for productive investment, while the latter intends to foster intra-regional mobility within Africa in the context of the AfCFTA. This initiative is directly related to two (out of four) themes of the last call for proposal of the Transition Support Facility Pillar III resources which aim to "catalyse private investments, including from the diaspora, and support private sector development through the promotion of entrepreneurship, innovation, and business linkages, targeting, inter alia, forcibly displaced populations and hosting communities." Another goal of the initiative is to contribute to "accelerate the implementation of the AfCFTA in transition states with a particular focus on promoting orderly intra-African economic migration."


**Figure 2** illustrates the interconnections between the policies and frameworks discussed so far. In order for the AU to achieve its broader **2063 Agenda**, there should be continuous progress in the attainment of its short- and medium-term targets. Concerning migration, the **MPFA 2018-30** is key in advancing the relevant objectives for the foreseeable future. For this to occur, though, member states need to fully embrace the **AfCFTA** and, more importantly, the **FMPP.** The **IOM** and **AfDB** will play a critical supporting role in getting buy-in from stakeholders across the continent. They can work closely with such stakeholders to implement the necessary frameworks and build those necessary infrastructure that can allow for the freer movement of people across African borders. The two organisations' respective policies and frameworks will subsequently be key in attaining bigger targets in terms of skills mobility, inclusive knowledge transfer, and broader economic development.

<sup>23</sup> African Development Bank Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa (2022-2026). Available at: [www.afdb.org/en/documents/bank-groups-strategy-addressing-fragility-and-building-resilience-africa-2022-2026](http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/bank-groups-strategy-addressing-fragility-and-building-resilience-africa-2022-2026)

<sup>24</sup> African Development Bank Group Gender Strategy 2021-25. Available at: [www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-development-bank-group-gender-strategy-2021-2025](http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-development-bank-group-gender-strategy-2021-2025)

<sup>25</sup> African Union. The Futures Report: Making the AfCFTA Work for Women and Youth. Available at: [www.au.int/en/documents/20201202/making-afcta-work-women-and-youth](http://www.au.int/en/documents/20201202/making-afcta-work-women-and-youth)

**Figure 2. Achieving the AU 2063 Agenda relies on the success of several other strategies**



Source: Author's own elaboration.

## Notable regional strategies and frameworks

Over the 2016-21 period, the **Free Movement of Persons & Migration in West Africa** (FMM West Africa) project served as the REC's main strategy to promote labor mobility and knowledge transfer in the Ecowas region. The project, which was managed by a multi-stakeholder consortium, aimed to improve labor migration and border management while combatting trafficking. The project followed a three-tiered approach. At the **local** level, it aimed to promote the active engagement with non-state actors (NSAs) and local authorities in information and protection activities for the benefit of migrant and cross-border populations in West Africa. At the **regional** level, it set out to strengthen the capacities of the Ecowas Commission to lead an intra-regional discussion on the free movement and migration issues and serve as a platform for policy development and harmonisation. **Nationally**, it was intended to strengthen the capacities of national institutions of ECOWAS member states and Mauritania in terms of migration data collection and management, migration policy development, border management, labor migration, and counter human trafficking.

While the project yielded results on all three fronts, significant challenges emerged during the implementation process. Among others, data collection and analysis were poor, while technical expertise and overall knowledge varied at different administrative levels and in different states. Insufficient human, financial, and technical resources coupled with bureaucracy also hindered the project. Some hindrances during the inception phase included a lack of political willingness and low interest. It is important to remind that these are all issues that could be resolved, should a second phase of the project come to fruition.

**The Southern African Migration Management (SAMM) Project**,<sup>26</sup> which was implemented by 16 nations<sup>27</sup> in the region in January 2020, aims to ensure effective and equitable migration governance to foster the positive impact thereof on economic growth and development in the countries of origin, transit, and destination. Its main objective is to contribute to the realisation of goals 8 (decent work and economic growth) and 10 (reduced inequalities) of the United Nations' SDGs framework. There are three RECs that are the main stakeholders in the implementation of the project, namely the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), SADC, and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Table 1 sets out the project's specific objectives and corresponding key result areas.

<sup>26</sup> The Southern African Migration Management Project. Available at: [www.live-sammproject.pantheon-site.io/](http://www.live-sammproject.pantheon-site.io/)

<sup>27</sup> Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Specific Objectives	Key Result Areas
Improved policy environment for labor migration across the region and improved access to legal and efficient means of labor mobility for (prospective) labor migrants.	Rights-based legal and efficient channels of labor migration and mobility (including appropriate protection measures for migrant workers) promoted and put in place in the Southern African/Indian Ocean region.  A Southern African and Indian Ocean migration observatory established and fully operational.
Strengthened and informed decision-making as well as management of mixed migration flows, including improved protection of vulnerable migrants in the Southern African and Indian Ocean region.	Evidence-based management strategies and policies to address mixed migration challenges, including assurance of appropriate protection frameworks for vulnerable migrants, are formulated and implemented.

Source: Authors' own elaboration, based on ILO's project's information webpage<sup>28</sup>

Accelerating and optimising the SAMM Project in terms of its overall aims, the objectives, and desired results set out in Table 1 are key moves since many of the larger economies in the region, despite the potential rewards that they can reap as both host and origin countries, are considered as having relatively restricted labor migration policies.


## Migrant stocks and skills shortages

To identify gaps in the existing migration strategies – and make appropriate recommendations – it is vital to understand migratory trends in Africa. In this regard, owing to great heterogeneity across the continent, a nuanced approach is required. This section will analyze migration against the backdrop of education, skills gaps and shortages, and sectoral requirements.

### Dissecting migration stocks

International migrants constitute a relatively small portion of most African countries' populations. In the continent's most populous nation and largest economy, Nigeria, international migrants make up a mere 0.6 percent of the population, which translates to just over 1.3 million people (see Figure 3). This figure is slightly skewed, as women account for only 45.5 percent of total migrants. Gabon sits on the other end of the spectrum with the largest migrant cohort at 18.7 percent of the total population. That said, only 35.7 percent of migrants are female. **In fact, there are only 16 African nations out of the 54 where female migrants make up 50 percent or more of the total migrant stock.** Women migrants face more obstacles and have lesser opportunities to migrate as they are expected to be their family's primary caregivers, which can explain lower numbers of women international migrants than men. Chad has the largest share of female migrants at 54.4 percent. In Equatorial Guinea, women comprise a meagre 22.9 percent of total migrants, despite migrants accounting for 16.4 percent of the total population. There is indeed a clear trend that women are insufficiently represented in the migrant profiles of countries where migrants form the largest portion of the population. Besides Equatorial Guinea, this trend is quite evident in Libya, Seychelles, and Gabon.

**Figure 3. International migrant profiles in Africa and the gender distribution thereof (2020)**




Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2020)

<sup>28</sup> International Labour Organization, Southern Africa Migration Management (SAMM) Project webpage. Available at: [https://www.ilo.org/africa/countries-covered/south-africa/WCMS\\_758857/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/africa/countries-covered/south-africa/WCMS_758857/lang--en/index.htm)

**Figure 4** plots the countries' total migrant stocks against the annual rate of change over the 2015-20 period. South Africa, who has the largest international migrant stock at just below 2.9 million individuals, has seen about 2.4 percent of its migrant population leave annually over this period. **Liberia, at 4.9 percent, has seen the biggest decline over this period.** On the other hand, countries with sizable migrant stocks, such as the Sudan (nearly 1.4 million) and Uganda (just over 1.7 million), have experienced notable growth of 16 percent p.a. and 14.1 percent p.a., respectively. On a regional level, Northern Africa's migrant stock has increased by 7.9 percent p.a., on average, over the 2015-20 period, while that of Southern Africa has declined by an average of 2.1 percent p.a. over the same period.

**Figure 4. Fluctuations in African countries' international migrant stock levels**



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2020)


## Education levels and skills across African countries

Due to high fertility rates compared with the rest of the world, Africa's working age population (aged 15-64) is expected to more than double, from 773 million in 2021 to 1.58 billion in 2050 (Haver Analytics, 2022). While the working age population for the rest of the world is anticipated to increase by only 5 percent (to 4.6 billion in 2050), Africa's working age population as a proportion of its total population will also increase, from 74.1 percent in 2021 to 76.3 percent by 2050. In the rest of the world the share of the working age population is expected to decline from 67 percent in 2020 to 63.2 percent in 2050. This projected increase in the continent's working age population over the next three decades presents both opportunities and challenges for strengthening economic development and integration across the continent. The rise in the working age population could drive higher earnings and, therefore, GDP growth, but only to the extent that formal jobs can be created. Moreover, it is key that these jobs are 'decent'<sup>29</sup> (i.e., they are sustainable, fairly compensated, are coupled with adequate benefits, and support acceptable living conditions).

Due to the continued digitalisation of the global economy, job opportunities in the future will require increased levels of digital skills, which means that Africa could potentially squander its demographic dividend due to digital skill gaps. Appropriate skills development is also necessary to ensure that sector-specific needs are met on the continent and to encourage the flow of these skilled individuals across borders. Kenya's booming ICT sector may attract individuals from other African nations with the appropriate qualifications, while South Africa's well-established and advanced financial sector could host other Africans with the necessary skills. However, Africa's education levels remain fairly poor despite significant progress made over the 2007-17 period. Most African countries have not caught up to the world median for mean years of schooling, which stood at 8.9 years in 2017 (see Figure 5).

<sup>29</sup> According to the International Labour Organization, "decent work" involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for all, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.


**Figure 5. Mean years of schooling in Africa\* (years)**



Sources: Authors' own elaboration, based on United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Bank data

This implies that large parts of the continent's population, especially in the least-developed countries, are still deprived of access to primary education. Advances in improving levels of primary educational attainment have also not translated to equally successful increases in secondary and post-secondary education which is needed to formalise African economies. For most countries on the continent, gross tertiary education enrolment is below the global average of 35 percent with the sub-Saharan Africa average of 8.6 percent being very low. Mauritius has the highest enrolment rate with 38.7 percent of the adult population having attended some form of tertiary education, while at the opposite end of the spectrum Eritrea has an enrolment rate of only 2.6 percent (see Figure 6). Notably, North African countries have, on average, higher levels of enrolment. This couples favourably with the region's high degree of mobility, which is visible in its annual rate of change in migrant stock. In addition to heterogeneity in terms of education levels across countries, differences in the quality of education is another big issue. This hinders the transferability of labor as companies may be hesitant to hire migrants from certain nations due to concerns – whether perceived or material – about the quality of the education they received. Moreover, migrants often simply do not possess the skills necessary to fulfil a certain role due to low quality learning.

**Figure 6. Gross enrolment in tertiary institutions in Africa\* (% of total population)**



Sources: Authors' own elaboration, based United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Bank data


## Major skills gaps and shortages

There exists significant skill mismatches and shortages in Africa, which means that many countries are burdened by sub-optimal levels of productivity and competitiveness. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2020), many companies that conduct business in the private sector in Africa, and especially in North Africa, identify skills gaps as a major limitation to their operations, as shown in Figure 7 below. The SADC countries are also constrained by the insufficient skill availability as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa all

fall below the world average in terms of the ease of finding skilled workers. Conversely, other countries like Kenya, Senegal, Zambia, and Ghana, are above the global average. However, these numbers do not necessarily reflect higher skill levels among employees. They in fact imply that there is a better match between the level of education and training and the skill level needed by businesses functioning in the respective economies.

While the skills gap in Africa is usually ascribed to the continent's low education levels, the causes can sometimes be more nuanced than this. For example, large portions of individuals attend tertiary education institutions in countries like Botswana, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria (see Figure 6). However, the unemployment rates in these countries remain elevated, suggesting that the chosen fields of study do not align with the knowledge and skills required by the economy. North Africa, in particular, has historically had a high reliance on the public sector for employment. This means that formal education channels have been aimed at public sector requirements, effectively causing the skills needed by the private sector to be neglected. In these instances, there are not any channels to formally identify which excess skills a specific country possesses, and which it lacks. This prevents policymakers from identifying nations whose skills needs match their skills profile. Setting up bilateral agreements between nations whose supply-demand needs correspond could mitigate the issues of skills mismatches and unemployment in both countries.

**Figure 7. Ease of finding skilled workers**



Source: World Bank (2022)

### Gaps in terms of sectors' skills requirements

At the sectoral level, the World Enterprise Survey by the World Bank provides some valuable insight (World Bank, 2022). The most recent survey asked firms that operate in the manufacturing and services sectors across the continent whether they view an inadequately educated labor force as a 'major constraint' to operations. The results, particularly in North African nations like Tunisia and Morocco, suggest that this is a significant limitation. In both countries, over 30 percent of companies stated that the perceived 'lack of education' limits activity in the manufacturing and services sectors. As these are two of the countries on the continent with the highest levels of tertiary education enrolment, the survey results again highlight the mismatch between the knowledge and skills produced by the workforce and the requirement of these economies.


Contrastingly, the portion of businesses perceiving an inadequately educated workforce as a major limitation was much lower in other African countries, such as Kenya, Rwanda, Zambia, and South Africa. Though, this does not diminish the importance of formulating policies aimed at ensuring a greater match between education systems and the skills required at the sectoral level. It is also vital to gear skills development towards sectors that are perceived to be important for future production as this trend will undoubtedly intensify as economic development on the continent progresses.

The mismatch in skills is also more noticeable in certain subsectors. For example, in Kenya and Tunisia, companies in the textiles & garments industries perceive a poorly educated labor force as a marked limitation while, in Morocco, businesses in manufacturing industries that exclude food and garments see the skills gap as a more severe constraint. In Egypt, the skills mismatch is seemingly more widespread in heavy industries, such as chemicals and petroleum, plastics and rubber. This data suggests that as industrial expansion has become engrained, the skills and competencies of the labor force started lagging behind the skills and competencies needed by companies functioning in specific subsectors.

## Mismatches between education levels and countries' educational needs

Figure 8 below illustrates the compatibility of African nations' labor force education levels with the respective countries' educational needs. It is quite evident that most countries on the continent have undereducated labor forces, with transition states like Burkina Faso (92.7 percent), Mali (94.3 percent), Chad (84.7 percent), and the Niger (86.9 percent) having some of the largest cohorts of undereducated workers. On the other hand, various SADC nations like South Africa (49.4 percent), Botswana (45.8 percent), and Zimbabwe (54.2 percent) have their needs relatively well met – another potential reason why these countries may be more hesitant to buy in to the concept of free labor mobility across Africa. Ironically, these countries also have some of the largest proportions of overeducated workers, suggesting that there is significant room for the respective economies to 'catch up' with the skill sets at their disposal. At the same time, provided that labor mobility increases, there is a possibility for these skills to be employed in other countries that have an undereducated labor force. This trend again highlights not only the benefits of, but also the need for, increased skills migration and knowledge transfer in Africa.

**Figure 8. Labor force skills compatibility in select African countries**




Source: ILO (2022)

## The importance of prioritising sectors in line with development goals

It is widely accepted that development efforts in Africa need to be enhanced to address the socioeconomic challenges that the continent is facing. On this assumption, the ratification of the AfCFTA provides significant opportunity as maximising the flow of capital and goods across borders is not possible without also freeing up the movement of people. Reducing the barriers and costs associated with cross-border trade will incentivise countries to conduct business with each other. This promotes specialisation as economies will focus on activities in which they possess a comparative advantage, and then trade these activities for those in which they do not. As discussed in section 3.3, some countries have skilled workers that do not necessarily match their own specialisation needs but may match that of other nations. Thus, matching the excess supply of a certain skill in one country with the shortage of that skill in another will allow both nations to focus on the economic activities that serve their own best interest. Coupling this with the free movement of capital, goods, and labor increases the likelihood of all participating parties achieving an optimal outcome, not only individually but also collectively. Therefore, it is key for African countries to identify their key sectors – not only at present, but also those that will become key as they move along their development path – and then to find the labor market(s) that possess the skills that these key sectors require. While this already occurs in Africa, it is largely through informal channels, and thus there exists scope for more governments on the continent to actively identify key economic sectors at a national level and then to formulate national development strategies around these. Moreover, increasing the volume of skills mobility partnerships in the areas of vocational education and training, with a focus on the sectors identified as possessing the highest potential for job creation, will hold great benefits – particularly for the youth.

**Figure 9. Migrant occupations per sector and skill level in select African countries**



Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2018)

**Figure 9** above illustrates the main sectors in which migrants are employed in selected countries on the continent, as well as the associated skill level. It is evident that migrants often find employment in low-skilled sectors. This fact highlights the importance of considering the informal sector when making decisions that relate to labor migration. Moreover, the figure highlights where semi- and highly skilled migrants may be able to find employment. In this regard, the secondary sectors of Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and South Africa offer jobs to migrants. The latter also has a significant number of migrants working in the tertiary sector – a trend that is also very pertinent in East Africa.

**Textbox 1. Snapshot case study: the tradability of skills among African countries**

Nigeria possesses a strong skill base in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, with many Nigerians finding employed in the ICT sectors of other nations. While the ICT sectors of many African countries lag far behind continental leaders and the rest of the world, there is a noticeable absence of bilateral agreements between these countries and those with ICT expertise, such as Nigeria and Kenya. Consequently, there is an opportunity for Nigeria to 'trade' its ICT workers for workers from other nations who can address other skills shortages, such as teachers – many of which currently are informally imported from Ghana. Moreover, Kenya has experienced a brain drain in fields like engineering, education, and medicine. This means that employment opportunities exist in these fields for Africans living in countries where related jobs are supply and demand mismatches. Therefore, **promoting labor market mobility across the continent will also support brain circulation. Brain circulation benefits both countries, instead of brain drain/gain that leaves a definitive winner and loser.** Doing this will also promote the development of skills in all participating

parties, as **it will actively promote skills development and knowledge transfer** from one country to another. While such agreements do not explicitly allow for the free movement of people across all African borders, it will serve as a key step in building credibility and trust in the system. This underscores the importance of a holistic approach and the value of achieving incremental successes in cross-border labor liberalisation. In terms of promoting bilateral agreements, the IOM advocates for the concept of [Skills Mobility Partnerships \(SMPs\)](#), which are inter-state agreements designed to promote human capital development and positive labor market outcomes for both the country of origin and destination.

**Considering the impact of climate change and global warming on Africa**, especially in terms of its food and water resources, there exists a great need to expedite the skills development process in agriculture across the continent. Much of Africa's informal sector also operates in the agricultural sector, and hence developing these skills provides the added benefit of formalising this large portion of the economy. Increasing diaspora engagement on this front can be extremely beneficial, as it will allow the transfer of skills and knowledge in the field from the developed world – which typically possesses fewer natural resources, but it is often less impacted by climate change than Africa. Moreover, incentivising diaspora to engage with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in the agricultural sector will create a channel through which valuable skills and knowledge will flow. Coupling this with an increased investment in the formalisation of agricultural sectors and development of agro-processing industries across the continent will mitigate the adverse effects of global warming on Africa. Kenya serves as a key example of a country that will benefit greatly from efforts to engage diaspora in the agricultural sector. Despite having a highly developed ICT sector, its agricultural capabilities are relatively informal and underdeveloped. This, in conjunction with changing weather patterns, which result in prolonged periods of drought, has worsened food insecurity in the country. Therefore, investing in smart agricultural solutions and developing the skills that need to accompany it, holds significant benefit. Not only will it increase food security and hedge against worsening climate conditions, but it will also advance economic development and diversification and rope in the informal sector.

Finally, the private sector's role in skills development should not be underestimated. In fact, as the relative competitiveness of African economies rise amid lower barriers to trade, the combined implementation of the AfCFTA and FMPP is set to increase the relevance of private-sector actors. It is expected that there will be an increase in foreign firms establishing their presence on the continent, provided that favorable business conditions are maintained. Consequently, it is key that policymakers ensure that the administrative processes of new business entering any given country do not act as hindrances. The economic benefits of new business are vast and not necessarily limited to those activities in which the country has already a comparative advantage. In this regard, policies to incentivise foreign businesses to invest and develop skills – whether they are geared towards a comparative advantage or not – will aid economic development and diversification. This hinges on the free movement of capital and goods across Africa as well as on the free movement of people.

## Policy recommendations

This section assesses the current strategic frameworks discussed in section 2 against evidence from the data and research analysed in section 3. In this way, it paves the way forward in terms of policy design and implementation. After identifying the main gaps in current migration frameworks and strategies, this section will make some recommendations aiming at further promoting skills mobility and inclusive knowledge transfer on the continent.

### Key lessons from empirical analysis

When considering the differences in migrant stocks, education levels, and economic sectors of African countries, high levels of heterogeneity across the continent become apparent. While this creates opportunity for the flow of human capital, it also presents various challenges. Some countries possess qualified labor forces that are unable to find employment as their skill sets do not match the needs of their own domestic economy. On the other hand, these skills are often in short supply in other countries. This creates an opportunity for African nations to trade labor, which will not only ensure that their needs are met but will also contribute to furthering skills development and ultimately address any supply shortages. However,

there are several obstacles to reaching a point where labor can flow more or less freely across African borders. **The two main hurdles identified are (1) gaining support from governments for the concept of labor mobility, and (2) aligning skills mismatches across the continent.** More specifically, achieving the former is a prerequisite for attaining the latter: that is, governments need to first identify countries that possess the skillsets they require, and then put the necessary measures in place to allow for the free movement of these skills. Moreover, African governments have differing views on labor migration. Such differences are evident at a regional level. Some RECs have much greater intra-regional labor mobility than others as they have robust migrant management systems in place (i.e. ECOWAS). Contrastingly, the SADC has a more restrictive policy, since it fears that opening its borders would lead to an influx of people that it would be unable to control or manage. Even in regions where people can move around more freely, some countries, such as Mali in West Africa, are de facto excluded from participating in labor migration due to negative political, social, or economic perceptions.

## Identifying gaps in current strategies and frameworks

While the current policy frameworks in place focus strongly on liberalizing the movement of people across the continent, it struggles to garner the support it needs from African governments in order to be implemented effectively and universally. The main reason for this is its attempt to serve as a one-size-fits-all approach for a continent that consists of a diverse set of countries. Consequently, the current frameworks work for some nations, but not for others, and therefore are adopted and implemented inconsistently across Africa. The existing policies are also focused on boosting the free movement of human capital in general, and do not prioritize matching countries' skills shortages with surpluses in others or developing skills where they are lacking. **This means that African economies' comparative advantages are not sought out and addressed by increased labor mobility, which means an opportunity to increase continental integration and promote human capital development is missed.** Another key issue is establishing trustworthiness in the migration policy framework(s). Authorities often misunderstand – or have concerns regarding – the implementation process. This means that African governments are not willing to cooperate on the issue and, as a result, progress on this front is hindered. Also the issue of informality needs to be addressed to improve the effectiveness of labor policies on the continent. Although these gaps are currently preventing the optimal flow of human capital in Africa, they can be addressed by making the necessary policy adjustments.

**Assessing the shortcomings in migration frameworks.** These identified trends underpin the slow advancement made on migration policy thus far. While there has been a concerted effort by continental bodies and various multilateral institutions to promote increased labor mobility, countries' reluctance to commit to a fluid continental labor market – whether due to security concerns, inadequate infrastructure and administrative systems, or simply in pursuit of their own self-interests – has impeded so far (Hirsch, 2021). Also, it is typically the richer African nations that are more reluctant to commit to migration liberalisation – which is visible in their lack of support for the FMPP. Some of the key issues that the aforementioned policies are yet to address effectively, include:

1. Inadequate civil registration and identity documentation systems: this makes it difficult for the home countries of migrants to vouch for their citizens to the extent that is required by host countries. Supporting efforts to address this issue on a regional level could aid in building trust between countries – particularly between those that share borders. This will require significant investment by both governments and other supporting partners – such as the IOM and AfDB – not only in the development of these systems, but also in the development of the capacity to maintain and update them.
2. Weak administration in criminal justice systems: This issue needs to be addressed to prevent the untracked migration of criminals. Perceived threats to national security are among the main hindrances to increased labor mobility in Africa, and administrative improvements on this front will help to build greater trust and thus reduce hurdles to migration that relate to security concerns.
3. Unreliable border management systems: Many countries in Africa lack reliable border management systems. That said, the EU has, for its own reasons, supported improvements on this front in West and North Africa and the Horn of Africa – not only for the bloc's own benefit, but for regional benefits too. However, overreliance on external forces, such as the EU, on developing border management systems may tilt them towards favoring northward migration rather than improving the flow of intra-Africa human capital. While fully addressing this shortcoming will take time, support from African institutions and multilaterals can fast-track progress – especially in poorer countries.

4. Insufficient exchange of security intelligence: Terrorist and militant groups, such as al Shabaab, Boko Haram, and Islamic State pose significant security threats to many African countries, many of whom do not have strong security monitoring systems. This prevents them from participating in the exchange of security intelligence, and is therefore a key area of improvement to increase trust across countries on the continent.
5. The lack of repatriation agreements: Continental or regional migration protocols typically do not include repatriation processes. Countries need support in this regard so that they can develop and implement fair agreements on repatriation before they are expected to welcome migrants.

### **Textbox 2. Snapshot case study: smaller, regional efforts provide opportunities for quick wins**

Despite aforementioned challenges, some promising patterns have also emerged in assessing the success of these policies so far. Smaller groupings of countries, whose interests are aligned, can move forward faster in terms of migration policy reform. For example, the EAC has made great strides in this regard, despite only consisting of six members. This implies that it may be simpler for smaller subsets of countries to agree to promoting the agenda surrounding the free movement of people when specific arrangements and protocols are needed, and this could contribute to the broader continental agenda as well.

It is also easier to make progress on a regional basis. This is typically due to familiarity and trust within regions, though it can also be a result of the exercise of power by some of the larger nations in a region. A key example of this is the FMM West Africa strategy discussed earlier in the report. Labor migration synchronicities among countries in the region have meant that skills mismatches are relatively well addressed, while knowledge transfer is also encouraged by increased skills mobility. This phenomenon underpins the importance of RECs in promoting labor migration and increasing skills mobility. Investing resources into regional and national capacity building also has a marked impact as it allows nations to better manage the cross-border flow of people. Ultimately, identifying these promising trends is key in capitalizing on them to further improve the flow of skills and people across African borders.

### **Recommendations to address shortcomings and promote migration**

- *Shortcoming 1 & 2 – Addressing the issue of inadequate civil registration and identity documentation systems and improving criminal justice system administration:*

A consensus should be reached on how the relevant administrative processes can be developed, introduced, and maintained uniformly across the continent. It may be useful to roll out such processes at a regional level first, as this will make implementation and progress tracking easier. In this case, it will be important to maintain a holistic approach, ensuring that at a later stage, regional processes can be easily integrated to form a continental framework for keeping record of migrant workers. To do this, authorities should collect and analyse credible data on, inter alia, demographics, cross-border movements, internal displacement, diaspora, labor markets, seasonal trends, education, and health. Moreover, countries should understand migration trends and their impact on environmental degradation, climate change, and humanitarian and financial crises. Since there are many laws and policies applicable to migration, good migration governance requires a whole-of-government approach where all ministries connected with the movement of people are involved. In this way, governments can ensure that their migration policy advance broader interests. Good data will also assist in further identifying gaps and opportunities when it comes to future policy decision-making, creating additional work opportunities for migrant workers, and promoting the transfer of knowledge across borders.

Furthermore, improving the administration of the continent's criminal justice system is key. It can prevent the untracked migration of criminals and ease governments' concerns, whether perceived or real, on security issues. To enhance the criminal justice system, it is important to develop a uniform blueprint for African governments. This blueprint should encourage data-sharing and cooperation. Notably, more robust civil registration and identity documentation systems can support the identification, monitoring, and prevention of the movement of criminals across borders. To achieve this, migration and border agencies should work with national and international justice and security

agencies to collect, analyse, and utilise information to address terrorism, human trafficking and smuggling, and other transborder criminal activity.

- **Shortcoming 3 – Strengthening border management systems:**

Many African countries currently lack effective border controls and management systems. In this regard, One Stop Border Posts (OSBP), that enable goods, people, and vehicles to stop in a single facility where they undergo necessary controls following applicable regional and national laws to exit one state and enter the adjoining state, should be encouraged. Moreover, Integrated Border Management (IBM) systems can enhance the coordination of border management efforts, thereby facilitating trade, the movement of people, and bolstering security.

- **Shortcoming 4 – Promoting the exchange of security intelligence:**

The implementation of measures outlined under Shortcomings 2 and 3 can also contribute to fostering cooperation and coordination between African governments concerning the exchange of security intelligence. Such cooperation can alleviate security concerns and strengthen the fight against terrorist and militant groups on the continent. Achieving this necessitates close collaboration between migration and border agencies as well as national and international justice and security agencies. Together, they should cooperate in collecting, analysing, and utilising information to address terrorism, human trafficking and smuggling, and other transborder criminal activity.

- **Shortcoming 5 – Encouraging repatriation agreement on the continent:**

It is crucial to establish a uniform framework for repatriation agreements across the continent. This clarity will boost governments' willingness to participate in cross-border labor market liberalization because it defines the steps for potentially possibly reversing the migration process when necessary. Consequently, consensus on the agreed-upon due process is key to ensure homogeneity across the continent.

## General suggestions to be considered in the policymaking process

Promoting **labor mobility in Africa can be significantly advanced by capitalizing on the relative success of the AfCFTA to further the agenda of the FMPP** (Apiko, Bisong & Byiers, 2021). Although these initiatives are integral to the AU's Agenda 2063, the latter has been prioritised above the former in many aspects. To address this imbalance, policymakers should be more explicit about the socio-economic benefits that increased labor mobility can offer. In this regard, it is imperative to engage all stakeholders and representatives (such as immigration agencies, national security departments, trade ministries, international organisations, business associations, civil societies organisations, etc) in these deliberations to avoid isolated parallel discussions. As national dynamics (such as political and socio-economic differences, labor market needs, security concerns, demographic trends, ethnic tensions, and xenophobia) may affect countries' stance towards liberalising labor migration, the inclusion of all relevant parties in the discussions will aid in managing these dynamics.

Another critical issue involves **addressing the perception of the free movement of labor**. Many African governments express concerns about their sovereignty and their ability to manage the flow of people in and out of their countries. Cross-border movement is often perceived as a security threat and, as a result, African policymakers struggle to strike the correct balance between safeguarding national sovereignty and harnessing the economic integration benefits linked with increased labor mobility. To correct this imbalance, the concerns, interests, and needs of all involved nations need to be addressed. Dialogues and negotiations should aim to foster a comprehensive understanding of the implications of enhanced labor mobility, including the freedoms and potential risks it entails, and how such risks could be mitigated. Moreover, it is important to bring the private sector (consisting of both national and foreign firms) on board, as employers in this sector are often the first to be affected by labor market skills shortages, and hence are typically the first to seek migrant workers to support their operations.

Another opportunity to advance the continental push for increased integration lies in leveraging **the progress achieved within specific RECs**. African countries are currently driven by Various objectives, including economic considerations and Pan-Africanism, to participate in regional labor mobility protocols through RECs. However, these objectives should extend beyond regional movement of people for the benefits of increased migration to become visible at the continental level. To accomplish this, it is crucial to

intensify the dialogue and engagement with African countries that are members of less active RECs. This approach is necessary to avoid 'dead zones' of implementation. Additionally, RECs can serve as platforms for enhancing cooperation on (i) sharing labor market information and skills intelligence to improve cross-border skills matching; (ii) ensuring the mutual recognition of skills and qualifications to enhance workers' skills portability; and (iii) exchanging best practices on skills development and training in strategic sectors to guarantee the relevant skills availability in the future.

**Policies should ensure that poorer countries are not left behind.** To prevent such exclusion, a proactive process should be adopted, enabling fragile and transitional states to gradually meet the preconditions for increased levels of integration based on appropriate criteria, rather than completely excluding them from participating if certain standards are not met. This necessitates the establishment of technical committees within member states and their respective regions to address issues hindering increased labor mobility.

**Lastly, policies should concentrate on promoting specific skills.** Fostering the movement of skills that align with certain country's comparative advantage will not only alleviate skills mismatches, but also contribute to the development of skills required in that specific country. Engaging the private sector and the diaspora in this regard offers significant benefits. The private sector could be incentivised to attract and develop the desired skills, while the diaspora can contribute by transferring knowledge. It will require policies that incentivise private businesses to set up shop in countries where a specific skill is in short supply. Additionally, engagement and/or partnerships with training institutions and vocational training centres would contribute notably to this endeavour. A possible approach would include a series of incentives like tax incentives. It is also important to identify sectors that require the most skill development (such as the ICT, agriculture and health sectors) and then formulate policies that promote skill development in these areas.


With regards to the identification of stakeholders to address the aforementioned shortcomings, institutions developing migration frameworks and strategies (such as the AU, IOM, and AfDB), RECs, and national governments will all play pivotal roles. Successful resolution of these issues demands synchronisation across the spectrum since stakeholders often focus on advancing their own specific objectives (whether at the continental, regional, or national level) without considering the 'bigger picture'. Therefore, it is essential to establish an overarching objective – i.e., **promoting skills mobility and inclusive knowledge transfer in Africa** – and then structure the regional and national strategies and frameworks around this objective to ensure they contribute to it.

## Conclusion

This chapter has found that, although the current labor migration frameworks, strategies, and policies provide a solid foundation for advancing skills mobility and inclusive knowledge transfer in Africa, there are still several gaps. Some of such policy gaps link with the lack of institutional capacity in the continent, while others result from perceptions and the prioritization of countries' short-term self-interest. Another key issue is **the lack of a centralized and uniform approach** among all relevant stakeholders. Consequently, all parties interested in promoting labor migration should align their efforts to enhance continental integration. That said, country-specific and regional initiatives will continue to play a pivotal role– as long as they all aim to achieve the same outcome.

Countries' labor market characteristics, as well as their capacity to facilitate the movement of people, vary greatly across the continent. Therefore, assistance and guidance to identify and manage a nation's relevant labor market profile and to develop their migration systems are important. To do this, **buy-in from most, if not all, governments on the continent will be needed** to allow the free movement of people across African borders and to promote skills development and the formalization of economies on the continent.

There is much room for institutions, such as the IOM and AfDB, to help African countries to implement the recommendations in this chapter (in section 4.3). This will liberalize the flow of human capital across borders, which, in turn, will contribute to the skills development of both host and destination countries. As this becomes the standard practice across the continent, efforts should be directed towards formulating strategies and policies that specifically target skills development and mobility. This area requires further research, but the groundwork for its facilitation will have already been established.



# Conclusion

This report reminds us of the complexity in defining the term Diasporas. The multiplicity of definitions among countries, and through different organizations lead to diverse analytical perspectives. While this diversity of perspectives is valuable, it can make it challenging to compare different studies. The findings of this study align with those of other organizations,<sup>30</sup> indicating that the challenges regarding diaspora engagement remain largely unchanged.

In addressing these challenges, “brokers”<sup>31</sup> are vital to foster a more effective engagement between the diaspora and governments, and with the local community. Diasporas can play an important role in reconciling communities and contributing to social cohesion in communities of origin if trust is deepened and social and cultural capitals are leveraged.

Furthermore, the report points out that diaspora communities are willing to invest in their countries of origin as long as it has a social impact. To achieve this, it calls for efforts to collect data on diaspora profiles, preferences, and ideas to facilitate inclusive engagement. Creating a conducive environment to encourage diaspora investment is also essential, particularly in fragile settings during times of economic uncertainty. Exploring ways to integrate diaspora finance into domestic resource mobilization policies is one avenue to consider, along with leveraging the African diaspora to enhance development aid policies.

New areas in which the contributions of African Diaspora communities should be maximized include knowledge transfer, which is linked to skills and labor mobility, digitalization, and climate change.

Regarding skills mobility, it is important to create mechanisms that would enable countries to engage with their diasporas that may no longer have the citizenship of countries of origin. The creation of innovative schemes could encourage diaspora’s temporary return to Africa, creating pathways to reconnect and reconcile their relationship to the continent.

The current mismatches between educational trainings and market needs across the continent highlight the importance and necessity for intra-African labor mobility, as to capitalize on countries’ respective comparative advantages. The challenges around labor mobility on the continent are not necessarily due to the absence of policies but the multifaceted limitations that affect their implementation. Better understanding of labor market needs, and the required profiles. Lessons learnt from skills mobility initiatives must be used to address the perceptions surrounding labor migration through empirical evidence. For instance, “lump of labor fallacy” refers to the belief that there is a fixed amount of work available, which entails that the entrance of new workers into the labor force, such as migrants, would decrease the amount of work available to nationals. The African Union can be key in forging a common understanding around this sensitive issue among its member states, including through continental programs such as the Joint Programme on Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration in Africa (JLMP).

Furthermore, while it is true that African countries have common skills qualification frameworks, it is still necessary to harmonize existing qualification frameworks and strengthen mechanisms for the recognition of skills and qualifications. Finally, in acknowledging the migration and security interlinkages perceived by African governments, it is important to shift the narrative around labor mobility and free movement of persons in genera through more evidence-based analyses.

In the context of climate-induced mobility, the report emphasizes the need for interventions to be context-specific and emphasizes the importance of local engagement. For this, local engagement is key to ensure a meaningful impact of such initiatives. The participation of host communities in the design and implementation of actions is critical for migrants, and internally displaced people to be integrated into these communities. In contexts of climate vulnerability, despite the scarcity of resources that makes conflict very likely, such situations can be avoided if communities are fully on-board prior to any intervention.

<sup>30</sup> World Bank (2013) *Diaspora for Development in Africa*. Available here: <https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-8258-5>

<sup>31</sup> In the report, the term «brokers» pertains to intermediaries positioned between diasporas and various other stakeholders, notably the government, with the aim of enhancing their engagement. Examples of such brokers include the AfDB, international organizations, diaspora organizations, the private sector, and foundations.

Shifting towards a people-centered approach in response interventions is crucial. This shift means moving away from an exclusive focus on infrastructure towards strategies that invest in human capital. Such strategies should target affected populations in vulnerable situations who are displaced due to climate change and those who find themselves involuntary immobile.<sup>32</sup> However, for these aspects to be integrated into the interventions addressing climate-induced migration and displacement, it is essential to have inter-ministerial coordination. Such coordination can ensure widespread access to services that response actions align with policies across various areas.

One crucial research area pertains to examining how, within the context of climate vulnerability, displacement is changing host and origin communities in terms of transformation of cities, bringing about labor and economic opportunities, as well as other important social changes. This analysis would support a shift of narrative on migration, from migration as a failure to migration as a necessary adaptation strategy to climate and environmental changes, with the potential of transforming the social and economic landscapes of African countries.

These three chapters not only present evidence of the interconnectedness between the Humanitarian, Peace, and Development aspects but also recognize the significant role of mobility in the process of «building-back-better» in Africa. In recent years, migration has been at the core of global discussions. It has also been on top of the continental agenda with clear opportunities to spur sustainable development through skills, financial and social capital of the diaspora, as well as mitigation and adaptation strategies to crises linked to climate change and socio-political conflicts. There is a potential to maximize the benefits of labor mobility and unlock the human capital coming from diasporas both abroad and in other African countries. This approach should be inclusive, considering the needs of local populations and those in contexts vulnerable to climate change and fragility. Such an approach helps address the challenges outlined in the three chapters. Furthermore, by capitalizing on the human, social and cultural assets of diaspora communities, new avenues arise for tackling contemporary challenges, including those associated with climate-induced mobility, skills mismatches and brain circulation. This perspective goes beyond a narrow focus on remittances. Importantly, there is now a growing body of analyses linking mobility and displacement with climate change. It proves the relevance of continuing building bridges across these areas. The AfDB and IOM remain committed to supporting the continent in implementing and putting into action the recommendations that have emerged from this collaborative study initiative.

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<sup>1</sup> Involuntary immobile populations refer to those populations who would want to leave but are not able to do so because of a variety of reasons directly linked to – or compounded by – climate change, such as poverty, conflict, food insecurity, health issues, inequalities related to age, gender, socio-economic levels, and others. In the report, those populations who are least mobile or involuntary immobile are explained to often be the most vulnerable ones, as they have the fewest options to adapt or move.

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